Showing posts with label cerner. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cerner. Show all posts

Monday, June 16, 2014

Masters of the Obvious at Athens Regional Medical Center: Lack of clinician input, training, common sense created problems with Athens Regional electronic records system - but mostly lack of common sense


My early medical mentor, Dr. Victor P. Satinsky, had disdain for those whom he called "Masters of the Obvious", who proffered profound words of wisdom that were in fact common-sensical or well-accepted, as if they'd invented those words personally.

I think it's fair to say that after countless publications dating back decades, pointing out the essential role of clinical leadership in the development of clinical tools such as healthcare information technology systems, that such involvement is now a standard of care that reasonable hospital leadership would mandate when spending tens of millions of dollars on potentially injurious or lethal systems.

Yet the physician revolt at Athens Regional Medical Center appears to be a result of its most senior leadership not keeping IT leadership on an appropriately short leash (a phenomenon that falls under the topical heading of "severe mismanagement"):

http://onlineathens.com/local-news/2014-06-14/lack-input-training-created-problems-athens-regional-electronic-records-system 

Lack of input, training created problems with Athens Regional electronic records system

By Kelsey Cochran
Athens Banner-Herald
Updated Sunday, June 15, 2014 

More input in the way Athens Regional Health Systems’ electronic health records system was implemented should have come from the clinicians who use it every day, and fewer decisions should have been made by the hospital’s information technology department, a top hospital administrator and two vice presidents of system vendor Cerner Corp. said this week, in the wake of criticism of the system by a number of physicians.

... Although some daily users of the system were involved in the planning and design process from the beginning, Cerner Vice President Michael Robin, who has worked closely with ARMC since the deal was first made, said his team noticed midway through its implementation that the hospital system’s IT team was leading the project, which is "atypical" of Cerner clients like ARMC, he said.

First, I don't think that IT team control of health IT projects is all that unusual.   Clinicians, even medical informaticists with cross-disciplinary expertise, rarely are more than "internal consultants" who may be ignored, as opposed to true leaders with executive presence and authority (e.g., control of budgets, grants of authority, and IT staff performance evaluation, hire and fire authority).

Second, where was the Board of Directors?  They were ultimately responsible for allowing the IT leadership in at a level beyond their collective heads.

Third, it's just a bit odd that the leader of the (failed) $20 billion National Programme for IT in the NHS, Richard Granger, said almost exactly the same thing about listening to end-users ca. 2007 (see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/07/clinical-it-mayhem-is-good-for-it.html).  I as well as numerous other authors had similar observations, in some cases dating to the 1960's.  For example,  see my essays, some dating to the late 1990s at http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases, and Dr. Donald Lindberg's quotes from 1969 at the page below from Morris Collen's book "A History of Medical Informatics in the United States 1950-1990."


EHR pioneer Dr. Donald A.B. Lindberg (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/od/roster/lindberg.html), 1969:  "Computer engineering experts per se have virtually no idea of the real problems of medical or even of hospital practice, and furthermore have consistently underestimated the complexity of the problems ... in no cases can these jobs be done, simply because they have not been defined with a physician as the continuing major contributor and user of the information." (Click to enlarge)

The essential nature of clinicians actually having input (and at a leadership level) into the design and implementation of clinical tools such as health IT is patently obvious.  Only in the perverse control-mentality of business information technology (a.k.a. MIS or management information systems, see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/05/seedie-society-for-exorbitantly.html for the possible pre-electronic computer, tabulator-based roots of that culture) could such a precept even be questioned, let alone ignored.

... Moore, who took over as administrative lead on the electronic health record system after Thaw resigned, said some of the issues outlined in the physicians’ letter were real, and some were “theoretical.”

Translation: some of the complaints were accidents waiting to happen.

..."To the best of our knowledge, there was not patient harm or patient death.”

In other words, this is yet another story where the common, feel-good and ignorant refrain "but patient care has not been compromised" has reared its ugly head.  (I've made this type of claim a topical header at this blog.  See query link http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Patient%20care%20has%20not%20been%20compromised for others.)

Assuming that's true - note that the impact of bad health IT can be delayed due to delayed effects of bad or missing information - this statement is, let me be impolite, vacuous on its face.

vac·u·ous (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vacuous)

adjective \ˈva-kyə-wəs\
: having or showing a lack of intelligence or serious thought : lacking meaning, importance, or substance

It seems some simple facts apparently need to be explained to these geniuses.   I'll put it in caps just to make sure they understand some basic issues:

  • A HOSPITAL IS NOT A PLACE FOR RISKY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EXPERIMENTATION.   UNNECESSARY RISK IN HEALTHCARE IS A VERY, VERY BAD THING.
  • THE GOAL OF HOSPITALS IS NOT TO SUBJECT PATIENTS TO RISK VIA MISMANAGEMENT OF HEALTHCARE IT, AND THEN PROCLAIM "NOBODY WAS INJURED OR KILLED" AFTER THE PERPETRATORS OF THE MISMANAGEMENT ARE UPROOTED.
  • CLINICIANS DO NOT TOIL IN HOSPITALS TAKING CARE OF SICK PATIENTS SO THAT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PERSONNEL CAN HAVE COMFY JOBS AND COOL COMPUTERS.

One wonders if these points might be above the intellectual pay grade of those running hospitals - including boards - in 2014.

If nobody was injured or killed, it was due to happenstance, not due to appropriate due diligence and adherence to the standards of care essential in this healthcare sector - that is, healthcare information technology.

Depending on happenstance is not a good healthcare management strategy.

-- SS

Monday, May 12, 2014

Cerner: "It’s in the DNA of our company to have the vision and passion to fix what’s broken in health care." Maybe they should fix their software first?

I point out this hyper-exuberant piece on health IT in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

Clearly someone at Cerner thinks they're going to cure the world with "population health" and their computer software:

With its Healthy Nevada initiative, Cerner Corp. cultivates a culture of health
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Diane Stafford,  Kansas City Star
May 11, 2014

http://www.stltoday.com/news/special-reports/mohealth/updates/with-its-healthy-nevada-initiative-cerner-corp-cultivates-a-culture/article_8cc3168f-fd9f-5e7e-ba80-cc05dd6a35f9.html

Cerner Corp. employees started visiting Nevada, Mo., in 2011, looking to adopt a community as a testing ground for theories to control skyrocketing medical costs.

At the outset, “our discussions were marked by a lot of confusion,” recalled City Manager John David Kehrman. “We thought of Cerner as a data company. We didn’t understand what they wanted.”

The North Kansas City-based company, grown to global prominence by selling health care information technology to hospitals and doctors, aimed to reach a broader audience with a message: You have to take more responsibility for your own health.

... the company’s bigger evolution is that it’s investing millions in its next-generation software, dubbed Healthe Intent, which tracks individual and group health and treatment results. It re-imagines jobs in the health care industry and eventually will reach into patients’ homes.

If the initiatives blossom, Cerner executives believe they will boost the company’s revenue by billions of dollars a year ... “Cerner’s founders never saw themselves being a health care IT company,” Swindells asserted. “They saw themselves fixing health care.”

Wow.  That's a neat trick for a health IT company.

(As I asked of health IT company CEOs making similar statements back at a 1997-or-so Microsoft Healthcare Users Group meeting, "How are you going to revolutionize healthcare when you and nearly everyone at this meeting has no actual healthcare experience?"  They had no rational answer.  See "Broken Chord", Healthcare Informatics, Feb. 1999, archived at this link.)

I won't comment further on the content of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch piece, which is marketing agitprop.  It's their right to produce such material, after all.  Read it for yourself and learn of our glorious Cerner-driven health utopia.

I will comment, however, on one line in the piece, namely:

... “It’s in the DNA of our company to have the vision and passion to fix what’s broken in health care,” said Matthew Swindells, Cerner’s head of population health and global strategy.

Considering the broken health IT this company introduces into the market upon unsuspecting physicians, nurses and patients [e.g., see notes 1-6], perhaps they should consider fixing what's broken in health IT before releasing to market, and certainly before attempting to tackle the infinitely harder task of "fixing what's broken in health care."

-- SS

Notes:

[1]  November 17, 2013. "Another 'Survey' on EHRs - Affinity Medical Center Nurses Warn That Serious Patient Complications 'Only a Matter of Time' in Open Letter", http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/11/another-survey-on-ehrs-affinity-medical.html
  
[2] January 19, 2012. "[British MP] Bacon calls for halt on [Cerner] Millennium", http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/acute-care/7471/bacon-calls-for-halt-on-millennium

[3]  January 21, 2011.  "MAUDE and HIT Risks: What in God's Name is Going on Here? [Cerner health IT defects reports]", http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html

[4]  March 4, 2011. "A study of an Enterprise Health information System [Cerner Firstnet]", Prof. Jon Patrick, Univ. of Sydney, http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/~hitru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=146

[5] Oct. 20, 2010.  "Medical center has more than 6000 "issues" with Cerner CPOE system in four months", http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/10/medical-center-has-more-than-6000.html

[6] 2009.  "The National Programme for IT in the NHS: Progress since 2006 - Public Accounts Committee" [on Lorenzo and Cerner Millenium], UK National Programme for Health IT in the NHS (now defunct), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubacc/153/15304.htm


Friday, May 9, 2014

EHR Story for Mother's Day 2014: Even The Formerly Simple Act Of Giving IV Fluids in ICU's Can Kill Babies. But's Let's Be Objective and Happy!

[Note to the humorless:  this post is satirical and sardonic to make a very serious point about the perversity of downplaying/ignoring health IT risks, issues too often ignored by those who know better.  If you don't like satire, don't read it.]

I've been critiqued for posting in too gloomy a manner for some's taste, even those who like me are in the Medical Informatics field.  For example, in the Feb. 2013 Kaiser Health News article "Health Technology’s ‘Essential Critic’ Warns Of Medical Mistakes" at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/february/18/scot-silverstein-health-information-technology.aspx:

... Many say he comes on too strong. Even admirers cringed when he began blogging about the 2011 death of his mother, which he blames in a lawsuit on a computer error that allegedly caused Abington Memorial Hospital to overlook a key medication. (Both he and the hospital said they couldn’t comment on a pending suit.) Personalizing his campaign, some thought, made him seem less objective.

Of course, if a close relative of these unnamed "many" were killed by, say, a drunk driver (something this unobjective group of mothers takes seriously:  http://www.madd.org/), or if their child were abducted and decapitated (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Adam_Walsh), or if something like this event (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55XJivhjB4U) happened, their response would surely be "oh well, stuff happens, let's all be 'objective', not 'personalize' things, not advocate with our personal stories, and above all, be happy!   

 

I really do admire the unnamed "many" for their ability to detach, so am presenting the following story of "anecdotal" patient harm to a child in a pediatric ICU in the spirit of happiness, joy, and Mother's Day love!




Here's the event we should all be happy about, reported via FDA - I note the FDA's said these devices are not "sufficiently risky" to warrant a high level of their attention even though they secretly admitted in an internal memo that there's no way to really know te true level of risk and harm (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/fda-on-health-it-risk-reckless-or.html), so clearly they're all a really jolly bunch:

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/medsun/medsun_details.cfm?id=117690

FDA MedSun report

Type of device: medical device data system
Device brand name: PowerChart
Device manufacturer's name: Cerner Corporation
Date of this report: (mm/dd/yyyy) 03/04/2014

Describe the event or problem:    

Medication Error.
This event was related to Health Information Technology. Specifically, the manner in which the system processed an order for free water replacement. Order was intended to be 20ml/hr for 6 hours for a total of 120ml. It was a 1000 ml bag so first they put 20ml/hr which would have defaulted the infuse over time to 50 hrs. They tried to change the infuse over to 6 hours which then changes the ml/hr rate to 167 ml/hr. They did not notice this had changed. 

Well, that's WONDERFUL!!  :-)  that the computer recalculates the flow rate for them when they change the infusion time, by paternalistically assuming that's what they wanted to do - change the RATE of infusion - when what they actually did is manually change the TIME (duration) of infusion. 

How LOVELY of some programmer to have given them this FANTASTIC convenience!!

Aren't computers wonderful!!!

Even the following should not be cause for ardent technophiles to wipe the smile from their downside-ignoring faces!!

... They did not realize that they needed to go into details tab to show the time frame so the patient got 167ml/hr instead of 20ml/hr for 6 hours. 

How obvious!!!  Every doctor, nurse, medical student and janitor knows from time immemorial knows you have to go into the detail tab to show the time frame!  (Smile)

... Order was verified by pharmacy and administered at that rate via peripheral IV. After approximately 1L of fluid had infused, patient showed seizure activity.  PICU (pediatric ICU) team called to bedside. Treatment provided for seizures and critical sodium and potassium. 

Awww ...  some seizures and critical sodium and potassium levels in the PICU.  Awww.....too bad!!!  We should be happy anyway!  For if this child died...the sacrifice would have been WORTH IT for the betterment of electronic medical records worldwide, and the parents no doubt would be flattered and joyous about their contribution to computing science.  After all, how better to figure out how to make this technology work??

After all, it takes a few broken eggs to make an omelette, and a few bumps in the road (like grave mounds) should be of little concern.

Because, remember ... w.e. c.a.r.e!


i c.a.r.e!!!!  As at U. Arizona Healthcare System, let's only use Happy Words with our patients about these systems! (click to enlarge, see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/10/words-that-work-singing-only-positive.html )

Further, we should use only Words That Work to describe the wonders of these systems in their current state!!!


Some flowers from Cerner CEO Patterson to momma to make up for her little baby having seizures and critically deranged potassium and sodium levels from those big, bad doctors' EHR mistake!

... The Cerner powerchart software system has functionality for continuous medications/fluid ordering that does not prevent "user error." 

Ut oh ... Looks like I'm going to have to be a sourpuss for just a moment and re-introduce the nasty, ill-tempered, non-objective idea of what the dastardly National Institute of Technology and Standards (NIST) calls "use error" (as opposed to "user error", A.K.A. "Blame the User",  http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/nist-on-ehr-mission-hostile-user.html):

... The EUP (EHR usability protocol) emphasis should be on ensuring that necessary and sufficient usability validation and remediation has been conducted so that use error [3] is minimized.

[3] “Use error” is a term used very specifically to refer to user interface designs that will engender users to make errors of commission or omission. It is true that users do make errors, but many errors are due not to user error per se but due to designs that are flawed, e.g., poorly written messaging [or lack of messaging, e.g., no warnings of potentially dangerous actions - ed.], misuse of color-coding conventions [see below], omission of information, etc.

Awwwwww....aren't I just mean and non-objective?




That mean doctor Silverstein's just not happy and objective!!  Bad, bad, bad man!

... When the provider orders the fluid, example is D5W, the screen opens to a "continuous details" ordering window. Within the screen, the ordering provider is presented with a preselected bag volume and type of fluid with a brownish background. They have the ability to modify bag volume but it was made this color to discourage that change by Cerner. 

Golly gee!  There's something to be happy about once again!  Brown, the universally-understood color, in any language, means "Warning, do not change this value, it could kill someone!!!" See how GOOD this technology really is!!!  Why use alerts and confirmation dialogs when a mere COLOR like brown suffices!!

... The rate and "infuse over" fields are a yellow color to show that they need to be completed. The intent [of the programmer, clearly an expert in human-computer interaction and communication by color and smoke signals - ed.] is for an ongoing continuous fluid and not to limit the time. 

Golly Gee Times Two!  Yellow, the absolutely universal color for "Warning, you need to complete this to prevent killing someone!"  


Yellow!  Don't you just think every time you see this color that "warning, you need to complete data entry to avoid killing someone?  Who needs WORDS?

It's all so CLEAR!!!!

... Providers can misinterpret this field to mean the length of time they want the order to infuse over, when the system intent for that field is to be the system-calculated length of time until the next bag supply will need to be sent to maintain the continuous infusion. 

See how simple!!!!   Isn't it OBVIOUS!!!!

The completed fields turn white. Cerner does not have an intermittent fluid administration order [who the hell needs that, says Cerner and the hospital executives who bought this package for the PICU!! Never a need for that in ICU's!! - ed] so providers are expected to go to a second tab, the "details" tab, where they have the options for identifying the duration of the infusion in terms of # doses or time. If the provider does not have awareness of this intent and modifies the "infuse over" field from the "continuous details" tab, they may inadvertently order a higher rate than intended.


Ha ha!  Those silly doctors can't even figure out a simple thing like that!!  What stooges they are!!

NYUK NYUK NYUK ... Hey Moe!!  Those silly doctors and nurses cannot understand the simple fact that Cerner does not have an intermittent fluid administration order so providers are expected to go to a second tab, the "details" tab, where they have the options for identifying the duration of the infusion in terms of # doses or time. If the provider does not have awareness of this intent and modifies the "infuse over" field from the "continuous details" tab, they may inadvertently order a higher rate than intended. 

See how much FUN health IT problems can be?  After all, in this ANECDOTAL case, all that happened was:

The device(s) may have caused or contributed to: Potential for patient harm, Serious Injury

But nobody died of this particular problem (that we know of), so this technology is SAFE!!!!





Happy mother's day!!!

--------------------

Additional not-so-funny thought:  depending on brown, yellow etc. instead of clear, written alerts/warnings, plus the fact that the system likely "knew" the weight of the child and should have alerted that the infusion of a liter was a very dangerous thing, reflect Bad Health IT on its face:

Bad Health IT ("BHIT") is ill-suited to purpose, hard to use, unreliable, loses data or provides incorrect data, is difficult and/or prohibitively expensive to customize to the needs of different medical specialists and subspecialists, causes cognitive overload, slows rather than facilitates users, lacks appropriate alerts, creates the need for hypervigilance (i.e., towards avoiding IT-related mishaps) that increases stress, is lacking in security, compromises patient privacy or otherwise demonstrates suboptimal design and/or implementation.  

Had I been a pre-marketing tester of this system working for FDA, those fluid-ordering characteristics would have been changed before the system would have been released to market.

Oh, wait ... there is no premarketing testing process for health IT, and FDA, via advice from the FDASIA committees as in the linked FDA-related post above, writes that none is really needed.

And who wants to damage TRUE INNOVATIONS like this - turning something that takes 5 seconds for a clinician to write, "D5W, 20 ml/hr x 6 hrs" (meaning dextrose 5% in water, 20 milliliters per hour for 6 hours) into a cryptic and muddled exercise with tabs, colors and numerous caveats - via regulation?

-- SS

Sunday, November 17, 2013

Another 'Survey' on EHRs - Affinity Medical Center (Ohio) Nurses Warn That Serious Patient Complications "Only a Matter of Time" in Open Letter

I've written previously about substantial problems nurses at Affinity Medical Center, Ohio (http://www.affinitymedicalcenter.com/) and other organizations are having with EHRs, and how hospital executives were ignoring their complaints.  The complaints have been made openly, I believe, in large part due to the protection afforded by nurses' unions.

See for example my July 2013 post "RNs Say Sutter’s New Electronic System Causing Serious Disruptions to Safe Patient Care at East Bay Hospitals" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/rns-say-sutters-new-electronic-system.html (there are links there to still more examples), and my June 2013 post  "Affinity RNs Call for Halt to Flawed Electronic Medical Records System Scheduled to Go Live Friday" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/06/affinity-rns-call-for-halt-to-flawed.html, along with links therein to other similar situations.

Particularly see my July 2013 post "How's this for patient rights? Affinity Medical Center manager: file a safety complaint, and I'll plaster it to your head!" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/hows-this-for-patient-rights-affinity.html, where a judge had to intervene in a situation of apparent employee harassment for complaints about patient safety risks.

Here's the latest at Affinity Medical Center - an open letter to the Chief Nursing Officer (CNO) dated August 15, 2013.  Images and text below:


Page 1 - click to enlarge (text is below)




Page 2 - click to enlarge (text is below)

The letter to the CNO states (emphases and comments in red italics are mine):

August 15, 2013

Mr. Osterman,

Nurses at Affinity Medical Center are pleased to see that you have responded to our request and provided additional Cerner education classes, but education was only one of many concerns. [I note that education cannot compensate for the toxic effects of bad health IT that is poorly designed and/or poorly implemented, and that it's legally the responsibility of a hospital to ensure all apparatuses implemented and the environment of care are themselves safe - ed.]

Since the implementation nurses throughout the hospital have brought many serious concerns to the attention of both yourself and other supervisors.  When nurses have reported these concerns they have been either ignored or dismissed. It is distressing that Affinity would so blatantly disregard the concern of their RN staff surrounding issues that concern patient safety.  It is clear to direct-care RNs that many of the problems that exist with Cerner are a direct result of the failure to include nurses in the planning stages. [Exclusion of enduser domain experts from health IT development, in 2013, is grossly negligent IMO - ed.]

Some of the concerns that nurses have brought to the attention of management include:

  • Medication errors/scanning issues - perhaps the biggest concern of all RNs 
  • RNs unable to access patient records for hours at  a time
  • Incorrect descriptors and inaccurate drop-down menus
  • Incorrect calculations in the I&O [fluid input and output, especially important in very ill patients - ed.] and MAP [mean arterial pressure, used to calculate drip rates of potent drugs that raise or lower blood pressure in critical care, among other things - ed.] portions of the chart 
  • Inaccurate medication times and the inability of RNs to ensure medications are scheduled correctly
  • Endless loops of computer prompts that are unable to be dismissed by RNs in an emergency 

[It should be apparent that these 'issues' - some due to fundamental design flaws - are quite serious in terms of the harm they can cause, even with the exceptional and stressful RN hyper-vigilance their presence necessitates- ed.]
 
These threats to patient safety cannot continue.  It is only a matter of time before a communication error or a medication error lead to a serious complication for a patient.  These types of errors have the ability to harm every patient and must be addressed immediately. 

[This is not theoretical or unlikely.  Such an error led to my own mother's crippling injuries and death, and to injuries and deaths in numerous other cases of which I am aware through my legal work - ed.]

We ask that you set up a meeting with a delegation of RNs from our Facility Bargaining Council to discuss the concerns that nurses have documented on 'Technology Despite Objection' forms [complaint forms about use of technology with objections - ed.] and make a plan to fix these life-threatening problems.

You may set up a meeting by contacting Pam Gardner, RN at [redacted] or our National Representative  Michelle Mahon, RN.  [For the National Nurses United labor union, http://www.nationalnursesunited.org/, with close to 185,000 members nationwide - ed.]  We look forward to hearing from you.

The letter is followed by the signatures of about 70 nurses.

I am informed by a Union rep in mid-November 2013, 3 months after the date of this letter, that (emphasis mine):

Nurses there are continuing to document the problems and concerns that they are experiencing.  I have attached a letter sent to the CNO at Affinity signed by nearly 70 RNs.  This is a pretty significant number of nurses especially in light of the fact that managers stole the circulating letter two times to prevent nurses from signing on.  The response to this letter was…….nothing.  The nurses have been ignored yet again. [Ellipsis in the original, I did not redact - ed.] 

It is clear the administration of this healthcare system has been explicitly put on notice of likely if not imminent danger to patients by multiple qualified experts, its own RNs.  If they do not act and patient harm occurs, it is my belief criminal negligence charges could be merited.

I also highly doubt patients are informed of these EHR system 'issues' and have been afforded the opportunity to give informed consent to the use of these computer systems in their care, or to go elsewhere for treatment.

These problems are repeating themselves over and over across this country and others, but many clinicians, especially those not protected to some degree by a labor union, do not speak out due to fear of retaliation.

Let's hope the nurses who signed this letter don't get their complaints plastered to their foreheads, as some were threatened with as in the aforementioned post.

-- SS

Saturday, November 9, 2013

"We’ve resolved 6,036 issues and have 3,517 open issues": Extolling EPIC EHR Virtues at University of Arizona Health System

The public may believe that, in healthcare, only the Obamacare insurance exchange website has lots of bugs.  On those, see my Oct. 10. 2013 post "Drudge Report, Oct. 10, 2013, 9 AM EST: All that needs to be said about government, computing and healthcare" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/10/drudge-report-oct-10-2013-9-am-est-all.html.

Another pillar of the Affordable Care Act, electronic medical records (promoted with incentives for adopters and with penalties for non-adopters via the HITECH section of the 2009 economic recovery act or ARRA) are pretty damn bad themselves.  Only, those systems don't make it hard to find insurance.  Through bugs and other features of bad health IT, they directly interfere with safety and provision of quality care:

Bad Health IT ("BHIT") is ill-suited to purpose, hard to use, unreliable, loses data or provides incorrect data, is difficult and/or prohibitively expensive to customize to the needs of different medical specialists and subspecialists, causes cognitive overload, slows rather than facilitates users, lacks appropriate alerts, creates the need for hypervigilance (i.e., towards avoiding IT-related mishaps) that increases stress, is lacking in security, compromises patient privacy or otherwise demonstrates suboptimal design and/or implementation. 

At my Oct. 20, 2010 post "Medical center has more than 6000 'issues' with Cerner CPOE system in four months - has patient harm resulted?" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/10/medical-center-has-more-than-6000.html) I observed:

From the October 2010 "News for Physicians affiliated with Munson Medical Center" newsletter, a large medical center in Northern Michigan, about more than six thousand "issues" with their Cerner CPOE.

... One wonders how many of those 6,000, and how many of the 600 remaining "issues" fall into categories of "likely to cause patient harm in short term if uncorrected" or "may cause in patient harm in medium or long term."

I note that Cerner CPOE is not a new product, nor are similar products from other vendors also afflicted with long lists of "issues." That there could be more than 6,000 "issues" at a new site suggests deep rooted, severe problems with CPOE specifically and health IT design and implementation processes in general.

Here's another such multi-"issue"-laden EHR, this at University of Arizona Health Network.  Image of frequent periodic "EHR Update" below.



"We’ve resolved 6,036 issues and have 3,517 open issues."

[Ignore the 'kewl dark sunglasses' worn by the hipsters at the top of this announcement.  Not sure if this has something to do with EPIC, but I consider the wearing of dark sunglasses by clinicians or any other staff in a hospital setting - where people are sick and/or dying - to be in exceptionally bad taste.]

The text starts:

ISSUES UPDATE as of 4:00 p.m., Nov. 8
We’ve resolved 6,036 issues and have 3,517 open issues.

That's a total of nearly ten thousand "issues."  As of now, that is.  "Issue" is a euphemism for "glitch" a.k.a. "software defect" and/or "implementation error", see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch.

These "issues" are  in a supposedly "mature" product for which this organization has spent enormous sums of money, that has undergone "innovation" for several decades now - in an environment free from regulation, I might add.

Many of the "issues" reduce patient safety, and could or already may have resulted in patient harm.  Such items on this listing, seen below, which is updated frequently, include:
    • Pharmacy Medication Mapping Errors – Making good progress: watch for further notices.  [Perhaps these should have been tested and fixed before go-live? - ed.]
    • Microbiology Results Mapping Incorrectly [does that mean "mapping" to the wrong patient? - ed.]  – all known errors fixed, monitoring and working on enhancements. [As above, perhaps these should have been tested and fixed before go-live? - ed.]
    • Prescription printing - output for prescription printing has been fixed
    • Refill requests for providers will be routed to the CLIN SUPPORT In Basket pool for the provider’s department.  This was a decision made by UAHN leadership. [Not sure why this is being done; perhaps for approval by managers? - ed.] 
    • Errors transmitting prescriptions will also be sent to the CLIN SUPPORT In Basket.  [Errors transmitting prescriptions? That's not reassuring regarding data integrity.  See ECRI report below  - ed.]

      This is not to mention that all of the "reminders" that follow are a distraction to clinical personnel, who cannot be expected to remember all of them.

      Bad as this is, at my April 1, 2012 post "University of Arizona Medical Center, $10 million in the red in operations, to spend $100M on new EHR system" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/04/university-of-arizona-medical-center-10.html) I observed that:

      ... $100 million+ is probably enough to pay for AN ENTIRE NEW HOSPITAL or hospital wing ... or a lot of human medical records professionals.

      To add more bitter icing to this cake, I wrote about a campaign for clinicians to speak only in wonderful terms about the new U. Arizona Health System EHR at my Oct. 3, 2013 post "Words that Work: Singing Only Positive - And Often Unsubstantiated - EHR Praise As 'Advised' At The University Of Arizona Health Network."  I observed the following about the "words that work" is the shameless 'suggested' script:

      • Efficient - see aforementioned links as well as "Common Examples of Healthcare IT Difficulties" at http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/

      • Convenient - as above.  According to whom?  Compared to what?  Pen and paper?

      • Improves patient safety and quality - see IOM report post at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html .  We as a nation are only now studying safety of this technology, and the results are not looking entirely convincing, e.g. ECRI Deep Dive Study of health IT safety at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html.  171 health IT mishaps in 36 hospitals, voluntarily reported over 9 weeks, with 8 reported injuries and 3 reported possible deaths is not what I would call something that "improves patient safety and quality" without qualifications.

      • The Cadillac of its kind - according to whom?

      • Patients at hospitals using this system love it -  Do most patients even know what it, or any EHR, looks like?  Have they provided informed consent to its use?

      • Exciting - clinician surveys such as by physicians at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/honest-physician-survey-on-ehrs.html and by nurses at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/candid-nurse-opinions-on-ehrs-at.html shed doubt on that assertion.

      • The best thing for our patients - again, according to whom?

      • Sophisticated new system - "New"?  Not so much, just new for U. Arizona Health.  "Sophisticated", as if that's a virtue?  Too much "sophistication" is in part what causes clinician stress and burnout, raising risk

      Considering the near 10,000 issues, the new ECRI Institute report "Top Ten Technology Hazards in Healthcare", 2014 edition comes to mind (https://www.ecri.org/Press/Pages/2014_Top_Ten_Hazards.aspx).  Named in that report, as has been the case for the past several years, is healthcare IT. 

      This year's problem description is:

      #4. Data Integrity Failures in EHRs and other Health IT Systems

      "Data integrity failures" include "issues" (per the bad health IT description) such as: data loss, data corruption, data attributed to the wrong patient, etc.

      ECRI Institute, a nonprofit organization, dedicates itself to bringing the discipline of applied scientific research to healthcare to discover which medical procedures, devices, drugs, and processes are best to enable improved patient care. As pioneers in this science for 45 years, ECRI Institute marries experience and independence with the objectivity of evidence-based research. Strict conflict-of-interest guidelines ensure objectivity. ECRI Institute is designated an Evidence-based Practice Center by the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. ECRI Institute PSO is listed as a federally certified Patient Safety Organization by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. For more information, visit www.ecri.org.

      ECRI also produced the 2012 Deep Dive Study of Health IT Risk (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html), where in a volunteer study at 36 member PSO hospitals, 171 health IT "mishaps" were reported in just 9 weeks, 8 of which caused patient injury and 3 of which may have contribute to patient death.

      In summary, The University of Arizona Health System, with components in the red, is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on an EHR system, that has had decades to mature. Yet, they are finding 10,000 "issues" already, a number of which reduce patient safety and are unresolved, with many more likely to be found.

      They are also 'advising' their staff to speak in glowing, unsubstantiated terms to patients about an EHR system that has 10,000 issues, and not seeking patient consent to its use in mediating and regulating their care - or giving elective patients the information that might allow them to choose another less "buggy" hospital.

      If (when) patient harm results from such cavalier hospital (mis)management, the juries are going to just love the dark sunglasses, I bet.

      -- SS

      Friday, June 21, 2013

      Monetary losses and layoffs from EHR expenses and EHR mismanagement

      More on monetary losses and layoffs from EHR expenses and EHR mismanagement:

      1.  Layoffs to balance the budget...

      http://www.news-record.com/news/local_news/article_da765340-d912-11e2-9eac-001a4bcf6878.html

      ... Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center [Winston-Salem, NC] said in November 2012, that it would cut 950 jobs — 6 percent of its total staff.

      Electronic records programs continue to push costs higher. The Winston-Salem Journal reported that Wake Forest’s Epic [EHR] program caused $8 million in work interruptions during the 2012-2013 year alone. Wake Forest is cutting costs at least through June 30 to make up for some of Epic’s expense. Its efforts include furloughs, wage reductions and other cuts.


      2.  Cerner EHR Project Loses U.K. Hospital 18 Million Pounds

      http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/electronic-medical-records/ehr-project-loses-uk-hospital-18-million/240157036

      ... Royal Berkshire Foundation Trust's implementation of Cerner Millennium electronic health record system is costly to maintain and hard to use, causing patient backlogs ... British hospital's attempt to implement an electronic health record (EHR) system has been so disastrous that it has had to write off £18 million ($28 million).


      ... "Unfortunately, implementing the [EHR] system has at times been a difficult process and we acknowledge that we did not fully appreciate the challenges and resources required in a number of areas," said the hospital's chief executive, Ed Donald. 

      In 2013, I find the statement "we did not fully appreciate the challenges and resources required in a number of areas" remarkable.

      Dear Mr. Donald, please allow me to introduce you to a novel concept:

      A Google search.  (Free, no less.)

      Try this, for example:  https://www.google.com/search?q=healthcare%20IT%20failure

      (I note that competent experts in my field, Medical Informatics, given appropriate executive presence - including hiring and firing authority, instead of the usual 'internal consultant' roles - could have prevented your organization's mistakes, and for a mere fraction of the £18 million.)

      A campaign against public sector waste in Britain, The Taxpayer's Alliance, has seized on the hobbled project as an especially egregious example of bad procurement. "[NHS] trusts must work a lot harder to get a good deal for the taxpayers footing the bill," it warned.  [I guess money doesn't grow on trees in the UK as it seems to in the US -ed.]

      The row comes in the same week British Parliament members expressed frustration that the funding scheme that supported other British hospitals' investment in EHRs, the controversial £9.8 billion ($15.2 billion) National Program for IT cancelled in 2011, continues to cost the country millions, with contracts in some cases not set to expire for 12 more years. [NPfIT in the NHS - see query link http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/NPfIT - ed.]

      Berkshire, however, opted out of that program in 2008 and had instead linked with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center to help it implement Millennium.

      I am merely the messenger here...

      -- SS

      Wednesday, October 3, 2012

      Honesty and Good Sense on Electronic Medical Records From Down Under

      Australians seem to not be as seduced by the Siren Song of cybernetic miracles as health IT leaders in the United States.

      It took an Australian computer scientist at U. Sydney to dissect and perform a detailed analysis of the internals of an American EHR system, the results of which were disturbing to say the least.  This was a task the American members of the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) should have taken on.  It's not as if they're unaware of clinical IT problems.

      It also seems to take a group of Australian researchers at the Univ. of New South Wales, the Australian Patient Safety Foundation, and the University of South Australia to perform a forensic analysis on U.S. data in the FDA's Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database, instead of Americans themselves. 

      At least AMIA allowed the Australians the opportunuty to present their findings.

      In "Patient Safety Problems Associated with Heathcare Information Technology: an Analysis of Adverse Events Reported to the US Food and Drug Administration" (free fulltext at this link), AMIA Annual Symposium Proceedings 2011;2011:853-7 the Australian researchers including Medical Informaticist and critical thinker Dr. Enrico Coiera (see here) analyzed healthcare information technology (HIT) events associated with patient harm submitted to the MAUDE database:

      We downloaded all 899,768 reports that were submitted to MAUDE from January 2008 to July 2010 and searched for events using a broad definition of HIT as “hardware or software that is used to electronically create, maintain, analyse, store, receive, or otherwise aid in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, and that is not an integral part of (1) an implantable device or (2) medical equipment.” We retrieved and classified 678 reports describing 436 unique events using a previously published methodology. Of the 436 HIT-related events that we examined, 11% (n=46) were associated with patient harm [this excludes the "near misses" - ed.] ... In this paper we specifically focus on examining the 46 events where HIT problems were associated with patient harm.

      These submissions are voluntary, and due to systematic, severe impediments to submissions as below, this data likely represents a very small fraction ("tip of the iceberg" per FDA itself, link) of the true incidence of these events.  See the addendum to this post "Systematic impediments to voluntary reporting of health IT risks."

      Summarizing the Australian researchers' findings (read the entire paper at the link above):


      Medication problems represented 41% of the events of these types:

      • Wrong patient
      • Wrong dose or overdose
      • Missed and delayed doses

      Clinical process problems
      represented 33% of the events:
      • Use errors in entering information ("use error" is an error due to poor and confusing design, as opposed to "user errors")
      • Poor functionality of CPOE and PACS

      Exposure to radiation occurred in 15% of the events

      Surgery problems occurred in 11% of the events.

      The authors recommended that "strategies to improve the safety of HIT should focus on designing safe user interfaces, integrated checks of key identifiers and decision support, and engineering safer clinical processes."

      Unfortunately, that does not appear to be occurring in the U.S. to any significant degree.  "Certification" of health IT to meet government criteria for financial incentives is unrelated to such measures and is in my view symptomatic of industry regulatory capture (see here and here).  The IOM itself has instituted a "watch and wait" policy, a likely unique special accommodation in current regulation of medical devices (see here).

      I reiterate this MAUDE data is voluntary and the impediments to its reporting systematic and severe.  See addendum to this post.

      In the category of good sense on electronic medical records, I note the following articles:

      Victoria aims for more open ICT strategy 

      Pulse+IT Magazine
      Kate McDonald
      02 October 2012

      The newly formed Victorian Information and Communications Technology Advisory Committee (VITAC) has released a draft strategy (PDF) describing how the state government should manage and use ICT to better provide government services.

      The strategy recommends that the government engage more closely with the ICT sector and move away from customised products in favour of existing market offerings.

      ... It recommends that the government engage with the ICT market early in the procurement lifecycle. “We will avoid being locked into single suppliers by favouring open standards and will be open to any qualified ICT provider regardless of size. Procurement of ICT services will be made more efficient.”

      The strategy should also provide guidance to agencies to move away from customised major ICT developments and use existing market offerings with little or no customisation instead.

      What this means is abandoning the approach of large, single-source (monolithic), proprietary clinical information systems from large health IT vendors that try to cover everything, in favor of smaller, open standards-based "best-of-breed" applications (from vendors of all sizes) that can be woven together to meet users' needs:

      The subsequent fallout from the Ombudsman's report led to the Victorian government cancelling several programs, including the $323 million HealthSMART program, an ambitious project to roll out common eHealth infrastructure throughout Victoria's public health services.

      This included implementing iSOFT's (now CSC) i.PM patient administration system and Cerner's clinical information system in its hospitals, as well as InterSystems' TrakCare platform for community health agencies.

      I note that another article in eHealth Insider mentions the same strategy in the UK, "Winchester switches off Cerner in ED":

      The Royal Hampshire County Hospital in Winchester has switched off Cerner Millennium in A&E and moved to Patient First.  The electronic patient record system will also be switched off for theatres and order communications at the old Winchester and Eastleigh Healthcare NHS Trust ... Basingstoke and North Hampshire was pursuing an alternative IT strategy, built around a 'best of breed' approach to building on its existing systems.

      The U.S. has yet to learn these lessons, and will likely repeat the same mistakes at the cost of hundreds of billions of dollars.

      Unfortunately, I have no answers.  I see no way to avoid it, considering the HITECH momentum that favors the large-vendor monolithic product model.

      -- SS

      --------------------------------------

      Addendum.  Systematic impediments to voluntary reporting of health IT risks:

      From the 2010 FDA internal memo on health IT risks:

      Limitations of the MAUDE search and final subset of MDRs include the following:

      1.  Not all H-IT safety issue MDRs can be captured due to limitations of reporting practices including:

      ... (a) Vast number of H-IT systems that interface with multiple medical devices currently assigned to multiple procodes making it difficult to identify specific procodes for H-IT safety issues;
      ... (b) Procode assignments are also affected by the ability of the reporter/contractor to correctly identify the event as a H-IT safety issue;
      ... (c) Correct identification by the reporter of the suspect device brand name is challenged by difficulties discerning the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.

      2.  Due to incomplete information in the MDRs, it is difficult to unduplicate similar reports, potentially resulting in a higher number of reports than actual events.

      3.  Reported death and injury events may only be associated with the reported device but not necessarily attributed to the device.

      4.  Correct identification by the reporter of the manufacturer name is convoluted by the inability to discern the manufacturer of the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.

      5.  The volume of MDR reporting to MAUDE may be impacted by a lack of understanding the reportability of H-IT safety issues and enforcement of such reporting.

      From the 2012 IOM report on health IT safety:

      ... While some studies suggest improvements in patient safety can be made, others have found no effect. Instances of health IT–associated harm have been reported. However, little published evidence could be found quantifying the magnitude of the risk.

      Several reasons health IT–related safety data are lacking include the
      absence of measures and a central repository (or linkages among decentralized repositories) to collect, analyze, and act on information related to safety of this technology. Another impediment to gathering safety data is contractual barriers (e.g., nondisclosure, confidentiality clauses) that can prevent users from sharing information about health IT–related adverse events. These barriers limit users’ abilities to share knowledge of risk-prone user interfaces, for instance through screenshots and descriptions of potentially unsafe processes. In addition, some vendors include language in their sales contracts and escape responsibility for errors or defects in their software (i.e., “hold harmless clauses”). The committee believes these types of contractual restrictions limit transparency, which significantly contributes to the gaps in knowledge of health IT–related patient safety risks. These barriers to generating evidence pose unacceptable risks to safety.
      … “For example, the number of patients who receive the correct medication in hospitals increases when these hospitals implement well-planned, robust computerized prescribing mechanisms and use barcoding systems. But even in these instances, the ability to generalize the results across the health care system may be limited. For other products— including electronic health records, which are being employed with more and more frequency— some studies find improvements in patient safety, while other studies find no effect.

      More worrisome, some case reports suggest that poorly designed health IT can create new hazards
      in the already complex delivery of care. Although the magnitude of the risk associated with health IT is not known, some examples illustrate the concerns. Dosing errors, failure to detect life-threatening illnesses, and delaying treatment due to poor human–computer interactions or loss of data have led to serious injury and death.”

      Not knowing the magnitude of the risks is an effect of the impediments, and does not represent a good environment for national implementation in my view.

      I also add "fear of medical malpractice litigation" to the lists above.

      -- SS

      Tuesday, August 7, 2012

      Massive Health IT Outage: But, Of Course, Patient Safety Was Not Compromised

      Having been 'Down Under' in Sydney addressing the Health Informatics Society of Australia on the need to slow down their national health IT program - and on the need to think critically about HIT seller public relations exaggerations and hubris - and being very busy, I missed this quite stunning story of a major health IT outage.

      Just a typical "glitch":

      Some lessons from a major outage
      Posted on July 31, 2012
      By Tony Collins

      Last week Cerner had a major outage across the US. Its international customers might also have been affected.

      InformationWeek Healthcare reported that Cerner’s remote hosting service went down for about six hours on Monday, 23 July. It hit “hospital and physician practice clients all over the country”. Information Week said the unusual outage “reportedly took down the vendor’s entire network” and raised “new questions about the reliability of cloud-based hosting services”.

      A Cerner spokesperson Kelli Christman told Information Week,

      “Cerner’s remote-hosted clients experienced unscheduled downtime this week. Our clients all have downtime procedures in place to ensure patient safety.  [Meaning, for the most part, blank paper - ed.] The issue has been resolved and clients are back up and running. A human error caused the outage.  [I don't think they mean human error as in poor disaster recovery and business continuity engineering - ed.]  As a result, we are reviewing our training protocol and documented work instructions for any improvements that can be made.”

      Christman did not respond to a question about how many Cerner clients were affected. HIStalk, a popular health IT blog, reported that hospital staff resorted to paper [if that was true, that paper was OK in an unplanned workflow disruption of major proportions, then why do we need to spend billions on health IT, one might ask? - ed.] but it is unclear whether they would have had access to the most recent information on patients.

      One Tweet by @UhVeeNesh said “Thank you Cerner for being down all day. Just how I like to start my week…with the computer system crashing for all of NorCal [Northern California].”

      Tony Collins is a commentator for ComputerWorldUK.com.  He's quoted me, as I wrote in my May 2011 post Key lesson from the NPfIT - The Tony Collins Blog.

      This incident brings to life longstanding concerns about hospitals outsourcing their crucial functions to IT companies.  

      Quite simply, I think it's insane, at least in the foreseeable future, as this example shows.

      It also brings to mind the concerns that health IT, as an unregulated technology, causes dangers in hospitals with inadequate internal disaster and business continuity functions aside from fresh sheets of paper.  Such capabilities would likely be mandatory if health IT were meaningfully regulated.

      The Joint Commission, for example, likely issued its stamp of approval for the affected hospitals, hospitals who had outsourced their crucial medical records functions to an outside party that sometimes went mute.  If someone was injured or died due to this outage, they would not care very much about the supposed advantages.

      There's this in the article:

      ... “Issue appears to have something to do with DNS entries being deleted across RHO network and possible Active Directory corruption. Outage was across all North America clients as well as some international clients.”

      Of course, patient safety was not compromised.

      Finally:

      Imagine being a patient, perhaps with a complex history, in extremis at the time of this outage.  

      I, for one, do not want my own medical care nor that of my relatives and friends subject to cybernetic recordkeeping unreliability and incompetence like this, and the risk it creates.

      -- SS

      Aug. 8, 2012 addendum:

      The Los Angeles Times covered this outage in a story aptly entitled "Patient data outage exposes risks of electronic medical records."

      They write:

      Dozens of hospitals across the country lost access to crucial electronic medical records for about five hours during a major computer outage last week, raising fresh concerns about whether poorly designed technology can compromise patient care.

      My only comment is that the answer to this question is rather axiomatic.

      They also quote Jacob Reider, acting chief medical officer at the federal Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, who said:

      "These types of outages are quite rare and there's no way to completely eliminate human error"

      This is precisely the type of political spin and misdirection I cautioned the Australian health authorities to evaluate critically.

      Paper, unless there is a mass outbreak of use of disappearing ink, or locally hosted clinical IT, do not go blank en masse across multiple states and countries for any length of time, raising risk across multiple hospitals greatly, acutely and simultaneously.  (Locally hosted IT outages only cause "local" mayhem; see my further thoughts on this issue here).

      -- SS