Showing posts with label mortality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mortality. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

To Die in Texas - Dr Mahmood's Apparently Fatal Stealth Hospital System Collapses Nearly Anechoically

I would bet that most people in the US still think our health care system is highly regulated.  Some may thus conclude that the system is basically safe, because, for example, drugs have to be proven safe and effective to be approved by the government, and hospitals must be licensed and run by competent people who are thoroughly vetted.  Of course, some people still think that the US has, or had until recently, the best health care system in the world (look here).

Furthermore, the view that less regulation is always better is no quite popular in the US and elsewhere.  For example, after the chemical spill threatened water supplies in the capitol of West Virginia, the Dallas News reviewed Texas Governor Rick Perry's consistent attacks on government regulation.   

'American business in general, and American agriculture specifically, have had enough of bureaucracy at both the federal and state levels, but especially bureaucracy out of Washington,' Perry said at a congressional hearing. 'The men and women who feed and clothe this nation are suffocating under the weight of mounting federal regulations.'

That was back in 1993, when Perry was Texas’ agriculture commissioner. Now Texas’ longest-serving governor, Perry has remained steadfast in his opposition to government regulations.

Some who take such a neoliberal stance may say the health care system is over-regulated, and thus is inefficient and not innovative, leading to our high costs and poor access.

However, an amazing case out of Governor Perry's Texas that was made public last year, and I regret I just heard about recently, suggests how little health care may be regulated, and how unregulated health care, whether or not it is efficient, may be deadly.

As reported in the Dallas News, July, 2013, in the last few years there seems to have been an epidemic of quality problems in a number of seemingly unrelated small rural Texas hospitals.  The report focused first on one hospital,

Renaissance Hospital Terrell

After for-profit hospital corporation Renaissance Healthcare declared bankruptcy in 2008 (look here), it sold its hospital in Terrell, Texas to RH Terrell Management LLC owned by one Dr Tariq Mahmood.  Almost immediately, however, there was trouble.  First Edwina Henry, the quality director, spied a doctor making questionable entries in patients' charts:

from her office, she had a clear view of doctors’ foot traffic through the medical records department.

When she saw [Dr Tariq] Mahmood jotting in patient charts, she knew he wasn’t seeing patients. Mahmood himself had not been credentialed to treat patients — a process in which management vets backgrounds and competencies of doctors. Part of Henry’s job was tracking such evaluations. She also knew it was a breach of privacy laws to review patients’ medical records.

'I immediately questioned some of the clerks and [insurance billing] coders,' she said. They were deeply concerned, saying he was altering the patients’ records to help boost reimbursements for insurance claims, Henry said.

When Ms Henry complained, things did not go well,

Henry made her confidential call to the bankruptcy court in early November 2008, alleging potential fraud and threats to patient care that were eluding government notice [Ed - note that the hospital was going through bankruptcy proceedings and had just been acquired by a new owner]. The court forwarded her complaint to the U.S. Justice Department, the Texas attorney general’s office and the state health department, officials confirmed.

Later that month, the state health department sent an inspector to the hospital. However, the visit was brief, Henry said, and the inspector didn’t interview her or seek her help in obtaining records.

Williams, the health department spokeswoman, told The News her agency’s records show the inspector was unable to substantiate violations at the time.

Henry was terminated from Renaissance as part of a 'restructuring'....
Then the hospital was cited for turning patients away from the emergency department,
At Renaissance, two women in labor, one bleeding, were refused treatment. The inspection reports don’t reveal whether the women suffered complications because of the delays.

A Renaissance employee told one of the women that if she 'could stand there and have a conversation with them then (she) wasn’t about to have a baby,' reports say.

Then there were problems with infection control,

At Renaissance, no supervision over infection control could be found. For three months in the summer of 2010, no one was in charge of tracking infectious diseases or preventing their spread.

The next year, the problem was blood transfusions

Inspectors returned to Renaissance in September 2011 to investigate a botched blood transfusion procedure. They found that a registered nurse had not supervised the patient’s care. In another case, an inspector witnessed an unsupervised vocational nurse administering blood to a patient, despite no evidence that she was competent to do so — another violation.

In 2012,

During the summer, the Texas secretary of state had revoked Renaissance’s business charter for failure to pay franchise taxes.

That office didn’t share the information with the health department; it isn’t required to do so.

In September, state health regulators notified Renaissance that they were proposing a $35,050 fine for 13 violations, including the nursing supervision failures, dating as far back as 2010.

Williams, the health department spokeswoman, could not explain why the fine process took nearly two years since the first violation. 

Finally, in 2013, patients started to die,

In January of this year, when state inspectors returned to Renaissance, they found nursing supervision failures yet again.

This time, the failures had led to three deaths: All ER patients. All with severe breathing difficulties. All receiving little to no intervention as their conditions worsened.

In particular,

[Eve] McCallum sought her own care after complaining of shortness of breath during a family dinner.

McCallum had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. When she was admitted, nurses were ordered to monitor her vital signs and oxygen levels. Her breathing soon improved, said her niece, Lou Ann Sims.

'We were fully expecting to pick her up the next morning,' Sims said.

Instead, they watched helplessly as her condition deteriorated. On Christmas Day, a physician explained to McCallum’s family that she had to be transferred to the intensive care unit.

Later, Sims witnessed a scene she can’t let go of: Her aunt lay connected to a ventilator while a nurse stood smoking a cigarette just outside the door. The nurse had propped open the door with an IV pole.

The family immediately sought to have McCallum transferred to another hospital. But hospital officials told them 'this would be a lateral move and was not allowed,' according to a transcript of an interview the family later conducted with state officials.

McCallum died two days later.

Inspectors wrote that a licensed vocational nurse had been left in charge of her treatment, without a registered nurse’s oversight. There was no evidence an RN had assessed her condition on admission or was watching over her in the ICU.

They could find no doctor orders to place her on oxygen, no order for medications administered to her, 'nor evidence of communication with the M.D.'

Suspecting more than just care breakdowns at Renaissance, McCallum’s family reported her death to the Texas attorney general’s fraud-control unit.


So partially in response to this egregious case,

By February, the state health department had moved to revoke Renaissance’s operating license, and CMS had ordered its federal funding terminated — only the ninth time nationally in the last three years CMS had taken such a step.

Even those steps could not shut down the hospital, but city officials took that last step due to the failure to pay taxes.

Other Hospitals

Dallas News reporter Miles Moffeit found several other cases of severe problems at small hospitals owned by Dr Mahmood, with at least one patient death apparently resulting, .


Shelby Regional Medical Center

This hospital was owned by Tenet Healthcare, but was sold to another of Dr Mahmood's companies, Shelby Medical Holdings, in 2007 (look here). 

In 2009, this hospital was also cited for providing insufficient treatment in the emergency department.

In 2012, things were really falling apart,

In October 2012, inspectors were at Shelby chronicling dirty, clogged air-conditioners and failures to prevent ceiling plaster 'from falling into the patient food service line and contaminating food.' Those problems put patients’ safety in 'immediate jeopardy,' they wrote.

As inspectors roamed Shelby’s halls in December, the power suddenly went out in four buildings, though not in the main hospital facility itself. The electric bill hadn’t been paid. They found other debts stacking up, too — as much as $190,442 owed to as many as 79 service providers.

Signs of neglect were everywhere. Only three of 20 patient rooms inspected were 'fully functional for patient care,' they wrote. They found holes in walls, dirty and tattered curtains, and patients complaining of heat pouring from the faulty A/C system.

Finally, in 2013, another patient died,

On Wednesday, CMS cut off federal funding to ... Shelby Regional Medical Center in Center in East Texas after regulators said a patient rushed there by ambulance never received treatment from a doctor.

The ER physician wouldn’t leave his 'sleep room,' the inspection report said, resulting in the patient’s death. Regulators also cited the hospital for failing to vet backgrounds of doctors and nurses.

Apparently soon thereafter Dr Mahmood shut the hospital down due to "legal issues that ... [he] is facing," per the Shelby Light and Champion.


Lake Whitney Medical Center

Dr Mahmood apparently purchased this hospital from a struggling local hospital authority in 2007.  

In 2009, it was cited for inadequate care in the emergency department,

At Lake Whitney, a nurse acknowledged to inspectors that she had shredded records of a patient who was denied care following a fall, according to a report. The 'patient wasn’t going to pay anyway,' the nurse was quoted as saying in the document.

In 2010, there was evidence of major infrastructure problems,

At Lake Whitney, patients were served food on rusty 'over-the-bed tables that were a source of possible infections for open wounds.' Bulging ceiling tiles exposed pipes. Pavement outside a main hospital door was 'cracked and unlevel,' putting patients at risk of injury.
As Dr Mahmood's legal troubles mounted, the hospital was sold to Frontier Hospitals Inc (look here).


Cozby-Germany Hospital 

I have been unable to discover when Dr Mahmood purchased this hospital. 

In 2010, it became apparent that the hospital was not properly licensed,

'The administrator reported the new owner had not notified (CMS) … and has not applied for hospital licensure with the state licensing agency,' a report said. [The owner] ... also was found to have appointed his own employees to the hospital’s governing board of directors, instead of independent outsiders.

And there were more severe problems with credentialing,

At Cozby-Germany hospital, hospital inspectors discovered that the chief of staff and another doctor had expired medical licenses. There were no 'functional' nurse and doctor credentialing processes, and clinical policies had not been updated since 2008, they said. The hospital pledged reforms.

But in May 2011, records show, Cozby hired one of Texas’ most notorious doctors, Rolando Arafiles.

At the time, Arafiles had been placed on probation by the medical board for allegations of harming nine patients, overbilling and improper coding at a Winkler, Texas, facility, according the board. He also was disciplined for intimidating the Winkler nurses who blew the whistle on his practices.

In November, Arafiles would be convicted of two felonies linked to the retaliation and would surrender his license.

In 2013, two local doctors purchased the hospital.

The Vanishing Owner

What made this series of cases all the more amazing is that it was really one interlinked case.  All these hospitals, plus a few more, had the same owner.  Yet no one, especially  no one in state or federal government knew that until 2013 when the facts were uncovered by Mr Moffeit.

[Dr Tariq] Mahmood, a Pakistan-trained doctor, obtained his Texas medical license in 1978. Since 2008, he has practiced medicine only at his Central Texas Hospital in Cameron, south of Waco, records with the Texas Medical Board show. Older documentation is not available.

Over the last two decades, he has purchased at least six hospital companies and two home-health care agencies, according to filings with the Texas secretary of state. He also has invested his money outside health care, acquiring the historic Hotel Lawrence in downtown Dallas, property records show.

In addition to Renaissance, Shelby and Central Texas Hospital, Mahmood owns the Lake Whitney Medical Center in Whitney and Cozby-Germany Hospital in Grand Saline. He sold Community General Hospital in Dilley around the time of his arrest in April.

The hospitals have no common corporate identity and little or no website presence, making it difficult for anyone to know they are owned by Mahmood or are part of a chain.


However, much bout Dr Mahmood was mysterious, and the deliberate cultivation of mystery might have slowed the response to this case.

Mahmood is rarely seen in the communities where his hospitals are located, say business associates and city officials. Sometimes they catch a glimpse of him passing by in a chauffeur-driven car.

'He’s almost impossible to track down' to discuss business matters, said Tom Elliott, a director for a nonprofit company that owns the hospital building in Grand Saline. 'He lets his people do the talking.'

Mahmood is a mystery to many of his own employees. He works almost entirely behind the scenes, they say, focusing largely on the business side of his operations. He often is traveling or spending time at his 10,000-square-foot gated estate in Cedar Hill, they say.

'We see him maybe once a year,' said one of his hospital physicians. 'The employees say he doesn’t like confrontation. I say he just doesn’t like to communicate. He seems to live in a different world.'

Aftermath

 At some point, the shadowy Dr Mahmood may have to answer for all this, at least to some extent,

In April, federal authorities charged the 62-year-old Cedar Hill resident with defrauding Medicare and Medicaid programs through $1.1 million in false billings.

Mahmood is accused of directing employees at his Central Texas Hospital in Cameron to alter underlying information in insurance claims from his other hospitals. 'In many cases,' the indictment alleges, these were 'for patients he had never seen.' Mahmood pleaded not guilty, and his attorney said he denies all charges. He has declined repeated interview requests from The Dallas Morning News. 

Note, however, that these are charges of financial fraud.  They do not obviously have to do with poor quality care, risks to patients' safety, or the deaths of at least three patients as discussed above.

This case was so bad that even the current Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, a politician known for taking a small government, minimal regulation stance, at least said he was going to take some action, as reported again in the Dallas News,

The governor’s office has ordered a 'deep and comprehensive look' at health care facilities owned by Dr. Tariq Mahmood, whose chain of rural Texas hospitals avoided serious regulatory action despite years of endangering patients.

The inspector general for the state Health and Human Services Commission and one of the agencies it oversees, the state health department, will conduct separate investigations, officials said Friday.

And in February, 2014, the Dallas News reported that the chief financial officer of the Dr Mahmood's stealth hospital chain was also in hot water,

The top administrator of a chain of hospitals that collapsed under the ownership of a North Texas physician faces charges that he defrauded the federal government of nearly $800,000 in stimulus funds.

Joe White of Cameron rose from maintenance man to head administrator and chief financial officer over hospitals once owned by Dr. Tariq Mahmood. Now he joins Mahmood in facing the possibility of prison time.

Like Mahmood, who pleaded not guilty, White is accused of identify theft and bilking the federal government of health care dollars. White has yet to enter a plea.

Note that the CFO and apparently COO was not even a professional generic manager.  He was a former maintenance man  and operator of a Radio Shack store.. 

Dr Mahmood has not yet come to trial.  Many questions about the case remain unanswered:
 -  Did Mahmood the only person besides his CFO cum maintenance man in charge of all this, or did he have other backers,  cronies, associates?
-  What happened to the rigorous state investigation promised by Rick Perry?
-  Given that what went on harmed patients, and hence was not just financial manipulation, are there any civil lawsuits pending?  Are there any other criminal investigations?\

Furthermore, despite its egregious nature, this case was amazingly anechoic  The only national recognition I could find was in Paul Levy's Not Running a Hospital blog.  Seven months later, I could find nothing in the national media, nothing in medical and health care literature.  Despite the amazingly poor quality of care in evidence, despite the fact that patients died, I could find no cries of outrage from those who proclaim to support quality health care or patient safety. 


Summary

Dr Mahmood and his chief operating and financial officer collectively displayed leadership that was ill-informed (the COO/ CFO was a former maintenance man), incompetent (see the egregious health quality problems listed above), self-interested (note the size of Dr Mahmood's mansion versus how little was obviously spent on his hospitals), opaque and dishonest (note how Dr Mahmood's ownership of the hospitals was obscured), and allegedly criminal.  This leadership persisted over at least eight years until it culminated in cases of apparently needless patient deaths.  

The amazing case of the stealth for-profit hospital system run by Dr Mahmood, and how its combined problems failed for so long to get systemic regulatory notice hardly suggest that our health care system is heavily regulated, or that current regulation can be relied upon to reassure patients that all is well and that the system is safe.

In fact, in the case of Dr Mahmood, government regulators did not seem to even want to know too much about hospital ownership,

Top health regulators weren’t even aware Mahmood owned several hospitals until The News sought information about them earlier this year. Regulatory agencies aren’t set up to track problem hospital owners or hold them accountable. Nor do they look for patterns of care breakdowns inside hospital chains.

'We just don’t have that authority,' said David Wright, deputy regional administrator for CMS. The federal agency oversees the state health department’s inspections of federally funded hospitals. 'We can only address problems in stand-alone facilities.'


Furthermore, it appears that modern regulators have decided to become hospital managers' and owners' best friends,

The process allows hospitals to avoid sanctions if they cooperate. Hospitals submit “corrective action plans” to remedy failures. It can take months for state regulators to bring penalties such as fines against a facility. In the case of Renaissance, it took years.

'We want to do what’s in the best interest of the patients, and our regulatory philosophy is to get hospitals into compliance,' said Carrie Williams, spokeswoman for the Texas Department of State Health Services. 'We’re not in the business of shutting down hospitals. We will give them some leeway and work with them.'

Of course, this minimalist, light touch regulatory methodology may have made some sense in an earlier era when nearly all hospitals were small community not-for-profit organizations, non-profit academic institutions, or were run by local governments.  It seems quaint, and hopelessly out of date in an era when most hospitals are part of ever larger systems, now often owned for-profit corporations, and when hospital system CEOs who are professional, and thus generic managers, not health care professionals, in an era of financialization and "maximizing shareholder value," that is, making short-term revenue the most important outcome.

Instead, the current minimalist regulatory system seems insufficient to prevent patients from dying of poor care allowed by poor leadership of health care organizations.  Much of the content of this blog has been about bad health care leadership, i.e., leadership that is ill-informed, incompetent, unsympathetic or hostile to health care professionals' values, self-interested, conflicted, dishonest, or even corrupt.  In my humble opinion, health care regulation ought to be sufficient to promote competent, caring, unconflicted, honest leadership that is accountable for putting patients' interests ahead of self-interest.  Regulation needs to be more intense, and much smarter, geared to the reality of a health care system that is now largely for-profit in an era when management dogma puts revenue ahead of all other concerns.

Maybe the deaths of some patients in Dr Mahmood's Texas hospital will finally let the air out of the mindlessly anti-regulatory bubble, and start some discussion of intelligent regulation to improve patient safety.

However, that cannot happen if this case remains anechoic.  I regret it took me so long to find it, but now I have done my part to start some echoes.  But where are the media, where are the journal editors, and where are those who so loudly proclaim their interest in patient safety and health care quality?

In particular, there are several prominent organizations that claim to promote health care quality and patient safety.  These organizations make these claims-

Joint Commission

 For more than 60 years, The Joint Commission has been a champion of patient safety by helping health care organizations to improve the quality and safety of the care they provide.

Leapfrog Group

 The Leapfrog Group is a voluntary program aimed at mobilizing employer purchasing power to alert America’s health industry that big leaps in health care safety, quality and customer value will be recognized and rewarded.

National Quality Forum

 Transforming our healthcare system to be safe, equitable, and of the highest value will take time and the work of many, but the potential rewards are great. The National Quality Forum (NQF) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public service organization committed to this transformation.

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

Our efforts focus on improving both the health of everyone in America and their health care—how it's delivered, how it's paid for, and how well it does for patients and their families.

These  organizations should the ones to start the conversation about improving rather than forever shrinking regulation.   I have not heard anything from them about the deadly hospitals of Dr Mahmood.  Are they listening now?  Will we ever hear from them?  Time will tell.... 

 Note: the entire Dallas News series on the Mahmood hospitals can be found here. 

Thursday, January 2, 2014

"Emotion, not Information" - the Lucrative Deceptive Marketing of Hospice, and its Potentially Fatal Consequences

One of the real recent advances in health care, in my humble opinion, was the organization of compassionate, palliative care for people at the end of life.  During my training and early career I saw too many patients with terminal illness getting aggressive, sometimes very painful treatments which at best only offered hope of briefly prolonging their lives.  Some patients chose such treatments with full knowledge of the implications, at times with the hope that they might survive until some significant event, for example, the birth of a grandchild.  Many patients, however, seemed to be suffering with no purpose.

The hospice and palliative care movement, however, offered true comfort to those with little hope of prolonged survival.  Good hospice care eased the final days of patients with advanced disease for whom no definitive treatments could be found.

Hospice seemed like a great alternative for such patients, but its reasonable use depended on physicians' abilities to identify patients who really were at the end of life, and for whom aggressive treatment would be futile.  The Achilles Heel of the hospice movement remained health care professionals' inability to reliably identify such patients.  The big problem is that putting a patient who actually potentially could survive for a long time in hospice will doom that patient were he or she to develop an acute illness for which treatment is available, like a bacterial pneumonia that might respond to antibiotics, because in hospice antibiotics are not given for acute infections.

So the development of hospice had a downside which could be fatal for some patients.  I think most physicians hoped, however, that we could minimize the number of such patients by trying hard to make accurate predictions, and that in the future, better technology would lead to better predictions.

The Rise of Corporate Hospices

Back in the 1980s, however, I did not anticipate that hospices might become parts of for-profit corporations, and that such corporations might be able to make more money by admitting more patients, even patients who really were not at the end of life.   Starting in 2011, however, we started to find cases in which that appeared to be what was going on (look here, then here, here, and here).

In 2013, more cases appeared, listed in chronologic order -

Hospice of Arizona LC and American Hospice Management LLC - Per a news release from the Department of Justice, these entities settled litigation that alleged, among other things, that they "submitted or caused the submission of false Medicare claims between Sept. 1, 2002, and Dec. 31, 2010, for Hospice of Arizona patients who did not need end of life care...."

 Hospice Care of Kansas, and parent company Voyager HospiceCare - Per a Topeka (Kansas) Capital-Journal article, these entities settled to resolve allegations that they "submitted inappropriate claims between January 2004 and December 2008 for patients without a terminal prognosis of six months or less."

Hernando-Pasco Hospice - Per the Tampa Bay Times, " Hernando-Pasco Hospice has agreed to pay $1 million to settle allegations that it billed the Medicare and Medicaid programs for patients who did not need end-of-life care, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida announced Monday.  The not-for-profit Hernando-Pasco Hospice, which goes by HPH Hospice, is accused of admitting ineligible patients in order to meet targets imposed by its management team, federal authorities said in a statement."

These were all small settlements, that is, less than $15 million, reported in relatively small media outlets.

This week the issue was in the media spotlight courtesy the Washington Post, in an article which provided yet more data and vivid examples suggesting that for-profit hospices were putting money ahead of vulnerable patients' well-being.   


The Post added to the background we provided above,


Medicare began paying for hospice care in 1983, following a resurgence of interest in end-of-life care, sparked in part by the publication of 'On Death and Dying' by Elisabeth Kubler-Ross.

'We can give families more help with home care and visiting nurses, giving the families and the patients the spiritual, emotional, and financial help in order to facilitate the final care at home,' Kubler-Ross testified to the Senate Special Committee on Aging in 1972.

After this well-intentioned beginning, there was a rapid increase in the use of hospice, and hence its costs,


The benefit was quickly embraced by Americans and continues to grow, with Medicare paying for hospice care for more than 1.2 million people annually. In 2000, Medicare spent $2.9 billion on the hospice benefit. By 2012, that figure has risen fivefold, to $15.1 billion.

But as more Americans have taken up hospice care, a profound change has been underway: Big businesses have moved in.

In parallel, the nature of hospices changed, going from being predominantly local non-profit organizations to predominantly corporate,


When Medicare paid its first hospice benefit, the vast majority of hospice-care providers were nonprofit groups. Over the past decade, however, the for-profits have come to dominate the industry.

In 2000, 70 percent of hospices were run by nonprofit organizations or government agencies. Today, nearly 60 percent are for-profit companies, and they may account for an even larger share of patients.


They really were for-profit,


The profit margins as measured by MedPAC, the Medicare watchdog, climbed to 8.7 percent in 2011.

The per-patient operating profit has risen from $353 in 2002 to $1,975 in 2012, according to the analysis of California data.

Big money lured aggressive players, in particular, private equity,

 The returns have attracted some prominent financial firms, whose analysts have run the numbers and decided to invest. Among the private investment companies that have put down bets on hospices in recent years are Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., KRG Capital Partners and Summit Partners.

As we have discussed elsewhere, the private equity model involves not long term management, but trying to make big money in the short term, either by directly extracting it from the companies taken over, of by rapidly selling them, if necessary, piece by piece. 


Financial Incentives to Enroll the Wrong Patients

Keep in mind that the revenue fueling the uber capitalists involved in for-profit hospices came predominantly from the US government, and depended on the rules set by the government to pay for hospice,

The vast majority of those profits flow from the U.S. government and Medicare, which makes an estimated 85 to 90 percent of all payments to hospices.

The payments provide more profit from patients with the longest stay in hospice,


The reason that longer stays are more profitable is that hospice companies typically spend more on patients at the beginning of their care and then again at the end of their lives.

When a patient is first enrolled, the hospice often must diagnose the patient’s illness, set up home equipment and get them stabilized. Then, during the last week of life, a hospice typically must pay for more frequent home visits by the nurse, aides and others.

As a result, patients who live a longer time — and for whom there is a long, stable period in the middle — generate more profits.

There is evidence that for-profit hospice management has reacted to these incentives to enroll patients who would live a long time, despite the fact noted above that hospice was intended for patients who were at the end of life, and were obviously thus expected not to live for a long time,


Indeed, it has been an open secret in the industry that, because of the method of payment, the way to run a hospice profitably is to enroll patients who stay for a long time.

The annual report in 2004 for one large hospice provider, VistaCare, noted that its fortunes depended on its ability to manage costs and 'maintain a patient base with a sufficiently long length of stay.'

The company also warned that 'cost pressures resulting from shorter patient lengths of stay . . . could negatively impact our profitability.'

'It is common knowledge in the industry that a longer length of stay is going to be more lucrative,' said Rachel Mason, who worked in marketing at Delta Hospice in California, where one of the company’s branches had one of the highest discharge rates of living patients in the state last year — 63 percent. 'If they come in very sick and die right away, it’s difficult to run a business that way.'

So, in the aggregate, stays have gone up, costs have increased, partially because there are more hospice ''urvivors," that is, patients who actually were admitted to hospice not at the end of life, survived much more than the six months which was supposed to have been their expected lifespan, and thus ended up graduating from hospice, a service meant originally for the terminally ill,

over the past decade, the number of 'hospice survivors' in the United States has risen dramatically, in part because hospice companies earn more by recruiting patients who aren’t actually dying, a Washington Post investigation has found. Healthier patients are more profitable because they require fewer visits and stay enrolled longer.

The proportion of patients who were discharged alive from hospice care rose about 50 percent between 2002 and 2012, according to a Post analysis of more than 1 million hospice patients’ records over 11 years in California, a state that makes public detailed descriptions and that, by virtue of its size, offers a portrait of the industry.

The average length of a stay in hospice care also jumped substantially over that time, in California and nationally, according to the analysis. Profit per patient quintupled, to $1,975, California records show.

Yet, while Medicare administrators have been warned about these perverse incentives, they have done nothing to fix them,

For five years, Medicare’s watchdog group has been recommending that the payments to hospice companies be revised to eliminate the financial incentive for improper care, but Medicare has not yet done so. To ensure that patients are appropriately selected for hospice care, Medicare relies on strict medical documentation requirements, a spokesman said. 

Perhaps Medicare administrators are listening harder to for-profit hospice executives than to their own advisory committee,

 The hospice industry is opposed to fundamental changes to the payment system. Jonathan Keyserling, senior vice president of health policy at the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization, an industry group, said that the current payment system is sound and that tampering with it could have unintended consequences. 

Furthermore,

because of the large sums of money at stake, MedPAC in June added a sense of urgency to its recommendation.

'Given the magnitude of hospice spending devoted to long-stay patients, who are more profitable under the current payment system than other patients, it is important that an initial step toward payment reform be taken as soon as possible,' MedPAC wrote.

Yet Medicare administrators still seemed to feel no sense of urgency, and are not eager to address the specifics of the MedPac recommendations,

A spokesman for Medicare said the agency is considering hospice payment reform but that no such changes will happen in fiscal 2014.

'While the Medicare hospice benefit provides a choice for beneficiaries to seek the care that best meets their care needs and desires, Medicare has and will continue to take actions to safeguard this benefit from inappropriate use,' said Jonathan Blum, principal deputy administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, said in a statement.

So to recap so far, the hospice movement devolved from one involving non-profit organizations providing care to the terminally ill to ever larger corporations providing care to the less ill, paid largely by the US government under rules from a simpler era.  However, since hospice provides only palliative care, this transition meant that some patients who were not terminally ill may have died from illness that would have been treated in an environment other than hospice.

Vivid Anecdotes of the Deceptive Marketing of Hospice

The Washington Post article summarized allegations from multiple legal actions that provided a disturbing tapestry of deceptive marketing deployed to recruit patients unsuitable to hospice care,

While the lawsuits against the for-profit hospices vary in the details, as a whole they depict an industry in which companies compete for new patients and provide services to patients who are not eligible for them.

Hospice 'outreach specialists' and 'community education representatives' seek out patients in a variety of ways: They solicit doctors and hospitals who might regularly deal with the terminally ill; they make connections at nursing homes, assisted-living developments and Meals on Wheels groups. They show up at the 'health fairs' held at senior centers with, for example, machines that test blood pressure. For families struggling to take care of a loved one, they offer the promise of extra help.

At AseraCare, officials gave advice to their recruiters on how to close a deal with families who are 'not ready yet' for hospice, according to a company presentation for Alabama employees. It instructed recruiters to 'focus families' by stressing the urgency of a decision, and saying things like, 'We only have 10 minutes left.'

'Effective communication is the transfer of emotion, not information,' the presentation said.

At Odyssey Healthcare, one of the nation’s largest hospice companies, representatives earned bonuses if they met their goals for new patients, according to that complaint. The case led to a $25 million settlement with the company.

At Vitas, a division of Chemed, a company that also owns the Roto-Rooter plumbing service, the corporate culture encouraged staff members to admit as many patients as possible, regardless of whether they were eligible for hospice care, according to the lawsuit. The lawsuit said the company paid bonuses based on the number of patients enrolled. One former manager said that the company philosophy was 'sign everybody up' and that medical staffers felt pressured to admit patients regardless of whether they were appropriate.

And at Angels of Hope hospice in LaGrange, Ga., audio recordings cited in the complaint described how some salespeople found patients: by cruising neighborhoods, looking for elderly people with disabilities.

The article coned down on specific litigation about AnseraCare,


One of the primary lawsuits against AseraCare was initiated by Dawn Richardson, a clinical manager at the company, and Marsha Brown, the former executive director at the company’s Monroeville, Mobile and Foley, Ala., outlets.

There was steady pressure for AseraCare managers to find more patients, the lawsuit said.

An executive who did not meet a quota was penalized, according to the lawsuit, and the company offered a massage chair for the person who brought in the most hospice patients.

'In order to make our admission goal for the month, we are down to the wire, and need today to be a huge admit day for every region,' a regional vice president wrote in an e-mail, according to the lawsuit. 'Mobilize your teams, get them into the game this morning . . . when we call on them, they always respond with referrals and a push to convert those referrals into admits ASAP.'

'We had a director who would be like, ‘Get a patient, get a patient, get a patient,’ ' Michael Bonham, a Lutheran minister who worked as a chaplain at the company in Alabama, said in an interview. He is not a party to any of the lawsuits.

These demands for patients were sometimes met with people who were sickly but not dying, according to the federal lawsuit, which outlines five examples.

One patient was supposed to have had end-stage heart disease and thus would have had trouble breathing and walking, according to the lawsuit.

He left the nursing home for his granddaughter’s graduation and for Christmas, had a good time and ate a lot, according to notes from hospice workers cited in the lawsuit.

Another, diagnosed with end-stage 'debility,' was not losing weight as is typically the case, according to the legal filing, and instead went out for a trip to Wendy’s and another to go birdwatching.

Hospice firms' public relations departments provided the usual high minded statements that did not address specific allegations about the marketing of hospice, for example,

'AseraCare provides an important and valuable service to patients and their families facing difficult end-of-life decisions,' the company said in a statement. 'Our policies and programs comply with the Congressional intent of the hospice benefit to reduce the stress and anxiety of the end of life of a loved one,' the company said.

'Doctors for each patient in question determined that the patient needed hospice care, and expressed their clinical judgment by signing the required physician certifications. Other independent and well-qualified physicians reviewed the charts of these ­patients, and overwhelmingly agreed with the original conclusions that these patients were entitled to receive the hospice benefit.'

The company declined to identify the doctors who certified the patients in Alabama.
That seems about as relevant as the mission and values statements of Golden Living, AseraCare's parent corporation,

Our Mission

To share our passion for improving quality of life through innovative healthcare — one person, one family and one community at a time.

Our Values

Make integrity and accountability your pledge.
Share our passion for excellence.
Be uncompromising in delivering quality care.


Summary

Yet somehow our society must make it right and possible for old people not to fear the young or be deserted by them, for the test of a civilization is in the way that it cares for its helpless members. 

Pearl S Buck, My Several Worlds, 1954, p 377 (see Wikiquote)

I also was once taught that the true test of a doctor is his or her care of the sickest and most vulnerable patients.  By this token,  how the hospice movement in the US evolved into corporate health care delivery which generates tremendous revenues from the most vulnerable patients, and in some cases may condemn ill but not terminal patients to death from treatable disease marks how badly US health care has failed.

The story combines many of the themes we have sounded before -

Perverse Incentives - a reimbursement scheme that made sense when hospices were local community non-profit organizations now provides incentives for commercial hospices to enroll patients who are not terminally ill, putting them at risk of inadequate care should they develop a new serious but treatable problem.

Money Before Mission - For-profit hospices which market themselves as equivalent to their community non-profit forerunners, are run, as is suggested above, to maximize revenue no matter the effect on mission. Presumably this is justified by the fallacy of maximizing shareholder value, which really means maximizing apparent short-term revenue in order to maximize executive compensation, no matter what the collateral damage.

Impunity - Although hospice enrollment of unsuitable patients not only may defraud the government, but may put such patients at risk of their lives, the only regulatory or law enforcement actions against big corporate hospices so far involve corporate fines that are small in comparison with revenues, but not penalties imposed on any individuals who authorized, directed or implemented such patient enrollment, even when patients wrongly enrolled have died from lack of treatment of potentially treatable problems.

Corporatism - Government agencies which could seriously challenge corporate hospices' actions have been curiously inert, perhaps because agency leaders feel more sympathetic to their fellow managers within corporate hospices than to the citizens whose interests they are supposed to protect.

Because of their potentially severe adverse effects on our most vulnerable patients, reform of hospices should be at the forefront of true health care reform.  At the least, we need vastly tougher regulation of corporate hospices, removal of perverse incentives for them from the government payment system, and vigorous law enforcement when their leaders induce them to misbehave.  Leaders of corporate hospices need to be held accountable for their actions, and must be pushed towards putting their patients' health ahead of all other considerations, including the leaders' personal enrichment.

Furthermore, the story of corporate hospices shows that while turning direct health care over to poorly regulated for-profit corporations may have been increased efficiency, been "disruptive" and lead to innovations, the efficiency, disruption and innovation have mainly lined the pockets of corporate insiders, and not improved patients' or the public's health.  We ought to give strong consideration to banning corporate hospices, and banning all forms of the corporate practice of medicine and corporate health care "delivery."

Given how many insiders make so much money from the current version of laissez faire capitalism in health care, however, I would expect strong resistance should such apparently "radical," but actually conservative proposals actually get any mainstream attention.