"Can't This be Avoided?" - How Corporate Marketers Manipulated a Clinical Research Report to Avoid "Undermining" Marketing Messages

Documents newly made public in the course of litigation about the drug Pradaxa show granular details about how clinical research may be manipulated by corporate research sponsors intent on marketing their products.

Background

As reported by the New York Times, the litigation is over allegations by thousands of patients and families that privately held Boehringer Ingelheim concealed the bleeding risks of the anticoagulant drug Pradaxa. 

Pradaxa and two other recently approved drugs, Xarelto and Eliquis, are in a race to gain market share from warfarin, a generic drug that for decades has been the standard treatment for preventing blood clots and strokes. Many patients viewed the older warfarin as a nuisance because it requires frequent blood tests and careful attention to diet and other drugs.

The new drugs do not require such monitoring, yet claim to be as good, or better, at preventing strokes and blood clots in patients with a heart-rhythm disorder known as atrial fibrillation.

However,

 

Since its approval in 2010, the drug, which can cause fatal bleeding, has brought in more than $2 billion in sales in the United States, according to the research firm IMS Health.

It has been prescribed to 850,000 patients, but has also been linked to more than 1,000 deaths. 

Internal Documents Show the Influence of Marketers on a Clinical Research Report

As summarized by the NY Times, 

 The makers of the blood-thinning drug Pradaxa were so worried that an internal research paper would damage drug sales that some employees not only pressured the author to revise it, but suggested it should be quashed altogether, according to newly unsealed legal documents.

In particular,

 

The documents show that Boehringer Ingelheim employees openly fretted when it appeared that the results of the research paper, written by Paul A. Reilly, a clinical program director at the company, indicated that some patients could benefit from monitoring of their blood. A certain segment of patients, the paper found, absorb too little of the drug to effectively prevent strokes, while another group absorbs so much that they are at a higher risk for bleeding.

In a draft version of the paper included in the court records, Dr. Reilly and his co-authors detailed specific levels of how much Pradaxa should be in a patient’s bloodstream, and said that keeping some patients within that range would help prevent strokes and bleeding.

As Dr. Reilly’s draft paper circulated within the company, some employees questioned what the marketing implications of such a conclusion would be.

One company supervisor, Dr. Jutta Heinrich-Nols, wrote in an email to other employees that she could not believe the company was planning to publish research that would negate a decade’s worth of work proving that patients taking Pradaxa would not need regular tests.

Publishing the research results, she warned, could make it 'extremely difficult' for the company to defend its long-held position to regulators that Pradaxa did not require testing.

And, Dr. Heinrich-Nols added in the email, the research, if known, would 'undermine' the company’s efforts to compete with other new anticoagulants, such as Xarelto and Eliquis.

 'I would like to ask you to check again whether this is really wanted,' she wrote about publishing the research.

A second NY Times article added more details,

In one email, from June 2012, an employee wonders about the implications of internal research showing that blood levels of Pradaxa could vary significantly in a single patient.

'This may not be a onetime test and could result in a more complex message (regular monitoring), and a weaker value proposition … vs. competitors,' wrote the employee, whose name was redacted in accordance with privacy laws in Germany, where the company is based.

In another, an employee — whose name was also removed — asks about whether a newly available blood test in the United States might be useful for doctors treating patients with Pradaxa, which is also known as dabigatran. Another replies that such a test could be developed 'in-house,' but '2 years ago there was an informed decision NOT to develop this.' The employee continued, 'this would go against the ‘no monitoring’ idea/claim.'

Employees also continued to question the merits of allowing a research paper to be published showing that some patients could benefit from monitoring of their blood. The paper was published on Tuesday but with some details removed.

'This publication will more harm than be useful for us, neither in the market but be especially harmful in the discussions with regulatory bodies,' one email read. 'Can’t this be avoided?'

 

So, in summary, Pradaxa has been marketed basically on its convenience, as a drug whose dosage need not be customized according to frequent blood tests, in contrast to cheaper generic warfarin whose dosage may need adjustment according to frequent blood tests.  Yet a clinical trail sponsored by Boehringer Ingelheim, the manufacturer of Pradaxa, seemingly showed that its risk of bleeding might be dependent on its blood level, and hence perhaps that its dosage should be varied according to blood test.  

However, the manuscript reporting the results of this trial was apparently subject to vetting by multiple company managers whose specific concerns were whether the results of this research "undermined" the marketing message, and hence whether these results should be changed or suppressed to avoid contradicting the company's intended marketing message.  

Let me try to add some context, based on my experiences in academic medicine writing research papers, commenting on colleagues' papers, and reviewing papers for journals.  Considerable discussion among the researchers and clinicians involved in research projects about how manuscripts are worded is the norm.  However, working a perhaps more innocent era, input from people with vested interests in the project producing a particular result was unheard of.  Many health care professionals thus may still act based on the idealistic assumption that clinical research reports are all about science, and not about marketing.

Was the Manipulation Successful?

A Medscape article noted that the published version of the research article 

found ischemic stroke and bleeding risks were correlated with plasma concentrations of the drug in 9183 patients treated with dabigatran 110 mg or 150 mg twice daily (the available European doses). In their logistic regression analysis, the risk of ischemic stroke was inversely associated with trough concentrations of dabigatran.

The researchers concluded that 'the magnitude of the effect of dabigatran plasma concentrations on outcomes in atrial-fibrillation patients in RE-LY depends strongly on demographic factors, most importantly increasing age.' However, the results also confirmed a wide therapeutic range among those treated with dabigatran, with a more than fivefold variation in plasma concentrations. The researchers concluded there might be a subset of patients who could improve their risk/benefit profile by tailoring the dose of dabigatran. 

However,

In the paper, there are no references to the optimal plasma concentration of dabigatran, although such statements were in various drafts that circulated throughout the company, according to the New York Times.  When the paper was published online in October, Reilly told Reuters news  that the 'there is no single plasma concentration range that provides optimal benefit-risk for all patients" and that "no monitoring is necessary.' [see relevant Medscape article here.]

So it does appear that the final version of the article included a discussion that was influenced by the marketers' wishes that the results would not appear to contradict the marketing party line. 

A rigorous review of the article might have suggested that varying the dosage of the drug according to its blood level might reduce bleeding risk, and hence increase its benefits versus its harms.  However, a casual reading might not have revealed that the data in the study undermined the marketing message that Pradaxa is a better drug than warfarin because it can be given at a fixed dose without the need for inconvenient blood tests.  Thus, the efforts by the marketers to alter the dissemination of the clinical research to support marketing messages and increase sales of the drug and resulting revenues - never mind what the data showed - appeared to be successful. 

Conclusions

This case study, only made possible by the public release of internal corporate documents in the course of litigation, suggests that in retrospect the dissemination of the results of one particular clinical trial were manipulated in a somewhat subtle way so that the data would not contradict a marketing message that now appears rather fictional.

In the absence of litigation, and of a judge willing to make public documents that one party to the litigation doubtless wanted to hide, the manipulation of this particular study might never have been apparent.  Most clinical research is now sponsored by health care corporations with vested interests in how the research turns out.  Much of this research could be manipulated by corporate marketers who wish it to support their marketing messages, the truth be damned.  We (and others) have discussed many examples of apparent manipulation of clinical research, 

However, it is unlikely that we, physicians, health care professionals, health care researchers and policy makers, and the public, will ever know for such which studies were manipulated.  At best, very critical, skeptical, rigorous review can suggest which studies might have been manipulated. In the absence of such review, we are in danger of being swamped in a morass of manipulated research, and thus lead to make clinical decisions that are based mainly on hucksterism, not science.

Thus, I strongly advocate that those who author authoritative systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and clinical practice guidelines base their work on extremely rigorous, skeptical reviews that assume the likelihood that all commercially sponsored published clinical research has been manipulated (and that research that even post manipulation could not be twisted to support marketing many have been suppressed)  Reviews, meta-analyses, and guidelines that were not so based on extremely critical review should also be viewed with a jaundiced eye. 

Perhaps it is possible to devise legal and regulatory methods to at least make such manipulation more transparent.  Maybe this case, however, should again suggest that clinical research, that is, research on human beings, should be completely separated from those with vested interests in selling products or services which could be better hyped were the research turn out in their favor. 

Why Trust Drug Company Executives After One Admits Commercially Sponsored Clinical Research Is All About "Competitive Advantage?"

Mickey, the semi-anonymous blogger on 1BoringOldMan, wrote a righteously angry post in support of transparent clinical research.  As we have noted frequently, clinical trials done on human subjects are often manipulated to increase the likelihood of results favorable to commercial sponsors, or suppressed when even such manipulation does not produce the desired results.

Note that such suppression and manipulation degrade the scientific value of the studies, impede the evidence-based medicine process to rationally apply clinical research evidence to improve the health of patients and the public, and violate the trust of research subjects who volunteer to participate based on the assumption that clinical research is meant to improve patient care and public health, and contribute to science, not just secure commercial advantage.  

A European initiative to combat suppression of clinical research has been opposed by a lawsuit from US pharmaceutical manufacturers AbbeVie, spun off from Abbott Laboratories, and Intermune.  The European Medicines Agency had been willing to to make public unpublished patient level data from commercially sponsored clinical trials.  The lawsuit has shut down the process, and is meant to shut it down permanently, claiming that the clinical data, obtained from volunteer research subjects, includes "trade secrets."

As summarized by Mickey, their motivation seems to be to conceal how pharmaceutical manufacturers and other commercial sponsors of human research use this research for promotional, rather than scientific purposes.

An AbbeVie lawyer asserted that some adverse effects data should be kept confidential, and that "internal tactical decisions on how we are going to run a study, engage with regulators, and confront and solve problems and challenges we have uncovered during clinical trials" should also be kept secret because revealing them could "give other companies a tremendous competitive advantage," never mind whether keeping secrets could undermine science, decrease the study's usefulness to aid clinical and policy decision making, and break the implicit contract between researchers and study subjects.

It is becoming more obvious that many drug company executives, and other leaders of large health organizations, may care more about "competitive advantage" than patients, science or the public good, as Mickey points out.  So much for that advertising puffery  about drug development to improve patient health.  Thus it may be ridiculous to think that these executives they will negotiate to improve transparency of clinical research in good faith when doing so could decrease such advantage, again no matter what the effect on patients, public health, or science.

On this case there is an opportunity to speak out, Dr David Healy has a petition up on Change.org to oppose the AbbeVie and Intermune lawsuit which might get some notice if there are enough signatures.

Back to the Future - Another Medical Device Company Accused of Hiding ICD Defects

Suppression of data about defects in and failures of implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) was one of the big issues we featured in the early days of Health Care Renewal (2005-06). 

At that time, Guidant, later acquired by Boston Scientific, was accused of hiding data that certain of its defibrillator models failed, possibly leading to preventable patient deaths (see this post and follow links backward).  Boston Scientific, which acquired Guidant, settled a civil lawsuit and was put on probation in 2011 after it pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges of failing to file required reports with the US Food and Drug Administration (see post here).   Similarly, in 2010, Medtronic settled multiple patients' lawsuits charging that it knowingly marketed a faulty ICD (see post here).

St Jude and the Obscure Riata Data

Now in 2012, A Wall Street Journal article suggested that St Jude Medical Inc hid problems with its Riata implanted cardiac defibrillator (ICD) for years.   

In December, 2010, St Jude Medical Inc issued a warning letter to doctors: Wires inside Riata defibrillator leads—cables that connect the heart to implantable defibrillators—were sometimes breaking through their insulation from the inside out.


The problem, which ultimately led to a recall last year, could cause defibrillators to send unnecessary jolts to the heart or fail to deliver lifesaving shocks to return chaotic heart rhythms back to normal. The company said it had identified dozens of cases with visible signs of the problem, and pulled Riata from the market.

For many doctors, this was the first notice of a problem with Riata.

But before that 2010 warning, physicians including Alan Cheng, director of Johns Hopkins Medicine's arrhythmia service; Samir Saba, chief of electrophysiology at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; and Ernest Lau at the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast, Ireland, say they had encountered this so-called "inside-out abrasion" in their own practices between 2006 and 2009. When these doctors brought the incidents to the attention of St. Jude they say they were told by company officials and field representatives that the incidents were isolated. The malfunctions described by the doctors didn't result in deaths.

St. Jude had been tracking the problem for several years, according to company documents collected by the Food and Drug Administration and reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Cases involving the so-called inside-out abrasion date to at least October 2005, the documents show. Inside-out abrasion became a focus of an internal St. Jude audit, which examined multiple cases of the failure before April 2008.

The Journal article noted that more transparency about device failures might allow physicians to spot problems earlier and prevent harm to patients.

more than a dozen physicians and device-safety experts say that if St. Jude had acknowledged the inside-out failure earlier, physicians might have identified the scope of the problem sooner.


In some cases, doctors concede that they, too, believed the failures were isolated and therefore didn't act quickly to report problems to St. Jude or the FDA, which may have made it harder to spot the growing trend of failures. The leads were implanted in more than 13,000 patients since July 2008.

'Every time you have a failed lead, you assume it's an isolated event, but, you start to string together isolated events, and then you have a recall,' said Dr. Saba.

Summary

So, for Health Care Renewal, this is a straightforward case, at least so far.  Yet another health care organization, this time, a medical device company, failed to reveal data that might have reflected unfavorably on one of its products, and hence lead to decreases in short-term revenue.  However, by suppressing the information, the company may have allowed doctors to keep implanting a potentially faulty device, and exposed patients to risk, possibly of fatality. 

We have discussed many at least somewhat parallel cases of suppression of research (here), and many cases of other kinds of deception by health care organizations (here).  Yet these cases continue to occur, physicians and other health care professionals continue to be fooled by secrecy and data suppression, and patients continue to be harmed by drugs, devices, or other interventions made by people who knew, or ought to have known that they were more dangerous than they appeared to be. 

One problem may be that the people with the most influence on medical practice and health policy continue to cheer lead for the veracity of information about drugs, devices, and other health care interventions supplied by the people who most stand to gain from selling same.  A few weeks ago, the editor of the august New England Journal of Medicine, Dr Jeffrey M Drazen MD, scoffed at physicians' skepticism of pharmaceutical industry funded clinical research, claiming that there were only "a few examples of industry misuse of publications...." [Drazen JM. Believe the data. N Engl J Med 2012;  367:1152-1153.  Link here.]  In doing so, Dr Drazen seemed to ignore all the stories about suppression of medical research (some of which we have discussed here), manipulation of medical research (some discussed here), and deception (some discussed here) and secrecy (some discussed here) practiced by large health care organizations, including but not limited to drug, device, biotechnology, and health care information technology companies.

Instead, the possibility that St Jude kept hidden data about the failings of one of its ICD models reminds us how skeptical we ought to be about the information provided, or not provided by those with vested interests in selling health care goods or services.  Physicians, health care professionals, those interested in health policy, and the public at large need to collectively exert pressure on the leaders of health care organizations to promote greater transparency, especially about data reflecting on benefits and harms of health care goods and services.  . 

The Case of the Vanishing Graduate Medical Education Funds

While primary care falters in the US, those who teach it seem to feel increasingly poverty stricken.  Now it appears that one reason for this is an amazing example of multiple failures of transparency and accountability.  Let me work through it, begging your pardon for a little bit of "inside baseball," medical education style.  The results suggest how we desperately need some medical disciples of Sherlock Holmes.

Background

My personal experience and increasing data suggests that most medical school faculty believe that their teaching is not valued by their institutions because teaching brings in no external funds.  In 2004, Dr Catherine DeAngelis, then the editor of JAMA, wrote "few medical schools provide adequate, if any, reimbursement for teaching time."(1)  (See this 2005 post.)   This seems absurd on its face, since what are medical schools for if it is not to provide teaching. 

However, there is evidence of this mission-hostile behavior.  In 2007, we quoted from a revealing interview with Dr Lee Goldman, Executive Vice President for Health and Biomedical Sciences at Columbia University,(2) who stated that "taxpayers," faculty who "generate more [money] than they cost," are valued most, and implied that faculty who focus on teaching are regarded as "welfare recipients," who bring in less external funding, and are valued least.  In 2010, we noted the results of a large-scale survey presented by Dr Linda Pololi in which 51% of faculty felt that the administration only valued them for the money that they brought in, and half felt that their institutions did not value teaching.(3)

Yet while faculty seem to believe that educational institutions receive little if any money to pay for teaching, it is not clear why the believe something so counter intuitive, and it is less clear what money actually goes to pay for medical education.

US Government Funding for Graduate Medical Education

However, several recent publications affirm that actually a lot of money goes towards one important form of medical education, yet the specifics of the money flows are shrouded in secrecy.  In the May, 2012, SGIM Forum, Dr Mark Liebow and colleagues summarized some of what is known about federal support of graduate medical education, that is, education of interns, residents, and other house officers.(4)  There are two streams of money that flow from Medicare to US hospitals:

Direct GME (DGME) payments help hospitals pay the salaries of residents, teaching faculty, and support staff. DGME is the product of three numbers: a per resident amount that varies by hospital, adjusted annually for inflation; the number of residents in the hospital (capped for each hospital at 1997 levels); and the fraction of discharges from the hospital that are Medicare beneficiaries. The Indirect Medical Education (IME) payment is a percentage amount added on to each DRG payment. The percentage is calculated via a complex formula (the only US statute containing an exponent!), where the key factor is the ratio of interns/residents to beds (IRB ratio).

These two streams are of considerable size:

Of the $9.2 billion Medicare paid for GME in 2010, $3 billion was for DGME and $6.2 billion for IME. The money is paid to hospitals sponsoring training programs rather than to the training programs or other hospitals where training occurs. While about 1,100 hospitals receive GME payments, 66% goes to the 200 hospitals that have the largest numbers of residents.

So, the 200 largest hospitals get about $2 billion in direct GME money (and presumably about another $4 billion in indirect money). This averages then to about $10 million DGME and $20 million indirect GME per hospital.

Thus, teaching, at least the teaching of interns, residents, and other house-staff does pay, and much more than trivial amounts. (Note that these amounts are not for teaching of medical students, which ought to be supported by other funding streams.)

Why then do faculty think that teaching does not bring in any money?

The GME Money Vanishes

An article by Dr Saima I Chaudhry and colleagues in the American Journal of Medicine begins to explain, although the explanations are found between the lines.(5)

First of all, while the graduate medical education money is paid by the government to the hospitals, the government does not publish what it pays to individual hospitals:

It has been previously reported that the amount of GME funding individual hospitals receive is not publicly reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,....

The government also does not hold the hospitals accountable for how they spend this money, nor for the quantity or quality of education they supply in exchange for it.

Remarkably, Chaudhry et al imply that that the people who run graduate medical education teaching programs also may not know how much money their hospitals receive from the government to fund their programs. The introduction to their article noted:

It is unclear how much program directors know about the amount and flow of DME funds to their programs. Program directors' beliefs about the transparency of funding to their programs, or their desire to influence how funds are distributed to them, also are unknown.

The article reported on a survey of internal medicine residency program directors which asked about "their knowledge of D[G]ME funding for their programs, the transparency with which funds are distributed to them, and their desire to influence this disbursement." The researchers sent surveys to 372 member programs, representing 97.1% of all US internal medicine residencies. They got 268 responses, a 72.0% response rate.

The main results were that only 159/268 (59.3%) of program directors had tried to find out how much DGME money their programs received, and of those, only 84 (52.8% of those enquiring, but only 31.3% of all respondents) actually knew how much money their programs got.

Of the 92 program directors who did not even try to discover how much money their programs received, approximately 21% said that "no one would tell me," 21% said that the "information would be inaccurate," 14% said they "don't know who to ask," and 2% were "afraid to ask."

Summary

US medical school faculty, especially those in primary care, increasingly feel pressured to perform activities that they perceive brings in money from external sources. They tend to believe that their own teaching somehow does not bring in any money, and that their careers will fail if they do not put more emphasis on other activities that the institution views as more profitable.

However, literally billions of US government dollars go to support the education of house staff, including the salaries of faculty who teach interns and residents, who probably are the majority of physician faculty. Faculty probably do not know this, because the government does not publish the amounts given to individual hospitals, nor demand of the hospitals any accountability for how they spend the money they receive.

Presumably, the top executives of each hospital know how much money the government gives them. Nonetheless, the majority of physician leaders of residency programs are never told these amounts, apparently because their hospital executives kept the amounts secret. Many of those educators who have tried to find out the figures were unsuccessful. Some did not even try to find out based on beliefs that their attempts would be unsuccessful, any amounts they discovered would be inaccurate, the people who knew the amounts were hidden, or that it would be dangerous to their careers to even try.

Thus billions of dollars of money flowing from the government to fund graduate medical education seems to have vanished in an amazing example of widespread deficiencies in accountability and transparency.

There are many people who blame government for many social ills. In this case, one can blame the US Congress for not writing a law that makes the money flows transparent and hospitals accountable for providing good educational value for the money provided. One can also blame the executive branch, particularly the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for not making the money flows and the values received for them transparent.

There are a few people, including this author, who also blame the leadership of health care organizations for many of the problems besetting health care. In this case, one can blame top leadership, presumably CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) of hospitals for hiding the amounts of money they receive from Medicare to finance graduate medical education. One can also blame the physician leaders of residency programs for not insisting that they know the true sources of financial support for their programs, obtain budgets that reflect this support, and recognition that their faculty really do bring in external funds for their teaching of house staff (and are thus valuable "taxpayers" in Dr Goldman's parlance.)

It is amazing that such amounts of money have been flowing for years mostly in secret. The secrecy has fueled incorrect, and in retrospect, bizarre ideas about the funding of medical education, and the value of medical educators to their institutions. This secrecy, in turn, has helped suppress the morale of medical educators, support the control of managers of health care professionals, and distort the flow of money within academic institutions and to compensation for certain favored individuals.

Would our dysfunctional health care system not be better off if we demanded transparency and accountability from its leaders?  In particular, the US government should make payments to hospitals for graduate medical education completely transparent, and develop a system to hold these hospitals accountable for how they spend the money.  Meanwhile, top leaders of hospitals receiving this money should make the amounts transparent, first to the people who are supposed to be doing the education that the money pays for, and to the public at large.  This would allow those running the relevant educational programs to develop reasonable and realistic budgets, to treat their faculty with respect, and to demonstrate what value they provide for the money received. 
The ongoing anechoic effect, and related deception and secrecy fostered by leaders in health care are major reasons our health care system is so dysfunctional, that costs are so high, and access and quality so poor.  True health care reform would ensure health care leaders put the mission before their personal enrichment, and act ethically with accountability, transparency, and honesty. 
References
1.   DeAngelis CD. Professors not professing. JAMA 2004; 292: 1060-1.  Link here.
2.  Goldman L, Halm EA.  A view from the top: general internal medicine from the perspective of a chair and dean.  SGIM Forum, April, 2007.  Link here.
3.  Pololi L, Ash A, Krupat E.  Faculty Values in the Culture of Academic Medicine: Findings of a National Faculty Survey. Link here.
4.  Liebow M, Jaeger J, Schwartz MD. How does Medicare pay for graduate medical education? SGIM Forum, May, 2012.  Link here.
5. Chaudhry SI, Khanijo S, Halvorsen AJ, McDonald FS,Patel K. Accountability and transparency in graduate medical education expenditures. Am J Med 2012; 125: 517-522. Link here.