A Little Sunshine Peeking Through the Clouds? - the Sunshine Act is Finally Implemented, Sort of

"Conflicts of interest" is probably the most frequently used Health Care Renewal tag.  We believe conflicts of interest are a major causes of health care dysfunction.  Therefore, I felt that one of the truly reformative aspects of the US Accountable Care Act (ACA, "Obamacare") could be the "Sunshine Act," a provision championed by Iowa Senator Grassley (R) and his staff investigator, Paul Thacker, that would require public reporting of most financial interactions among health care corporations and health care professionals and hospitals.

The roll-out of Sunshine Act implementation occurred this week, and not unexpectedly, was very rocky.   As reported by the Wall Street Journal,

it hasn't been a smooth process. First, CMS delayed the public reporting of the data by a year to give companies more time to prepare. The Open Payments online system has experienced technical problems, including a data mix-up that resulted in some doctors being linked to payment records for other doctors with the same surname. The preview function for doctors had a cumbersome registration process, some doctors said, and was taken offline at times in recent weeks.

The first batch of data is incomplete. CMS in August said it removed about one-third of the payment records from the physician-preview database because it said some of the state medical-license numbers that companies reported for doctors didn't match a database that the agency was using for verification, among other problems. CMS now is releasing those records but without identifying the physicians tied to them. It will update the database to include the physicians' names for those records next year. Also, CMS isn't immediately releasing payments related to proprietary research-and-development; those will be reported at a later date.

 But why should we have expected anything else, given the parties involved?

Drug, Device and Biotechnology Companies

As reported by the NY Times,

all manufacturers of drugs, medical devices and medical supplies that have at least one product covered by Medicare or Medicaid must report payments or gifts they make to doctors and teaching hospitals. This can be as seemingly trivial as a bag of bagels — all payments above $10 are included — or as lofty as a research grant. It also includes meals, travel expenses and speakers’ fees. Group-purchasing organizations, which serve as middlemen between health care providers and manufacturers, also must disclose doctors’ ownership and investment interests in their companies.

Presumably such reporting actually was quite burdensome to the companies.

Furthermore,company executives might not be exactly thrilled about putting all this information out there.  As we have frequently discussed, to serve their own interests, such companies make all sorts of payments to physicians, other health care professional, and hospitals and other non-profit health care organizations.  In particular, payments to health care professionals may foster companies' marketing and public relations goals.

While some payments are made for technical and clinical consulting, many are to support "education" that may serve marketing or public relations.  In particular, many payments are for "drug talks," that is, talks sponsored by the drug companies, usually through speakers' bureaus, and given probably not as part of formal, accredited continuing medical education.  Since the publication of "Dr Drug Rep" in the New York Times in 2007, it became evident that such talks emphasize content provided by the pharmaceutical companies, and are intended to be corporate marketing exercises.  From that case we also learned that physicians who deviate from the marketing message do not last long on speakers' bureaus.  (See posts here and here.)

In addition, pharmaceutical companies often pay physicians deemed to be "key opinion leaders," whose opinions are promoted supposedly for their brilliance and erudition.  However, as noted here and here, the companies buying their services think of KOLs as sales people.    Evidence about key opinion leaders actually performing like marketers has come from documents revealed during litigation (e.g., see this recent example of a huge monetary settlement made of charges that GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational drug company committed fraud among other things, and in the course of its unethical activities used key opinion leaders as marketers).   Also, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here) for examples of how corporate managers view key opinion leaders as marketers.

Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies protest that much of the money they pay goes to support research.  But the clinical research they sponsor has been shown to be frequently subject to manipulation designed to increase the likelihood of results favorable to these companies' products.  When manipulation fails to provide sufficiently favorable results, corporations may simply  suppress it.  Academic institutions desperate for more external funding, and physicians whose continued gainful employment at such institutions requires external funding may not be too quick to protest manipulation and suppression by those paying the bills.

Vox just summarized some of the relevant evidence:

Research for decades has shown that relations with industry — from industry-sponsored education to encounters with pharmaceutical-company sales representatives, and even drug samples provided by those companies — can bias a doctor's judgment in all sorts of ways. It can color the medical education they give to future doctors, cause them to inappropriately prescribe drugs, to push for the FDA approval of medicine, or for drugs to be included on their hospital formularies. Industry-funded studies are also four times more likely to lead to favorable and positive results than independent research.

The side-effects of this 'Bad Pharma' behavior range from waste in the health system, to mistreatment of patients, and even avoidable patient death.

So is it any surprise that industry may not have been enthused or comfortable about complying with the Sunshine Act?  Instead of admitting that, of course, they have complained, as reported by the NY Times,

the website is being questioned by the industry, which says that technical problems and data inaccuracies limit its value.

But it seems that industry may have created the sorts of data problems about which they now complain.  Note that when ProPublica made this first assessment of the database,

Many drug and device companies attributed payments to multiple subsidiaries, rather than reporting them under the name of a single parent company. Johnson & Johnson, for instance, submitted payments under at least 15 subsidiaries. The device maker Medtronic reported payments by at least six subsidiaries. So did the drug maker Novartis. On first blush, that makes it tough to calculate how much each company spent overall.

Similarly, companies reported payments associated with particular drugs in different ways. The expensive drug Acthar, which is marketed for a variety of different conditions, is listed under at least eight different name variations. The diabetes drug Januvia is reported as both 'Januvia' and 'Januvia Diabetes.' There is one drug simply listed as 'KNEES' and another as 'Foot and Ankle.'

So it appears that the companies reported data in a confusing, perhaps deliberately confusing manner, obfuscating the relationships between companies and subsidiaries, and between essentially similar drugs with different names.  It is hard to believe that all, or even most of these problems were due to mishandling by the government.  So it is a little hard to take the companies' criticisms of the quality of the data seriously.

Physicians and Organized Medicine

"We have met the enemy and he is us." - Pogo

On the other hand, news articles suggested some physicians were also unhappy with the data release.  For example, per the WSJ article,

Some doctors disputed details of the payment data. The database shows John LeDonne, a surgeon from Baltimore, as having received about $78,200 in payments for food and beverage for the five-month period from medical-device maker Dr. LeDonne acknowledged he performs paid consulting work for health-care companies including Teleflex, but that he rarely received free meals. He said the total payment amount was in the right 'ballpark,' but should not have been classified in the food-and-beverage category. 

That seems to be a bit of quibble.  The amount he received, and its source, seem more important than whether it was labelled "consulting," or "food and beverage" payments.

More importantly, a few doctors were worried, as reported by the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, that the information may reflect negatively on them,

 'Overwhelmingly, the interaction between industry and physicians is positive,' said Dr. Robert Harbaugh, chairman of neurosurgery at Penn State and president of the American Association of Neurological Surgeons.

Maybe Dr Harbaugh should realize that there already are a lot of reasons to think about the negative aspects of physician - industry paid interactions, as summarized above. And Vox reported,

 Dr. Thomas Stossel, known as Harvard's 'pro-industry professor,' says 'doctors' work with industry is necessary and beneficial.' He worries that the Sunshine Act could make it embarrassing and difficult for doctors to do work like developing medical devices or designing clinical trials, and that industry may start avoiding working with American doctors because of the time and investment disclosure will require.  

Dr Stossel did not provide evidence to explain the necessity or benefits of the work for industry, nor why doctors could not design clinical trials outside of industry relationships. 
Doctors also complained about data quality, but I am not aware that the medical profession rushed to help with improving the data for the Sunshine Act.  Obviously, there are some physicians who have personally profited quite a lot from their relationships with drug, device, and biotechnology companies but who may not be comfortable having the figures booted around in public, e.g., per the WSJ,

Among individual physicians, Stephen Burkhart was one of the top recipients of non-research payments from industry. The San Antonio orthopedic surgeon received $7.4 million in non-research payments or transfers of value for the five-month period, mostly from device manufacturer Arthrex Inc. for payments identified as 'royalty or license.'

Dr. Burkhart couldn't be reached for comment. Arthrex said in a statement that it has 'financial relationships with a number of orthopedic surgeons and teaching hospitals,' like many manufacturers, for their advice and expertise.

Chitranjan Ranawat,a New York orthopedic surgeon, received about $4 million in nonresearch payments or transfers of value, mostly from DePuy Synthes unit for 'royalty or license,' according to the database. 

 Dr. Ranawat couldn't be reached for comment.

And those were payments made in a five month period.  Maybe the doctors have a reason to be uncomfortable.

Furthermore, ProPublica reported that 21% of the $3.5 billion in payments, approximately $735 million, reported by the system were for "promotional talks," a la "drug talks" as noted above.  Since "Dr Drug Rep," such talks have gotten something of a bad reputation, but are obviously lucrative, so those who got paid to give them may not be happy with their detailed disclosure.

The US Department of Health and Human Services

The Sunshine Act was but a small part of the huge ACA, most of which the US DHHS, and particularly the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) was charged with implementing, but probably with proportionately insufficient funding and time.  So no wonder that the Sunshine Act never seemed to find a vocal champion within DHHS.

Most likely money concerns, and the constant din of outside criticism of "government bureaucrats" by those demanding more "business-like" government lead CMS to outsource the work on the Sunshine Act database, as described by another ProPublica article,

While the payments database is a far cry from Healthcare.gov — and less complex – it's reasonable to expect some glitches. CGI Federal, the company that led what turned out to be the botched launch of Healthcare.gov, is also responsible for the release of the payment data.

Massachusetts also outsourced operation of its Health Connector to CGI Federal, with equally bad results.  The state had to terminate the contract (look here.)

So if lackadaisical bureaucrats outsourced the Sunshine Act to contractors of questionable competence, what result should have been expected?

Why the present administration, and the bureaucrats it supposedly commands, seemed so uninterested in this particular aspect of the ACA is not clear, but perhaps we should peer around some revolving doors for the answer.  (For example,  John Podesta, a current White House adviser, worked for non-profits funded by drug company Eli Lilly and device company Synthes [look here]; and Nancy-Ann DeParle, former White House "health czar," had previously served on the boards of of Boston Scientific, Cerner and Medco [look here], and now is involved in health care investments made by private equity, and is on the board of CVS [look here]).

Of course, the sort of conflicts of interest that were supposed to be revealed by the Sunshine Act are highly beneficial to the parties directly involved, whatever embarrassment they may cause.  Given the power of those parties, plus the lukewarm, outsourced effort by government perhaps influenced by government officials with their own "revolving door" conflicts of interest, is it any wonder that the Sunshine Act implementation was "rocky?"

Summary

Nonetheless, because of the Sunshine Act, we do now know a bit more about conflicts of interest involving drug, device, biotechnology and related companies on one hand, and physicians, other health care professionals and hospitals on the other.

Maybe throwing even veiled sunshine on some of these relationships will inspire some people to rethink whether they want to continue them.  There are other reasons they should do so.

We have called endlessly for full, detailed disclosures of all conflicts of interest, for honesty's sake if for no other reason.  We have also called for severe curtailment of all conflicts affecting clinical decision making, health care education, clinical and health care research, and health policy making.  But Health Care Renewal can easily be dismissed as a voice crying out in the wilderness.  However, we are really not alone.

The 2009 Institute of Medicine report set relatively tough standards for managing conflicts of interest affecting clinical research and teaching, which unfortunately since have largely been ignored.  It did call for senior institutional officials to disclose their conflicts of interest, and for institutional boards of trustees to form conflicts of interest committees that would exclude conflicted individuals, but otherwise did not address conflicts of interest affecting academic leaders or institutional trustees.  The 2013 Pew Charitable Trusts Conflicts-of-Interest Policies for Academic Medical Centers suggested restrictions on conflicts affecting faculty, trainees, and students, but again did not mention senior institutional leaders or boards of trustees.  Implementing even some of these recommendations would be true health care reform.

Maybe more publicity about the web of conflicts of interest that drapes of over health care will lead to some further steps in the needed direction. 

Health Care Renewal Bloggers to Present

Course on Trustworthiness of Clinical Practice Guidelines

Dr Roy Poses and Dr Wally Smith will be teaching a course on Trustworthiness of Clinical Practice Guidelines at the Annual North American meeting of the Society for Medical Decision Making, Doral, Florida, 18-22 October, 2014.

Particularly relevant to Health Care Renewal, the course will focus on reasons physicians may fail to trust clinical practice guidelines, including  concerns about the integrity of the evidence base supporting the guidelines, particularly due to manipulation and suppression of clinical research, and concerns about the guideline development process, including conflicts of interest. Furthermore, we will discuss measures that might improve the trustworthiness of the CPG development process, with emphasis on the recent report by the US Institute of Medicine, of which Dr Smith was an author.

Special Symposium on Understanding and Challenging Health Care Corruption

Dr Roy Poses and Dr Wally Smith will be presenting a special symposium,  Defense against the Dark Arts: Understanding and Challenging Health Care Corruption at the Annual Meeting of the Society for General Internal Medicine, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 22- 25 April, 2015. 

We plan to summarize the scope of health care corruption, and discuss the impunity of those involved, and how discussion of it became taboo, before brainstorming ways to begin to challenge corruption.

You Say You Want Some Revolutions? - Famed Academic Physician Dr Milton Packer's Endless Alternating Turns as Drug Company Spokesperson and FDA Advisor

Last week, we noted  we again discussed the web of conflicts of interest that is draped over medicine and health care, and seems responsible for much of our current health care dysfunction.  We have discussed examples of conflicts of interest affecting clinical research, clinical teaching, clinical care, and health care policy.  Each time I think we must have cataloged all the useful examples, a striking new one appears.

Only a few days later, yet another new variant has in fact appeared.

A New Kind of Revolving Door

A new version of the "revolving door" apparently was first noted by Public Citizen, and then reported by Ed Silverman at Pharmalot. 

The usual version of the revolving door occurs when a person transitions from a full-time job in industry to a government position which has regulatory authority or other influence over that same industry, or vica versa.  We have discussed various health care manifestations of that revolving door here.

The new version, as described by Mr Silverman, in its manifestation at the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is:

the agency allows some experts who serve on its advisory panels to also make presentations at other meetings of these same panels on behalf of drug makers. By allowing some people to wear different hats within a short amount of time, the advocacy group charges the FDA creates the potential for bias to creep into the proceedings.

The Public Citizen letter to the FDA summarized the problem,

In particular, a sponsor’s use of an individual who serves, or has recently served, as a voting member of an FDA advisory committee to present its case before that member’s colleagues on the committee takes advantage of the special collegiality existing among members in order to improve a company’s chances of a favorable vote. Furthermore, such a revolving door raises concerns about the objectivity of committee members who accept such paid arrangements, with FDA’s approval, at future hearings involving the same or a rival company.

Someone Familiar Going Round and Round

The Public Citizen letter used as an example one well-known academic physician who seemed to have made many revolutions in this sort of revolving door.  As summarized in the PharmaLot post,

As an example, Public Citizen cites a meeting this past March 27 of the FDA’s Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee, which was held to review an application for a Novartis drug called serelaxin to treat acute heart failure. And Milton Packer, who chairs the department of clinical sciences at UT Southwestern, appeared as a paid speaker on behalf of Novartis.

In his opening remarks, Packer disclosed that Novartis paid for his time and travel, according to the advocacy group. But because he is also considered to be a ‘special government employee,’ which is how advisory panel members are classified, he obtained permission from the FDA to participate as a paid speaker for Novartis (see page 31 here).

However, Packer served as a temporary voting member of the same FDA advisory committee less than two months earlier. Moreover, Public Citizen says this was the sixth time, since Packer first presided as chair of this committee in 1997, that he had 'spoken on behalf of and/or served as a (presumably) paid consultant' to drug makers whose meds were being reviewed at those meetings.

The other occasions in which Packer appeared before the Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory committee involved speaking on behalf of Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2002; acting as a consultant and speaker for GlaxoSmithKline in 2003; appearing as a speaker for NitroMed in 2005; appearing as a speaker for Sanofi in 2009 and acting as a consultant on behalf of Pfizer in 2010.

In fact, the Public Citizen letter also asserted that

Dr. Packer’s presence as an FDA advisory committee member at hearings extends beyond the CRDAC, as he has also participated in at least three meetings of the Arthritis Advisory Committee and served at least once on the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee since 2005.

We note with concern that, as with his revolving-door tenure at CRDAC, Dr. Packer has similarly worked with industry in the following capacities at non-CRDAC advisory committees while intermittently serving as a recurring member of some of these same committees:

- As a consultant to Centocor for its presentation on infliximab (Remicade) to the March 4, 2003, meeting of the Arthritis Advisory Committee;
- As an 'external expert' cited by GlaxoSmithKline at the July 30, 2007, joint meeting of the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs and Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committees to discuss the cardiac ischemic risks of the thiazolidinedione diabetes drugs, with a focus on rosiglitazone (Avandia); and
- As a consultant to Boehringer Ingelheim for its presentation concerning the drug tiotropium (Spiriva HandiHaler), made before the November 19, 2009, meeting of the Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs Advisory Committee.

Summary

Dr Milton Packer served as a presumably paid spokesperson for six different pharmaceutical companies advocating for six different drugs at meetings of the FDA Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Committee.  Over roughly the same time period he served as the chair, acting chair, or voting member of that same committee in numerous instances.  Also, Dr Packer served as a presumably paid spokesperson for one of the same drug companies, and for two additional drug companies advocating for another three drugs at meetings of three other FDA advisory committees.  On various occasions he had also served as a member of these three committees.  Parenthetically, one of the drugs for which Dr Packer, a cardiologist, advocated, Avandia, to a non-cardiologic committee was subsequently pulled from the market because of concerns about excess cardiologic complications (look here). 

Dr Packer repeatedly went back and forth between roles as a paid advocate for drug companies and as a member or chair of federal advisory committees which could influence FDA decisions about the drugs for which he advocated and which were made by the companies that employed him.


It certainly seems that Public Citizen was right in that the sorts of transitions Dr Packer made constituted multiple conflicts of interest, and that his work for multiple drug companies was likely to have distorted the recommendations of the committees on which he served.  Rapid transitions between temporary committee memberships and paid advocacy positions before such committees does seem to be a new version of the revolving door, and newly discovered type of conflict of interest.  It seems that conflicts of interest now pervade every aspect of health care, with huge cumulative effects on clinical and health policy decision making.

Note also that the person whose conflicts of interest were used as examples by Public Citizen just appeared in Health Care Renewal in another capacity.  Earlier this month we discussed a study (PARADIGM - HF) of a new drug for congestive heart failure (sacubitril) which received prominent media attention.  After various people, not limited to yours truly, pointed out that this study seemed to have multiple flaws which undercut claims that the new drug would be a "game changer," the principal investigator of the study delivered a written whupping to a critic whose writing appeared prominently on a cardiology web-site .  The scathing comeback, however, seemed based on a volley of logical fallacies, including repetitive ad hominem attacks on the critic (look here).  The PARADIGM - HF Principal Investigator was none other than the same Dr Milton Packer whose revolving door cycles were discussed above.  Note that the company that sponsored, and largely ran and designed PARADIGM - HF, and which paid Dr Packer to serve as Principal Investigator, was the same Novartis for whom Dr Packer was a spokesperson in the first example above. 

We wondered whether Dr Packer's conflicts of interest contributed to confused, illogical thinking and his apparently logically fallacious response to his critic.  Now it appears that Dr Packer has been immersed much more deeply in conflicts of interest than were apparent a few days ago.  So should he be regarded mainly as a heart failure "expert," or mainly as a paid marketer and public relations man for drug companies?  Obviously, he is both, but the mixture is not so clear.  The concern is all the more important because Dr Packer has become such a prominent medical academic.

So once again, again, again,...  we call for all conflicts to be disclosed in the interests of honesty.  Beyond that, as we have been saying for years, patients' and the public's health would benefit from an aggressive effort to reduce conflicts of interest affecting clinical and health policy decision making.    

Higher Authorities? - Pharmaceutical Companies, Addiction Experts, and Marijuana Policy

We have often discussed the web of conflicts of interest that is draped over medicine and health care, and seems responsible for much of our current health care dysfunction.  We have discussed examples of conflicts of interest affecting clinical research, clinical teaching, clinical care, and health care policy.  Each time I think we must have cataloged all the useful examples, a striking new one appears.

So, let us get down into the weeds, so to speak, in the trendy new area of marijuana policy.

I am not about to express an opinion on whether marijuana will prove to be useful in health care, but certainly some people are advocating that it might be while others are advocating for the decriminalization or legalization of marijuana for social and health reasons.  Others, of course, do not agree.

Now Vice News, which advertises itself as "an international news organization created by and for a connected generation," has published an article by investigative journalist Lee Fang about conflicts of interest, key opinion leaders, and marijuana policy.  Its main premise was,

As Americans continue to embrace pot—as medicine and for recreational use—opponents are turning to a set of academic researchers to claim that policymakers should avoid relaxing restrictions around marijuana. It's too dangerous, risky, and untested, they say. Just as drug company-funded research has become incredibly controversial in recent years, forcing major medical schools and journals to institute strict disclosure requirements, could there be a conflict of interest issue in the pot debate?

VICE has found that many of the researchers who have advocated against legalizing pot have also been on the payroll of leading pharmaceutical firms with products that could be easily replaced by using marijuana. When these individuals have been quoted in the media, their drug-industry ties have not been revealed.

The article profiled three prominent physicians who advocate against easing rules on marijuana.  The first was Dr Herbert Kleber, a Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Division of Substance Abuse at Columbia.  Per the article, he

has been quoted in the press and in academic publications warning against the use of marijuana, which he stresses may cause wide-ranging addiction and public health issues.

However,

what's left unsaid is that Kleber has served as a paid consultant to leading prescription drug companies, including Purdue Pharma (the maker of OxyContin), Reckitt Benckiser (the producer of a painkiller called Nurofen), and Alkermes (the producer of a powerful new opioid called Zohydro).

Then there was Dr A Eden Evins, Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard and Director of the Center for Addiction Medicine at the Massachusetts General Hospital,  who

is a frequent critic of efforts to legalize marijuana. She is on the board of an anti-marijuana advocacy group, Project SAM, and has been quoted by leading media outlets criticizing the wave of new pot-related reforms. 'When people can go to a 'clinic' or 'cafe' and buy pot, that creates the perception that it's safe,' she told the Times last year.

But,

when Evins participated in a commentary on marijuana legalization for the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, the publication found that her financial relationships required a disclosure statement, which noted that as of November 2012, she was a 'consultant for Pfizer and DLA Piper and has received grant/research support from Envivo, GlaxoSmithKline, and Pfizer.' Pfizer has moved aggressively into the $7.3 billion painkiller market. In 2011, the company acquired King Pharmaceuticals (the makers of several opioid products) and is currently working to introduce Remoxy, an OxyContin competitor.

Finally, there was Dr Mark L Kraus, described as a private practitioner and board member of the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM).  He

submitted testimony in 2012 in opposition to a medical marijuana law in Connecticut. 

However,

 According to financial disclosures, Kraus served on the scientific advisory panel for painkiller companies such as Pfizer and Reckitt Benckiser in the year prior to his activism against the medical pot bill.

Mr Fang's argument that the relationships among these physicians who advocate against liberalized marijuana laws and pharmaceutical companies constitute conflicts of interest did not seem unreasonable

Studies have found that pot can be used for pain relief as a substitute for major prescription painkillers. The opioid painkiller industry is a multibillion business that has faced rising criticism from experts because painkillers now cause about 16,000 deaths a year, more than heroin and cocaine combined. Researchers view marijuana as a safe alternative to opioid products like OxyContin, and there are no known overdose deaths from pot.

Assuming the validity of this argument, the article also noted institutional conflicts of interest affecting organizations that publicly advocate against loosening marijuana restrictions,

I reported for the Nation that many of the largest anti-pot advocacy groups, including the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions for America, which has organized opposition to reform through its network of activists and through handing out advocacy material (sample op-eds against medical pot along with Reefer Madness-style videos, for example), has relied on significant funding from painkiller companies, including Purdue Pharma and Alkermes. Pharmaceutical-funded anti-drug groups like the Partnership for Drug-Free Kids and CADCA use their budget to obsess over weed while paying lip-service to the much bigger drug problem in America of over-prescribed opioids.

Summary

As we have discussed previously, narcotics addiction is a very difficult clinical and societal problem.  That makes it all the more distressing that research and teaching about, clinical practice affecting and health policy related to narcotics and narcotics addiction has been tangled up with the increasingly aggressive marketing of prescription narcotics.  Now it turns out that the companies that make and market narcotics seem to be tangled up with addiction medicine experts who are not such big fans of medical or recreational marijuana. (And it turns out once again that the physicians who claim expertise on treatment of addiction have financial relationships with the companies that market addictive medications.)

There seems to be no corner of medicine and health care untouched by the web of conflicts of interest.  So once again we call for all conflicts to be disclosed in the interests of honesty.  Beyond that, as we have been saying for years, patients' and the public's health would benefit from an aggressive effort to reduce conflicts of interest affecting clinical and health policy decision making.     

Put that in your pipe and smoke it. 

Logical Fallacies in Defense of the PARADIGM - HF Trial of Valsartan - Sacubitril, Suppsedly the "Game Changer" for Heart Failure

We frequently discuss how commercial sponsors manipulate clinical research to serve their interests.  There have been many cases of commercially sponsored controlled trials ostensibly designed to assess their sponsors' products manipulated to make these products look better.

Unfortunately, often such manipulation seems to escape public notice.  What skepticism they may generate often gets little notice, an example of the anechoic effect.  Very rarely do the people responsible for the trial deign to address skeptical criticism. 

However, we recently noted that cogent criticism of a very recently published trial got some circulation, leading to a dialogue with the trial's principal investigator.  The results seemed to show why those involved with manipulated sponsored trials often try to just ignore criticism.

Introduction - the PARADIGM - HF Trial of Valsartan - Sacubitril


As we recently posted, based on a new article now online in the New England Journal of Medicine, a combination of a new drug, sacubitril, in a new class, naprilysin inhibitors, with an older drug, valsartan, an angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB), has been hailed as a "game changer" for patients with heart failure.  However, although the study (entitled PARADIGM - HF) had many good features, it also had some major problems which made its interpretation difficult, and made the hype about "new hope" seem excessive.  Unbeknownst to me when I wrote the post, some pithy overlapping criticisms of PARADIGM - HF by Dr Vinay Prasad were posted on CardioExchange.

Surprisingly, Dr Prasad's post elicited a lengthy comment by Dr Milton Packer, the principal investigator of PARADIGM - HF, defending the study's methods.  This resulted in a back-and-forth between him and Dr Prasad.  (Available by subscription only.)  This seems to be on of those rare instances in which a pillar of the medical establishment was willing to defend the way things are done these days in health care, and in this case, the way commercially sponsored randomized controlled trials are designed.

In my humble opinion, this exchange illustrated one reason that most criticisms about flaws in commercially funded clinical research get the silent treatment: there really are not good explanations for them, other than they resulted from the intention to increase the likelihood that the sponsors' products would look better than they really are.

Let us consider in detail some of the written comments by Dr Packer addressing two major criticisms by Dr Prasad.

The Question about the Choice of Comparator

Dr Prasad and I both questioned the choice of the drug to which valsartan - sacubitril was compared.  Dr Prasad wrote,

In PARADIGM-HF, oral enalapril was dosed up to 10 mg twice daily, whereas LCZ696 was dosed up to 200 mg twice daily (which includes a cumulative 320 mg of valsartan). The problem is that 320 mg is the maximum HF dose of valsartan per drug labeling, but enalapril can be dosed up to 40 mg daily (20 mg twice daily) — double the maximum dose proscribed per protocol.

So,

In effect, drug dosing in PARADIGM-HF was a 'straw man' comparison. The reported outcomes may be entirely a consequence of more ARB versus less ACE inhibitor. That is reason enough to doubt the findings. Sacubutil, the novel drug, could have been a sugar pill, and the results may well have turned out the same. But there are two more good reasons to be skeptical.

Note that in effect Dr Prasad charged that the entire trial was based on a logical fallacy, the "straw man" fallacy.

Dr Packer's Response: Red Herrings, Ad Hominem Fallacies, and Appeals to Authority

Red Herring - Comparison to Trial with a Different Patient Population

Dr Packer made several responses to this criticism.  First,  he asserted that using the maximum dose of enalapril as a target dose would have been inappropriate,

Dr. Prasad proposes that the dose of enalapril was too low, and we should have used 40 mg daily of enalapril as a comparator. However, when 40 mg of enalapril daily has been used in a clinical trial (CONSENSUS), these extremely high doses were poorly tolerated due to hypotension and renal insufficiency.

However, that appears to be to be an example of the red herring fallacy.  The PARADIGM - HF trial was meant to include patients with mild to severe symptoms of CHF (CHF classes II - IV), although it actually included a few (about 5%) patients with no symptoms (class I).  However, as Dr Prasad pointed out in his later comeback,

Dr. Packer suggests that CONSENSUS trial proves that enalapril 40 cannot be given safely. It is worth noting this trial enrolled only NY Heart Classification IV patients, while these were less than 1% of pts in PARADIGM HF. Many patients in PARADIGM HF might well have been able to tolerate and benefit from enalapril 40mg.

So Dr Packer's argument based on a trial of only the sickest patients with CHF seems likely not be relevant to discussion of a trial of patients with much milder disease.

Red Herring - Physiologic Changes vs Patient-Centered Outcomes

Then, Dr countered Dr Prasad's concern that the design of PARADIGM - HF could not distinguish whether the apparent benefits of valsartan (at maximum dose) and sacubitril versus enalapril (at a moderate dose) were due to the valsartan alone versus the combination thus,

Furthermore, Dr. Prasad can provide no evidence whatsoever than valsaratan 160 mg BID produces more blockade of the renin-angiotensin system than enalapril 10 mg BID. It is simply not true.

This seems to be an even better example of the red herring fallacy.  The argument is not about the physiological changes the drugs may or may not produce.  It is about the design of a clinical trial and how that design could affect interpretation of patient-centered outcomes.  Degree of renin-angiotensin system blockade may not directly predict survival, hospitalization, functional status, etc.

Red Herring - References to a Trial of Valsartan in Addition to ACE Inhibitors

Appended to the above, Dr Packer wrote,

In fact, valsartan 160 mg BID does not even have a mortality effect when compared with placebo, whereas enalapril 10 mg BID does have a survival benefit.

It later became apparent that the evidence he felt supported this assertion came from yet another trial with an alphabet soup name, Val - HEFT.  But, as Dr Prasad argued, this was yet another red herring,

The VAL-HEFT trial– where Valsartan 160 BID was no better than placebo– occurred in the setting where 92% of patients were already on an ace-inhibitor. As such, it cannot be used to say what the effect of valsartan is among patients not taking an ace-inhibitor, as was the case in PARADIGM-HF.

To explain a bit, the Val - HEFT trial enrolled patients who were nearly all already taking an ACEI, including enalapril.  So its data could only speak to the question of whether adding valsartan to an ACEI has an effect, not whether valsartan alone is efficacious in CHF.  It does not appear that there has ever been a large, long-term randomized controlled trial that tested valsartan versus placebo for CHF.   So Dr Packer seemed to have supplied another quite large red herring.

Of course that raises the question of why  PARADIGM - HF only assessed the combination of  sacubitril plus valsartan, rather than sacubitril combined with other ARBs.  This question was not directly addressed in the exchange between Dr Packer and Dr Prasad.  Parenthetically, note that valsartan is sold by Novartis, the sponsor of PADADIGM - HF, as Diovan.

Dr Packer only complicated things later by writing,


if Dr. Prasad dismisses the evidence from Val-HeFT, he eliminates ALL of the evidence that supports the use of valsartan in heart failure. If he sets the Val-HeFT trial aside, what evidence is there that valsartan 160 mg BID does ANYTHING in heart failure?

Again, Dr Packer was the one supposedly responsible for the choice of valsartan as the ARB to combine with sacubitril.

In summary thus far, I could not find any instance in the exchange in which Dr Packer logically used evidence to explain why his trial compared valsartan (targeted to maximum dose) plus sacubitril to enalapril (targeted to a moderate dose).  Instead, his arguments seemed to consist of multiple examples of the red herring fallacy.

Ad Hominem - Dr Prasad's Degree of Understanding of the Heart Failure Literature

Instead, he also threw in some additional general points which appeared to be rather gratuitously fallacious, To start,

 

I wish that Dr. Prasad understood the field of heart failure trials better than he does,

Then,

I wish Dr Prasad understood the heart failure literature better.

These seem to be examples of the ad hominem fallacy.  Rather than addressing the logic and evidence used by Dr Prasad, Dr Packer implied that Dr Prasad simply lacks understanding. Dr Prasad's polite response was,

Dr. Packer could tighten his posts by reducing the number of times he wishes I understood the heart failure literature better.

Appeal to Authority - Dr Packer's and Colleagues' Implied Superior Expertise on the Medical Literature

That did not prevent Dr Packer from coming back with,

 

I suggested that Dr. Prasad become more familiar with the medical literature because it would save him considerable time in formulating useful arguments.

With this repetition, Dr Packer seems to be not only using the ad hominem fallacy, but implying the fallacy of the appeal to authority. The implication is that Dr Packer clearly is an expert, and Dr Prasad is not, and the expert should be heeded. Just to underline this, Dr Packer later wrote,

Dr. Prasad suggests that others share his concerns. If he were here in Barcelona at the ESC meeting, he would know that that was not the case. However, I realize that It is common for those who seek only to win debates to claim that others agree with them. But Dr. Prasad, wishing that people agree with you does not make it true.

That just makes it worse. The implication is that all the experts in Barcelona agree with Dr Packer, and hence as a group they must be right. By the way, it is obvious from our previous blog post, comments on it, and other comments on the CardioExchange exchange that there are at least other people who agree with Dr Prasad.

Appeals to Authority - The New England Journal of Medicine and the US Food and Drug Administration Must Always be Totally Right

Not to leave it there, Dr Packer added as general comments several other appeals to authority.  At the end of his first set of comments there was this,

The real lesson of PARADIGM-HF is that combined angiotensin receptor neprilsyin inhibition is superior to inhibition of the renin-angiotensin system alone in patients with chronic heart failure. That is the conclusion of our paper, which passes stringent peer review in the New England Journal of Medicine.

The implication is that no paper published in the New England Journal of Medicine should ever be questioned about anything.  Also,


 

it does not appear that you are aware of the criteria that the FDA uses to evaluate or approve new drugs for cardiovascular disease.

This added the appeal to authority that since the FDA approved this trial, there must be nothing major wrong with it, to another implied ad hominem about Dr Prasad's lack of awareness.

Thus it seemed that Dr Packer's defense of his PARADIGM - HF study's choice of drugs to compare was based almost entirely on a string of logical fallacies, rather than logic and evidence.

The Question of Run-In Period Bias

Dr Prasad's other major criticism of his trial had to do with its use of active run-in periods.  He wrote,

The reason why drug run-in periods are problematic is discussed at length in the literature. In short, run-in periods exclude intolerant and nonadherent patients, foster spuriously large treatment effects, and (most troubling) create inclusion criteria that are irreproducible — i.e., that apply to no population we can clearly describe, as reasons for dropout are multifaceted and unique.

Even more concerning is that drug run-in periods test a different question than the one we think we are testing. In PARADIGM-HF, the run-in tested whether sticking with LCZ696 or switching to enalapril is better for HF patients who have taken and tolerated enalapril followed by LCZ696. It effectively turns the trial into a withdrawal study. If stopping LCZ696 is harmful, that counts against enalapril.

Dr Packer's Response: Appeals to Common Practice 

Dr Packer's main argument in defense of the run-in period involved yet another logical fallacy, the appeal to common practice, for example,
  

Dr. Prasad seem ill-informed here. Drug run-in periods are not a controversial study-design choice. In fact, this type of design is strongly preferred because it closely mimics clinical practice.

Again,

I wish I understood Dr. Prasad’s arguments against run-in periods. We have used them in many heart failure trials, and it was used in the SOLVD Treatment Trial,...

Dr Prasad ultimately responded so as to underline the essence of the fallacy,

The fact that many (and often industry sponsored) studies use drug run in periods is not a justification for their use. 

Summary

The recently published paper reporting the results of PARADIGM - HF has already generated considerable media hype (and an uncritical editorial) proclaiming valsartan - sacubitril as a new wonder drug for congestive heart failure.  While the trial was not without good features, several critics, including Dr Vinay Prasad and yours truly, suggested the study had multiple problems which make its results difficult to interpret.  The Principal Investigator of the study, Dr Milton Packer, chose to publicly defend his trial, yet so far his defense seems built more on logical fallacies than on logic and evidence.  After he published his remarks in defense of the trial, the hype seems no more justified than it did before.

Not only was PARADIGM - HF sponsored by Novartis, but many of its investigators had ties to Novartis and other pharmaceutical companies.  Dr Packer should be applauded for disclosing clearly the number of companies with whom he works in his dialogue with Dr Prasad.

Competing interests: Personal fees from AMAG, Amgen, BioControl, CardioKinetix, CardioMEMS, Cardiorentis, Daiichi, Janssen, Novartis, and Sanofi.

However, not only is it likely that financial relationships with commercial health care firms influence health care professionals to be more favorably disposed to these firms' products, but also such conflicts of interest may cause conflicted, and hence confused thinking.  As  I have noted before, Dr Joe Collier said, "people who have conflicts of interest often find giving clear advice (or opinions) particularly difficult."  [Collier J. The price of independence. Br Med J 2006; 332: 1447-9. Link here.]  

This all adds to the argument that society needs to reconsider its delegation of the responsibility for much clinical research to the companies that make the drugs, devices, and other goods and services used in health care.  The temptation for them to manipulate the results to improve their marketing is too great.  The temptation for the health care professionals involved to go along to get along with the rich sponsors is too great.  It may be less profitable for some individuals, but it would be much better for patients' and the public's health if research involving people, particularly experiments (clinical trials) involving patients, were directly funded by, and designed, implemented, and analyzed by people without vested interests in the results turning out in favor of particular commercially produced goods or services. 

The RUC. "an Independent Group of Physicians?" - But It Includes Executives and Board Members of For-Profit Health Care Corporations and Large Hospital Systems

Introduction

We just discussed how a major story in Politico has once again drawn attention to the opaque RUC (Resource Based Relative Value System Update Committee) and its important role in determining what physicians are paid for different kinds of services, and hence the incentives that have helped make the US health care system so procedurally oriented.  (See the end of our last post for a summary of the complex issues that swirl around the RUC.)

The Politico article covered most of the bases, but notably omitted how the RUC may be tied to various large health care organizations, especially for-profit, and how the incentives it creates may benefit them. When the RUC membership first became public in 2011 due to efforts by Wall Street Journal reporters, I used internet searches to find that nearly half of the RUC members had conflicts of interest (look here).  Most of them were part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.

In preparing my latest post, I found that to its credit, the AMA now makes the RUC membership more accessible (look here, free registration required.)  So I decided to check whether the current RUC roster still seems so conflicted.

As I did in 2011, I ran internet searches on all new RUC members since 2011, and updated searches on the continuing members.  Results are below.  Information new since 2011 is highlighted thus.  Note that I believe all the listed relationships are or were actual, but cannot rule out errors, especially given some RUC members have common names.  Any corrections are welcome.


The RUC Members and Their Financial Relationships

- Barbara S Levy, MD

Chair, RVS Update Committee
Federal Way, WA 2000

Consultant/Advisory Boards: Conceptus; AMS; Covidien; Halt Medical; Gynesonics; Idoman Medical (hysteroscopic surgery and sterilization, endometrial ablation, electrosurgery, vaginal hysterectomy) per UptoDate


-Margie Andreae MD
American Academy of Pediatrics
Ann Arbor, MI

Chief Medical Officer of Integrated Revenue Cycle and Billing Compliance, University of Michigan Health System, per University of Michigan Health System

- Michael D. Bishop, MD
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP)
Bloomington, IN 2003

- James Blankenship, MD
American College of Cardiology (ACC)
Danville, PA 2000

Lecture fees from Sanofi-Aventis per New England Journal of Medicine
Financial relationships with  The Medicines Company, Abbott Vascular, Conor Med Systems, Portola Pharmaceuticals, Schering Plough, AGA Medical, Astra Zeneca, Abiomed, Bristol Myers Squibb, Tryton Medical, Kai Pharmaceutical, Novartis (Grants or Research Support) per Society for Cardiovascular Angiography and Interventions Disclosure Summary


- Robert Dale Blasier, MD
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS)
Little Rock, AK 2008

-Albert Bothe Jr MD
CPT Editorial Board
Danville PA

Executive Vice President and Chief Medical Officer, Geisinger Health Systems, per Geisinger

- Ronald Burd, MD
American Psychiatric Association (APA)
Fargo, ND 2006

-C Scott Collins MD
American Academy of Dermatology
Rochester, MN

- Thomas P Cooper MD
American Urological Association
Everett, WA

General Partner, Aperture Venture Partners LLC, (health care focused venture capital firm) , per Aperture
Member, Board of Directors, Kindred Healthcare, per Kindred
Member, Board of Directors, Hanger Inc (orthotic and prosthetic care), per Hanger
Member, Board of Directors, IPC/ the Hospitalist Company, per IPC


-Anthony Hamm DC
Health Care Professional Advisory Committee
Goldsboro, NC

- David F. Hitzeman, DO
American Osteopathic Association (AOA)
Tulsa, OK 1996


- Charles F. Koopmann, Jr., MD
American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery (AAO-HNS)
Ann Arbor, MI 1996

- Robert Kossmann, MD
Renal Physicians Association (RPA)
Santa Fe, NM 2009

Member of Advanced Renal Technologies Advisory Board, Network 15 Medical Advisory Board, Baxter Home Dialysis Advisory Board, Fresenius Medical Advisory Board per Renal Physicians Association

- Walter Larimore, MD
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)
Colorado Springs, CO 2009

-Alan E Lazaroff MD
American Geriatrics Society
Denver, CO

- J. Leonard Lichtenfeld, MD
American College of Physicians (ACP)
Atlanta, GA 1994

Member, Physician Advisory Board, Aetna per Aetna 
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, American Cancer Society, per ACS

- Scott Manaker, MD, PhD
Practice Expense Subcommittee
Philadelphia, PA 2010

Consultant to Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson. Owns stock in Neose Technologies, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Rohm and Haas per Chest

-William J Mangold Jr MD
American Medical Association
Tuscon, AZ

Vice President, Board Developer Inc (health care management consulting firm), per Board Developer
Senior Advisor, ADVI (health care management consulting firm), per ADVI
Member, Board of Directors, Sante (post-acute health care company), per Sante

-Geraldine B McGinty MD
American College of Radiology,
New York, NY

- Gregory Przybylski, MD
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS)
Edison, NJ 2001

Stock Ownership: United Healthcare (300 shares); Scientific Advisory Board: United Health Group (B, Spine Advisory Board) per NASS meeting

- Marc Raphaelson, MD
American Academy of Neurology (AAN)
Leesburg, VA 2009

personal compensation for activities with Jazz Pharmaceuticals and Medtronics as a speakers bureau member or consultant per AAN

- Sandra Reed, MD
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
Thomasville, GA 2009


GlaxoSmithKline Consulting, $1750 in 2009, $1500 in 2010 per ProPublica Dollars for Docs search through here

-  David H Regan MD
American Society of Clinical Oncology
Portland, OH

Payment from Cephalon in 2009 for $2200, per ProPublica search 


-Chad A Rubin MD
American College of Surgery
Columbia, SC

-Joseph R Schlecht
Pimrary Care Seat
Jenks, OK 

- Peter Smith, MD
Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS)
Durham, NC 2006

Eli Lilly, Consulting, $1500 in 2009, $1990 in 2010 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Advisor or consultant to Bayer per Medscape

-Samuel D Smith MD
American Pediatric Surgical Association
Little Rock, AK

-Stanley Stead MD
American Society of Anesthesiologist
Encino, CA

-  J Allan Tucker MD
College of American Pathologists
Mobile, AL

- James Waldorf, MD
American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS)
Jacksonville, FL 2008

- George Williams, MD
American Academy of Ophthalmology (AAO)
Royal Oak, MI 2009

Advisory Team, RetroSense Therapeutics
Shareholder and consultant for ThromboGenics Ltd. and holds intellectual property on the use of plasmin per Review of Opthamology
Alcon Laboratories, consultant, lecturer; Allergan, consultant, lecturer; Macusight, consultant, equity owner; Neurotech, consultant; Nu-Vue Technologies, equity owner, patent/ royalties; OMIC- Ophthalmic Mutual Insurance Company, employee; Optimedica, consultant, equity owner; Thrombogenics, consultant, equity owner per AAO meeting

Pfizer, “Professional Advising,” $5534 in 2009 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Member, Medical and Scientific Committee, Pixium Vision Inc, per Pixium 
Member, Board of Directors, Macusight Inc, per BusinessWeek.  


Summary 

The membership of the RUC continues to have a considerable number of apparent financial conflicts of interest.  By my count, in 2014, nearly half, 15/31 members had such conflicts.

Again, most of the conflicts were financial ties such as part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.  A number of members who had such ties known in 2011 have several more such ties in 2014. 

In 2014, new kinds of conflicts of interest that appear even more intense have appeared.  Several members are now known to also be members of the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations, including biotechnology, device, health care provider, and health care management services companies. 

We have been writing about the severe conflicts of interest presented by service on the boards of  health care corporationa.  In 2006 we first discussed a newly discovered species of conflict of interest in health care, in which leaders of medical or health care organizations were simultaneously serving on boards of directors of health care corporations.
 
We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive.  It ostensibly requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]  Of course, after the global financial collapse of 2008 made us sadder and a little wiser, we realized that many board members actually seem to have unyielding loyalty to their cronies among top management.  However, in any case, the stated or actual interests of a member of the board of a health care corporation, like a pharmaceutical company or medical device company, could be very different and at odds with the mission of an academic medical institution or a non-profit ostensibly dedicated to improving health care quality, like in this case, the RUC of the American Medical Association.

Also, one new RUC member is apparently a top executive of a health care management services company, and another new RUC member is apparently a general partner of a health care venture capital firm. Again, such leadership roles create responsibilities that could be very much at odds with a leadership role in a very influential committee run by a physicians' society.

Finally, two new members are top executives of large, although admittedly non-profit hospital systems.  One member is now known to be a full-time executive of a large, non-profit disease specific patient advocacy organization.  While hospital systems' interests may overlap those of physicians, modern  hospital systems are often run by generic managers who put revenues ahead of all else.  Furthermore, in pursuit of revenues, hospital system leaders may be very interested in increasing utilization of the most lucrative, usually high-technology and procedural services, and thus in structuring physicians' incentives accordingly.  While disease-specific patient advocacy goups' interests may also overlap those of doctors, they may tend to be more interested in their diseases than all others.

By the way, note that AMA and RUC leaders often defend the RUC as purely physician run organization, e.g., the testimony of the RUC leader, Dr Barbara Levy, at a Senate hearing, per MedPage Today in 2011, (see this post),

The RUC is an independent group of physicians from many specialties, including primary care, who use their expertise on caring for Medicare patients to provide input to CMS [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services],' RUC chair Barbara Levy, MD, said in a statement. 

But now it is clear that the RUC includes corporate executives and board members, and top hospital system executives.  These people may have MDs, but their loyalties appear divided.

We have questioned the tremendously influential role the RUC plays in setting the incentives that drive the US health care system.  Now it appears that the RUC membership remains conflicted.  Almost half work part-time for drug, device, biotechnology, and health insurance companies.  Several are in the top leadership and/or governance of various health care corporations and large non-profit hospital systems.  Thus it seems that the incentives that drive are health care system are under the influence of people who may put corporate or organizational revenue ahead of patients' and the public's health.

As we wrote before, the prevalence of conflicts of interest among RUC members highlight the need for a more accountable, transparent and honest system to manage how the government pays physicians, and a need for more transparency and accountability in the relationship among the government, health care insurance, and physicians.

As a first step, I submit that all RUC members who are executives or board members of for-profit health care corporations or large hospital systems step down from the RUC, or resign these positions.

Retrospective on the Blumsohn - Procter and Gamble -Sheffield University Affair: the Unhappy Lives of Whistleblowers and the Anechoic Effect

Introduction - the Unhappy Lives of Whistleblowers

The UK Times Higher Education Supplement just published a feature on the unhappy fate of academic, including academic medical whistleblowers.

Whistleblowers in universities can hit the national headlines for shining light on issues of public interest, only for their careers to end up in very dark places.

Some of higher education’s most prominent whistleblowers paint a bleak picture about the impact on their subsequent careers. They talk about being persecuted by colleagues after coming forward. But even after leaving their jobs, some believe they still suffer a legacy. One talks about being 'effectively blackballed' from ever working again in higher education.

For other whistleblowers, exile is self-enforced.

It is noteworthy that the graphic for the article showed a whistleblower with a ball and chain, but the ball is in the shape of a whistle.

Summary - The Blumsohn - Actonel - Procter and Gamble - Sheffield University Case

The article focused on the case of Dr Aubrey Blumsohn, which we discussed recently, and have posted about since 2005 (here).  For all relevant posts, look here.

The Times provided a good summary.  It is worth quoting it here, as a reminder of a very important case which has had far too few echoes.

[The] case began in 2002, when he was working in the research unit led by Richard Eastell, professor of bone metabolism at Sheffield. The unit was researching the effects on patients of Procter & Gamble’s anti-osteoporosis drug Actonel.

Blumsohn raised concerns about abstracts for conference papers submitted by P&G, under his primary authorship, but without the firm having granted him full access to the drug trial data.

His concerns were first raised with senior colleagues and then reported in Times Higher Education in 2005.

The data analysis for the research was carried out by P&G, which paid for the research and which did not release key data to Eastell and Blumsohn. According to Blumsohn, this prevented honest publication of research.

After coming forward, Blumsohn has previously said, his other research work was used as the basis for a series of research grant applications that Eastell sponsored and signed off for a PhD student, without acknowledging Blumsohn’s input and despite his objections.

In 2005, he told the university that he was speaking to the media after losing faith in its internal systems for dealing with such allegations. He was subsequently suspended and told by Sheffield that he could lose his job over alleged 'conduct incompatible with the duties of office', including 'briefing journalists' and 'distributing information, including a Times Higher article, to third parties with apparent intent to cause embarrassment'.

He later reached a settlement with the university and it dropped all disciplinary charges. However, he left the university in 2006.

Blumsohn says of what happened afterwards: 'I withdrew from medicine completely, I withdrew from academia and ultimately withdrew my medical registration as well.'

Given the impact on his career, does Blumsohn regret coming forward with his concerns? 'I had to do that,' he says. 'As a scientist, I couldn’t just go along with having my name attached to manipulated publications, based on secret data ghost-analysed by pharmaceutical companies.'

Could Sheffield have dealt with his concerns more effectively? 'I don’t know how Sheffield could have done better, or indeed how any medical school could have done,' Blumsohn replies.

He clarifies: 'The problem these days is that some parts of universities – most notably medical schools but some other parts as well – have so many conflicts of interest and financial imperatives guiding what they do, I’m not sure other universities would necessarily have behaved differently from Sheffield. When millions of pounds are at stake both in private fees for academics and university funding, and a pharmaceutical company is wanting you to dance, the pressure to go along and to get staff to remain quiet is overwhelming.'

A few comments are in order.  While universities appear to be places of free speech and open discussion, note that Sheffield apparently could punish Dr Blumsohn simply for talking to journalists, but particularly for simply saying things that might embarrass university leaders.  So university leaders wish not to be embarrassed seems to trump free speech and academic freedom.

Second, Dr Blumsohn rightly pointed out that the issue was really scientific integrity, not embarrassment.  He tried to stop what he perceived as manipulation of clinical research by a pharmaceutical company to support its vested interests in selling a particular drug.  Such manipulation threatened scientific integrity, and ultimately threatened patients' health.

Third, Dr Blumsohn also rightly pointed out in retrospect that what university managers really seemed to fear was not just personal embarrassment, but curtailment of money flows from industry to their institution that made them look good, and presumably become more wealthy.

Few Echoes in the Discussion of Whether the Former Procter and Gamble Executive on Whose Watch the Affair Occurred Should be US Veterans Affairs Secretary

As we discussed here, a top executive at Procter and Gamble whose remit at the time the affair occurred seemed to include Actonel and research related to it was nominated to run the US Department of Veterans Affairs, and hence the whole VA health system.  Only two blogs, including this one, raised the issue of the Blumsohn - Actonel - Procter and Gamble - Sheffield University affair as relevant.  There was no other public discussion of this connection.  The former Procter and Gamble executive was confirmed, and now runs the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Summary

This is another example of how leaders of big health care organizations remain unaccountable for their organizations' misdeeds.  The lack of any mainstream discussion of the Blumsohn - Actonel - Procter and Gamble - Sheffield University affair in connection to the VA nomination demonstrate the anechoic effect.  Even the most determined whistleblowers often do not get the public notice they deserve, and their revelations do not have the effects they ought to have, even after the whistleblowers have paid a very high price to try to spark public discussion.

So anyone thinking about trying to get public notice for some fact or issue that threatens the powers that be will think twice, both about the potential downsides to the whistleblower, and the potential ineffectiveness of these attempts.    

In the past two weeks, I have heard in confidence about three stories in which discussion of issues that might offend the powers that be, specifically, the leaders of big health care organizations, has been suppressed.  I am convinced that for every Dr Aubrey Blumsohn, there are dozens who are aware of deception, other unethical conduct, even crime and corruption that could harm patients and patient care, but are afraid to speak out.

Of course, as long as these issues remain hidden, the damage to patients and the public's health continues to be done.

We clearly need changes in public policy to protect whistleblowers and foster free speech about important issues in academics and health care.  We need health care professionals, health care researchers, health care policy makers, and those among the public who care about health care and health care need to organize to support free speech and academic freedom.  Otherwise, the anechoic effect will continue to befog all of health care.

Hat tip to Dr Carl Elliott writing for the Fear and Loathing in Bioethics blog.

Health Care Corruption, "No Dirty Little Secret," but "An Open Sore" - Lessons from India for the US

Health care corruption is widely prevalent around the globe, but remains the great unmentionable.

Introduction: Global Health Care Corruption

We have discussed health care corruption whenever we have an opportunity, but rarely does the topic appear in the English language media or in English language medical and health care journals, particularly in the US.  Some might think that this is because health care corruption is not so prevalent in the US and other "developed" countries.  However, our most read post of all time was about a Transparency International global survey that found that fully 43% of Americans believe our health care is corrupt. 

A recent editorial in the BMJ(1) opened thus,

Healthcare is a high risk sector for corruption. Best estimates are that between 10% and 25% of global spend on public procurement of health is lost through corruption. This is big bucks. Total global spend on healthcare is more than $7 trillion each year. Corruption takes many forms, depending on the country’s level of development and health financing system. The United States, for example, lost between $82bn and $272bn in 2011 to medical embezzlement, mostly related to its health insurance system. No country is exempt from corruption. Patients everywhere are harmed when money is diverted to doctors’ pockets and away from priority services. Yet this complex challenge is one that medical professionals have failed to deal with, either by choosing to enrich themselves, turning a blind eye, or considering it too difficult. Transparency International, a watchdog on these matters, defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, which in healthcare encompasses bribery of regulators and medical professionals, manipulation of information on drug trials, diversion of medicines and supplies, corruption in procurement, and overbilling of insurance companies. This is no dirty little secret. It is one of the biggest open sores in medicine.

When health care corruption is actually discussed in polite circles, including the scholarly literature about medicine and health care, the discussion usually refers to corruption elsewhere.  In particular, in developed countries, discussion of health care corruption usually focuses on less developed countries.
Thus, maybe it should not be a surprise that the editorial by Jain et al accompanied another BMJ article about health care corruption in India. Yet by reading between their lines, both articles have global application, and are just as relevant to those nations in which the powers that be seem to have smugly concluded that health care corruption is only a problem in benighted third world countries.

A Personal View on Health Care Corruption in India

David Berger a UK trained general practitioner (GP), discussed the corruption he found while volunteering in India.(2)  His introduction was,

'The corruption strangles everything, Sir. It’s like a cancer.' Accompanied by apologetic shrugs and half smiles, statements like this are commonly heard in India. I knew this was the case before I went to work as a volunteer physician in a small charitable hospital in the Himalayas, but what I didn’t realise was how far the corruption permeates the world of medicine and the corrosive effect it has on the doctor-patient relationship.

Berger raised several issues:

Neoliberalism and Privitization

The healthcare system itself is a model of inequity; it is one of the most privatised in the world, with out of pocket expenditure on healthcare at more than 70%, far higher even than in the United States. This phenomenon is at least partly the result of the neoliberal World Bank policies of the 1990s, which mandated a reduction in public financing of healthcare, fuelling growth of the private sector. The latest in technological medicine is available to people who can pay, albeit at a high price,...

Kickbacks to Physicians for Referrals

This is a common form of corruption in India.

all investigations attract a 10-15% kickback to the referring doctor. One day, the marketing executive for this clinic had turned up at the hospital with an envelope full of cash—the commission for investigations ordered in the past few months. The senior doctor refused it and stipulated that in future the commission was to be paid back to patients, which is why the resident had to sign the form. The country’s doctors and medical institutions live in an 'unvirtuous circle' of referral and kickback that poisons their integrity and destroys any chance of a trusting relationship with their patients.

Kickbacks from Pharmaceutical Firms

There is also widespread corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, with doctors bribed to prescribe particular drugs. Tales are common of hospital directors being given top of the range cars and other inducements when their hospitals sign contracts to prescribe particular antibiotics preferentially.

I met a former pharmaceutical sales executive who left the industry, sickened by the corrupt practices he was supposed to employ. Working for one of the largest drug companies in the country, he was expected to bribe doctors with money and luxury goods. The crunch came when a doctor demanded that the company fly him to Thailand for a holiday and then provide him with prostitutes at his home. When the company representative queried this, his manager told him to comply, and he felt he had no choice but to resign, protesting that he was 'not a pimp.'

Huge Fees Charged to Medical Students

Endemic corruption extends to medical studies themselves. In another 'unvirtuous circle,' students can have to pay very large “donations” (perhaps $200 000 or more, some 20 times the average doctor’s annual salary) to get into the rapidly increasing number of private medical colleges and to get on to sought after postgraduate training schemes. This means that doctors can have high levels of debt or family obligation when qualifying, which is a strong incentive against working as generalists in rural areas and favours them practising technological medicine for maximum profit in urban areas to try to recoup their investment.

The US Parallels

All the issues above have clear parallels in the US.  But in the US, hardly anyone talks about health care corruption as a local or national problem.  

 Neoliberalism and Privitization

The US is known for its increasingly private health care system, pushed by the ideology of "neoliberalism" or "economism."  US health insurance is mostly provided by private, for-profit corporations, not non-profits, or government agencies.  US hospitals and hospital systems are increasingly private, as are other organizations that provide direct health care, e.g., hospices.  US physicians are increasingly corporate employees.  India may be more privatized, but the US is close behind.

 Kickbacks to Physicians for Referrals

We have frequently posted about cases in which there was good evidence that physicians in the US got kickbacks, or bribes.  Most involved legal settlements of cases in which there were allegations of widespread kickbacks.  Some of them involved kickbacks for referrals (e.g., the settlement involving Omnicare in 2013, look here).  On the other hand, resolution of cases involving kickbacks to small groups of physicians for referrals are so common in the US that we rarely discuss individual examples. For example, I found the following headlines from the last few weeks:

NJ Arrests More than 12 in Alleged Kickback Scheme
Randolph Doctor Jailed for 20 Months for Role in Massive Kickback Scheme
O.C. Grand Jury Indicts 15 Doctors   

We have also written extensively about how corporate physicians are pushed to avoid "leakage," that is referral of patients to health care facilities not owned by their corporate employees (e.g., look here). 


Kickbacks from Pharmaceutical Firms

We have posted about numerous examples of widespread kickbacks given by health care corporations, particularly pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies, to physicians to enhance their prescriptions for or use of their products.  Most recent examples include legal settlements by Pfizer about kickbacks to promote use of Neurontin (one of many by that company, look here); by Medtronic to promote use of its pacemakers and defibrillators (look here); and by Johnson and Johnson to promote use of Risperdal (look here).  Moreover, we have discussed many examples of physicians paid as "consultants" or given "honoraria" for talks by companies whose goal was to use these physicians as "key opinion leaders," actually covert marketers for their drugs or devices.  Many of the conflicts of interest we have discussed actually seemed to involve kickbacks or bribes, even though some physicians and policy-makers like to refer to them as "collaborations" with industry to increase "innovation." 

Huge Fees Charged to Medical Students

The huge tuition charged US medical students, their huge resulting debt, and their resulting tendency to pursue procedural specialties rather than cognitive specialties, particularly primary care, have become cliches.

So it seems that the US has some of the same possible risk factors for corruption as does India, that there are many cases in the US of activities that are called corruption in India, and that a near majority of US citizens feel their health care is corrupt.  But health care corruption remains a largely taboo topic in the US. 

Summary: Some General Approaches

The editorial by Jain et al that to its authors' credit emphasized that health care corruption is a global problem suggested some general approaches to corruption(2)

Good governance, transparency, and zero tolerance must form the basis of any anti-corruption strategy. Changes must be implemented in society at large for reform to be sustained. Better governance requires rigorous legislation and functioning administrative mechanisms to provide fiscal oversight. Ethical standards of conduct must be explicitly established and staff held accountable for their performance. Punitive measures should be available to serve as a deterrent. Honest behaviour must be rewarded. These policies may be ineffective, however, unless healthcare professionals are assured of a decent salary and fair opportunities for professional growth

Also

Simple and effective channels for complaints must be established, and appropriate legal support and protection provided to whistleblowers. Looking deeper, underlying issues such as education and social justice must not be forgotten if the battle against corruption is to be sustained and eventually won. Answers may also lie outside the world of medicine.

Note that we have discussed all these approaches: accountability, transparency, governance, boards of trustees, boards of directors, ethics and integrity policies , impunity, legal settlements, and education about corruption (look here). 


Not that any of them have been widely adopted.

So to repeat an ending to one of my previous posts on health care corruption....  if we really want to reform health care, in the little time we may have before our health care bubble bursts, we will need to take strong action against health care corruption.  Such action will really disturb the insiders within large health care organizations who have gotten rich from their organizations' misbehavior, and thus taking such action will require some courage.

References

1.  Jain A, Nundy S, Abbasi K. Corruption: medicine's dirty open secret.  Brit Med J 2014.  Link here. 

2.  Berger D. Corruption ruins the doctor-patient relationship in India.  Brit Med J 2014.  Link here.