Friday, September 5, 2014

Logical Fallacies in Defense of the PARADIGM - HF Trial of Valsartan - Sacubitril, Suppsedly the "Game Changer" for Heart Failure

We frequently discuss how commercial sponsors manipulate clinical research to serve their interests.  There have been many cases of commercially sponsored controlled trials ostensibly designed to assess their sponsors' products manipulated to make these products look better.

Unfortunately, often such manipulation seems to escape public notice.  What skepticism they may generate often gets little notice, an example of the anechoic effect.  Very rarely do the people responsible for the trial deign to address skeptical criticism. 

However, we recently noted that cogent criticism of a very recently published trial got some circulation, leading to a dialogue with the trial's principal investigator.  The results seemed to show why those involved with manipulated sponsored trials often try to just ignore criticism.

Introduction - the PARADIGM - HF Trial of Valsartan - Sacubitril


As we recently posted, based on a new article now online in the New England Journal of Medicine, a combination of a new drug, sacubitril, in a new class, naprilysin inhibitors, with an older drug, valsartan, an angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB), has been hailed as a "game changer" for patients with heart failure.  However, although the study (entitled PARADIGM - HF) had many good features, it also had some major problems which made its interpretation difficult, and made the hype about "new hope" seem excessive.  Unbeknownst to me when I wrote the post, some pithy overlapping criticisms of PARADIGM - HF by Dr Vinay Prasad were posted on CardioExchange.

Surprisingly, Dr Prasad's post elicited a lengthy comment by Dr Milton Packer, the principal investigator of PARADIGM - HF, defending the study's methods.  This resulted in a back-and-forth between him and Dr Prasad.  (Available by subscription only.)  This seems to be on of those rare instances in which a pillar of the medical establishment was willing to defend the way things are done these days in health care, and in this case, the way commercially sponsored randomized controlled trials are designed.

In my humble opinion, this exchange illustrated one reason that most criticisms about flaws in commercially funded clinical research get the silent treatment: there really are not good explanations for them, other than they resulted from the intention to increase the likelihood that the sponsors' products would look better than they really are.

Let us consider in detail some of the written comments by Dr Packer addressing two major criticisms by Dr Prasad.

The Question about the Choice of Comparator

Dr Prasad and I both questioned the choice of the drug to which valsartan - sacubitril was compared.  Dr Prasad wrote,

In PARADIGM-HF, oral enalapril was dosed up to 10 mg twice daily, whereas LCZ696 was dosed up to 200 mg twice daily (which includes a cumulative 320 mg of valsartan). The problem is that 320 mg is the maximum HF dose of valsartan per drug labeling, but enalapril can be dosed up to 40 mg daily (20 mg twice daily) — double the maximum dose proscribed per protocol.

So,

In effect, drug dosing in PARADIGM-HF was a 'straw man' comparison. The reported outcomes may be entirely a consequence of more ARB versus less ACE inhibitor. That is reason enough to doubt the findings. Sacubutil, the novel drug, could have been a sugar pill, and the results may well have turned out the same. But there are two more good reasons to be skeptical.

Note that in effect Dr Prasad charged that the entire trial was based on a logical fallacy, the "straw man" fallacy.

Dr Packer's Response: Red Herrings, Ad Hominem Fallacies, and Appeals to Authority

Red Herring - Comparison to Trial with a Different Patient Population

Dr Packer made several responses to this criticism.  First,  he asserted that using the maximum dose of enalapril as a target dose would have been inappropriate,

Dr. Prasad proposes that the dose of enalapril was too low, and we should have used 40 mg daily of enalapril as a comparator. However, when 40 mg of enalapril daily has been used in a clinical trial (CONSENSUS), these extremely high doses were poorly tolerated due to hypotension and renal insufficiency.

However, that appears to be to be an example of the red herring fallacy.  The PARADIGM - HF trial was meant to include patients with mild to severe symptoms of CHF (CHF classes II - IV), although it actually included a few (about 5%) patients with no symptoms (class I).  However, as Dr Prasad pointed out in his later comeback,

Dr. Packer suggests that CONSENSUS trial proves that enalapril 40 cannot be given safely. It is worth noting this trial enrolled only NY Heart Classification IV patients, while these were less than 1% of pts in PARADIGM HF. Many patients in PARADIGM HF might well have been able to tolerate and benefit from enalapril 40mg.

So Dr Packer's argument based on a trial of only the sickest patients with CHF seems likely not be relevant to discussion of a trial of patients with much milder disease.

Red Herring - Physiologic Changes vs Patient-Centered Outcomes

Then, Dr countered Dr Prasad's concern that the design of PARADIGM - HF could not distinguish whether the apparent benefits of valsartan (at maximum dose) and sacubitril versus enalapril (at a moderate dose) were due to the valsartan alone versus the combination thus,

Furthermore, Dr. Prasad can provide no evidence whatsoever than valsaratan 160 mg BID produces more blockade of the renin-angiotensin system than enalapril 10 mg BID. It is simply not true.

This seems to be an even better example of the red herring fallacy.  The argument is not about the physiological changes the drugs may or may not produce.  It is about the design of a clinical trial and how that design could affect interpretation of patient-centered outcomes.  Degree of renin-angiotensin system blockade may not directly predict survival, hospitalization, functional status, etc.

Red Herring - References to a Trial of Valsartan in Addition to ACE Inhibitors

Appended to the above, Dr Packer wrote,


In fact, valsartan 160 mg BID does not even have a mortality effect when compared with placebo, whereas enalapril 10 mg BID does have a survival benefit.

It later became apparent that the evidence he felt supported this assertion came from yet another trial with an alphabet soup name, Val - HEFT.  But, as Dr Prasad argued, this was yet another red herring,

The VAL-HEFT trial– where Valsartan 160 BID was no better than placebo– occurred in the setting where 92% of patients were already on an ace-inhibitor. As such, it cannot be used to say what the effect of valsartan is among patients not taking an ace-inhibitor, as was the case in PARADIGM-HF.

To explain a bit, the Val - HEFT trial enrolled patients who were nearly all already taking an ACEI, including enalapril.  So its data could only speak to the question of whether adding valsartan to an ACEI has an effect, not whether valsartan alone is efficacious in CHF.  It does not appear that there has ever been a large, long-term randomized controlled trial that tested valsartan versus placebo for CHF.   So Dr Packer seemed to have supplied another quite large red herring.

Of course that raises the question of why  PARADIGM - HF only assessed the combination of  sacubitril plus valsartan, rather than sacubitril combined with other ARBs.  This question was not directly addressed in the exchange between Dr Packer and Dr Prasad.  Parenthetically, note that valsartan is sold by Novartis, the sponsor of PADADIGM - HF, as Diovan.

Dr Packer only complicated things later by writing,


if Dr. Prasad dismisses the evidence from Val-HeFT, he eliminates ALL of the evidence that supports the use of valsartan in heart failure. If he sets the Val-HeFT trial aside, what evidence is there that valsartan 160 mg BID does ANYTHING in heart failure?

Again, Dr Packer was the one supposedly responsible for the choice of valsartan as the ARB to combine with sacubitril.

In summary thus far, I could not find any instance in the exchange in which Dr Packer logically used evidence to explain why his trial compared valsartan (targeted to maximum dose) plus sacubitril to enalapril (targeted to a moderate dose).  Instead, his arguments seemed to consist of multiple examples of the red herring fallacy.

Ad Hominem - Dr Prasad's Degree of Understanding of the Heart Failure Literature

Instead, he also threw in some additional general points which appeared to be rather gratuitously fallacious, To start,

 
I wish that Dr. Prasad understood the field of heart failure trials better than he does,

Then,

I wish Dr Prasad understood the heart failure literature better.


These seem to be examples of the ad hominem fallacy.  Rather than addressing the logic and evidence used by Dr Prasad, Dr Packer implied that Dr Prasad simply lacks understanding. Dr Prasad's polite response was,


Dr. Packer could tighten his posts by reducing the number of times he wishes I understood the heart failure literature better.
Appeal to Authority - Dr Packer's and Colleagues' Implied Superior Expertise on the Medical Literature

That did not prevent Dr Packer from coming back with,

 
I suggested that Dr. Prasad become more familiar with the medical literature because it would save him considerable time in formulating useful arguments.

With this repetition, Dr Packer seems to be not only using the ad hominem fallacy, but implying the fallacy of the appeal to authority. The implication is that Dr Packer clearly is an expert, and Dr Prasad is not, and the expert should be heeded. Just to underline this, Dr Packer later wrote,

Dr. Prasad suggests that others share his concerns. If he were here in Barcelona at the ESC meeting, he would know that that was not the case. However, I realize that It is common for those who seek only to win debates to claim that others agree with them. But Dr. Prasad, wishing that people agree with you does not make it true.

That just makes it worse. The implication is that all the experts in Barcelona agree with Dr Packer, and hence as a group they must be right. By the way, it is obvious from our previous blog post, comments on it, and other comments on the CardioExchange exchange that there are at least other people who agree with Dr Prasad.

Appeals to Authority - The New England Journal of Medicine and the US Food and Drug Administration Must Always be Totally Right

Not to leave it there, Dr Packer added as general comments several other appeals to authority.  At the end of his first set of comments there was this,

The real lesson of PARADIGM-HF is that combined angiotensin receptor neprilsyin inhibition is superior to inhibition of the renin-angiotensin system alone in patients with chronic heart failure. That is the conclusion of our paper, which passes stringent peer review in the New England Journal of Medicine.

The implication is that no paper published in the New England Journal of Medicine should ever be questioned about anything.  Also,


 
it does not appear that you are aware of the criteria that the FDA uses to evaluate or approve new drugs for cardiovascular disease.

This added the appeal to authority that since the FDA approved this trial, there must be nothing major wrong with it, to another implied ad hominem about Dr Prasad's lack of awareness.

Thus it seemed that Dr Packer's defense of his PARADIGM - HF study's choice of drugs to compare was based almost entirely on a string of logical fallacies, rather than logic and evidence.

The Question of Run-In Period Bias

Dr Prasad's other major criticism of his trial had to do with its use of active run-in periods.  He wrote,

The reason why drug run-in periods are problematic is discussed at length in the literature. In short, run-in periods exclude intolerant and nonadherent patients, foster spuriously large treatment effects, and (most troubling) create inclusion criteria that are irreproducible — i.e., that apply to no population we can clearly describe, as reasons for dropout are multifaceted and unique.

Even more concerning is that drug run-in periods test a different question than the one we think we are testing. In PARADIGM-HF, the run-in tested whether sticking with LCZ696 or switching to enalapril is better for HF patients who have taken and tolerated enalapril followed by LCZ696. It effectively turns the trial into a withdrawal study. If stopping LCZ696 is harmful, that counts against enalapril.

Dr Packer's Response: Appeals to Common Practice 

Dr Packer's main argument in defense of the run-in period involved yet another logical fallacy, the appeal to common practice, for example,
  
Dr. Prasad seem ill-informed here. Drug run-in periods are not a controversial study-design choice. In fact, this type of design is strongly preferred because it closely mimics clinical practice.

Again,

I wish I understood Dr. Prasad’s arguments against run-in periods. We have used them in many heart failure trials, and it was used in the SOLVD Treatment Trial,...

Dr Prasad ultimately responded so as to underline the essence of the fallacy,

The fact that many (and often industry sponsored) studies use drug run in periods is not a justification for their use. 

Summary

The recently published paper reporting the results of PARADIGM - HF has already generated considerable media hype (and an uncritical editorial) proclaiming valsartan - sacubitril as a new wonder drug for congestive heart failure.  While the trial was not without good features, several critics, including Dr Vinay Prasad and yours truly, suggested the study had multiple problems which make its results difficult to interpret.  The Principal Investigator of the study, Dr Milton Packer, chose to publicly defend his trial, yet so far his defense seems built more on logical fallacies than on logic and evidence.  After he published his remarks in defense of the trial, the hype seems no more justified than it did before.

Not only was PARADIGM - HF sponsored by Novartis, but many of its investigators had ties to Novartis and other pharmaceutical companies.  Dr Packer should be applauded for disclosing clearly the number of companies with whom he works in his dialogue with Dr Prasad.

Competing interests: Personal fees from AMAG, Amgen, BioControl, CardioKinetix, CardioMEMS, Cardiorentis, Daiichi, Janssen, Novartis, and Sanofi.

However, not only is it likely that financial relationships with commercial health care firms influence health care professionals to be more favorably disposed to these firms' products, but also such conflicts of interest may cause conflicted, and hence confused thinking.  As  I have noted before, Dr Joe Collier said, "people who have conflicts of interest often find giving clear advice (or opinions) particularly difficult."  [Collier J. The price of independence. Br Med J 2006; 332: 1447-9. Link here.]  

This all adds to the argument that society needs to reconsider its delegation of the responsibility for much clinical research to the companies that make the drugs, devices, and other goods and services used in health care.  The temptation for them to manipulate the results to improve their marketing is too great.  The temptation for the health care professionals involved to go along to get along with the rich sponsors is too great.  It may be less profitable for some individuals, but it would be much better for patients' and the public's health if research involving people, particularly experiments (clinical trials) involving patients, were directly funded by, and designed, implemented, and analyzed by people without vested interests in the results turning out in favor of particular commercially produced goods or services. 

EHR safety, a false sense of security, and epistemological problems in the Medical Informatics community

Neil Versel is an author of many articles about healthcare information technology.  He recently published "Patient safety in the balance: Questions mount about EHRs and a wide range of patient safety concerns" (http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/patient-safety-balance) in Healthcare IT News,

a sidebar on my views "A 'false sense of security'" (http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/false-sense-security).

I thought my feedback back to him would be of interest, centering on a published comment of the typical hyper-enthusiast variety made by a prominent member of my Medical Informatics professional community.  The view exemplifies a widely-held but erroneous (and decidedly non-scientific) viewpoint in my professional community - and many others, including government -  regarding drawing conclusions in the face of significant evidentiary gaps and impediments regarding harms.

Here are my emails to Mr. Versel.  They speak for themselves, especially the short second supplementary email seen at the bottom of this blog post

-- SS

-------------------------------------------------------------


EMAIL #1:

From: Silverstein,Scot
Sent: Friday, September 05, 2014 10:05 AM
To: Neil Versel
Subject: Re:" A 'false sense of security'"

Neil,

Thanks for citing me in your article at http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/patient-safety-balance, http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/false-sense-security etc.

Want to call your attention to one of my largest disappointments and frustrations in health IT that evolved over the past decade or two, namely, cheerleading for the technology in the face of commonly understood Western science and epistemology ("the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion").

My concerns are best exemplified by the comment posted at the article site by a prominent member of my Medical Informatics professional community:


"The question is not whether EHRs are safe or not; sometimes they are, and sometimes they are not. The real question is whether they are safer than paper records, and the weight of scientific evidence is that they are."

The actual truth, considering the explicit statements with explicit reasons given by IOM, FDA, ECRI, and others as to why what we know about electronic harms is incomplete ("tip of the iceberg", see below), is that "while the potential for electronic systems to be safer than paper exists, the scientific evidence is inadequate to make any statement about comparative safety on the ground."

The data inadequacy is made far worse by the known and stated systematic impediments to discovery and diffusion of the harms, and a lack of robust studies on ACTUAL harms due to paper-based record keeping, especially and critically regarding optimal and well-staffed paper systems.  (Try a Medline search on that topic!)

The hyper-enthusiasts who favor the theoretical over reality on the ground and who push for speedy national rollout without proper safeguards, surveillance and regulation, are, in fact, killing people. [I.e, whose injuries and deaths at the hands of bad health IT were otherwise preventable had appropriate industry safeguards been in place - ed.]

There is actually nothing to argue, nothing to debate on this issue.

Some material backing up these assertions is below, mostly already covered in my blog-based 11 points.  [As at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/fda-on-health-it-risk-reckless-or.html - ed.]

Cheers,

Scot

------------------------------



Examples: 

1)  IOM report on HIT safety, 2012 (as I report at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html , midway down):


.. While some studies suggest improvements in patient safety can be made, others have found no effect. Instances of health IT–associated harm have been reported. However, little published evidence could be found quantifying the magnitude of the risk.
Several reasons health IT–related safety data are lacking include the absence of measures and a central repository (or linkages among decentralized repositories) to collect, analyze, and act on information related to safety of this technology. Another impediment to gathering safety data is contractual barriers (e.g., nondisclosure, confidentiality clauses) that can prevent users from sharing information about health IT–related adverse events. These barriers limit users’ abilities to share knowledge of risk-prone user interfaces, for instance through screenshots and descriptions of potentially unsafe processes. In addition, some vendors include language in their sales contracts and escape responsibility for errors or defects in their software (i.e., “hold harmless clauses”). The committee believes these types of contractual restrictions limit transparency, which significantly contributes to the gaps in knowledge of health IT–related patient safety risks. These barriers to generating evidence pose unacceptable risks to safety.[IOM (Institute of Medicine). 2012. Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care (PDF). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, pg. S-2.]

Also in the IOM report:


… “For example, the number of patients who receive the correct medication in hospitals increases when these hospitals implement well-planned, robust computerized prescribing mechanisms and use barcoding systems. But even in these instances, the ability to generalize the results across the health care system may be limited. For other products— including electronic health records, which are being employed with more and more frequency— some studies find improvements in patient safety, while other studies find no effect.
More worrisome, some case reports suggest that poorly designed health IT can create new hazards in the already complex delivery of care. Although the magnitude of the risk associated with health IT is not known, some examples illustrate the concerns. Dosing errors, failure to detect life-threatening illnesses, and delaying treatment due to poor human–computer interactions or loss of data have led to serious injury and death.”

2)  FDA Internal memo on HIT risk, 2010 (as i report at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/smoking-gun-internal-fda-memorandum-of.html):


... In summary, the results of this data review suggest significant clinical implications and public safety issues surrounding Health Information Technology. The most commonly reported H-IT safety issues included wrong patient/wrong data, medication administration issues, clinical data loss/miscalculation, and unforeseen software design issues; all of which have varying impact on the patient’s clinical care and outcome, which included 6 death and 43 injuries. The absence of mandatory reporting enforcement of H-IT safety issues limits the number of relevant MDRs and impedes a more comprehensive understanding of the actual problems and implications.


 This is especially true considering the FDA's own noted limitations of their information sources:




Limitations of the MAUDE search and final subset of MDRs include the following:

1. Not all H-IT safety issue MDRs can be captured due to limitations of reporting practices including
... (a) Vast number of H-IT systems that interface with multiple medical devices currently assigned to multiple procodes making it difficult to identify specific procodes for H-IT safety issues;
... (b) Procode assignments are also affected by the ability of the reporter/contractor to correctly identify the event as a H-IT safety issue;
... (c) Correct identification by the reporter of the suspect device brand name is challenged by difficulties discerning the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.
2. Due to incomplete information in the MDRs, it is difficult to unduplicate similar reports, potentially resulting in a higher number of reports than actual events.
3. Reported death and injury events may only be associated with the reported device but not necessarily attributed to the device.
Memo: H-IT Safety Issues
4 Correct identification by the reporter of the manufacturer name is convoluted by the inability to discern the manufacturer of the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.
5 The volume of MDR reporting to MAUDE may be impacted by a lack of understanding the reportability of H-IT safety issues and enforcement of such reporting.


3)  Jeff Shuren MD JD, head of FDA CDRH (as I report at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/02/fda-on-health-it-adverse-consequences.html):


The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT held a meeting of the HIT Policy Committee, Adoption/Certification Workgroup on February 25, 2010. The topic was "HIT safety." The agenda, presenters and presentations are available at this link.

At this meeting FDA testimony was given by Jeffrey Shuren, Director of FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health. Dr. Shuren noted several categories of health IT-induced adverse consequences known by FDA. This information was striking:

He wrote:


... In the past two years, we have received 260 reports of HIT-related malfunctions with the potential for patient harm – including 44 reported injuries and 6 reported deaths. Because these reports are purely voluntary, they may represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the HIT-related problems that exist.

Even within this limited sample, several serious safety concerns have come to light. The reported adverse events have largely fallen into four major categories: (1) errors of commission, such as accessing the wrong patient’s record or overwriting one patient’s information with another’s; (2) errors of omission or transmission, such as the loss or corruption of vital patient data; (3) errors in data analysis, including medication dosing errors of several orders of magnitude; and (4) incompatibility between multi-vendor software applications and systems, which can lead to any of the above.

4)  ECRI Institute Deep Dive study of health IT safety (as I report at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html):

Participating facilities submitted health IT related events during the nine-week period starting April 16, 2012, and ending June 19, 2012. ECRI Institute PSO pulled additional health IT events that were submitted by facilities during the same nine-week period as part of their routine process of submitting event reports to ECRI Institute PSO’s reporting program. The PSO Deep Dive analysis consisted of 171 health IT-related events submitted by 36 healthcare facilities, primarily hospitals

(There were 8 injuries and 3 possible deaths associated with these 171 IT-related events over just 9 weeks, suggesting a damn serious problem way ahead of paper errors.)

5)  Statement by Medical Director of ECRI, same link as above:

Karen Zimmer, MD, medical director of the institute, says the reports of so many types of errors and harm got the staff's attention in part because the program captured so many serious errors within just a nine-week project last spring.  The volume of errors in the voluntary reports was she says, "an awareness raiser."

"If we're seeing this much under a voluntary reporting program, we know this is just the tip of the iceberg; we know these events are very much underreported."

6)  ECRI's continuing concerns based on continuous data submitted by their PSO member hospitals that health IT systems are "one of the top ten (and in fact in 2014, risk #1) technology risks in healthcare" (as I report at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/in-ecri-institutes-new-2014-top-10.html)


This is a short list, but you get the idea about making any statements about comparative risks of paper v. electronic.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

EMAIL #2: 

 From: Silverstein,Scot 
Sent: Friday, September 05, 2014 10:08 AM
To: Neil Versel
Subject: RE: Re:" A 'false sense of security'"

Not to mention that the "real" question isNOT "whether they [electronic systems] are safer than paper records."

The real question is:  is it ethical, based on the current clinical reality and incomplete state of knowledge, to push this technology on patients?

I also could add to that question:  "...especially without informed consent?"

Scot


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-- SS  

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

Sacubitril - Valsartan, a "New Threshold of Hope" or Hype for Heart Failure?

Summer must be over, because the next new blockbuster drug appears to be here.  At the end of August, the media heralded the results of a study of a new product for congestive heart failure (CHF) from Novartis.

Novartis' New "Game Changer"

The New York Times article was fairly restrained, simply saying it

has shown a striking efficacy in prolonging the lives of people with heart failure

The Reuters article's headline said

New Novartis drug may upend heart failure treatment

In Forbes, Matthew Herper called it a

Game Changer

The accompanying editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine (1) suggested the drug

may well represent a new threshold of hope for patients with heart failure

On the heels of the debate about the high price of Sovaldi, Gilead's drug similarly touted as a game changer for the also common disease, hepatitis C (look here), almost immediately the concerns about cost followed.  Another Reuters article quoted the past president of the European Society of Cardiology,

We are entering a new era of treatment and, of course, it will cost a lot of money, which is a problem

This blog was late to the party for Sovaldi, and did not get to examine the evidence used to support its ostensibly wondrous properties until a while after it was published, and after the drug was approved.  Therefore, I thought we should examine the new evidence about Novartis' new drug now, before the drug is reviewed for marketing approval.

Congestive Heart Failure

First, let me give a very informal review of congestive heart failure (CHF).  CHF is a syndrome that is the final common pathway for many patients with heart disease.  It can be commonly caused by prolonged hypertension, coronary artery disease (often after one or more myocardial infarctions, or heart attacks), cardiac valve disease, or various problems with the heart muscle (cardiomyopathies).  In CHF, the heart cannot pump sufficiently to meet the body's needs.  The body responds in various ways, not all advantageous.  There are two main types of heart failure.  In one, systolic dysfunction, the heart's pump function, measured by its ejection fraction, is directly reduced.  In the other, sometimes called diastolic dysfunction, the heart becomes stiff, and hence it may not fill with blood adequately.  In either case, a common response is accumulation of fluid.  Fluid can accumulate in the lungs, causing breathlessness.  CHF patients often are fatigued, breathless, find it hard to do physical activity, and may have swelling of the legs or abdomen (edema).

Starting more than 20 years ago, a series of landmark clinical trials found that various types of medication could be used to modify the often disadvantageous compensatory mechanisms evoked by CHF with systolic dysfunction.  Controlled trials showed these medications could reduce symptoms, reduce hospitalizations, and prolong life.  These medications included those that affected the renin-angiotensin system, used by the body to control blood flow and pressure, including angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors (ACEIs), and angiotensin receptor blockers (ARBs).  Also found to be efficacious were beta-blockers and mineralocorticoid blockers. At this point, all these medications are available in cheap, generic form in the US.

Review of the New Study of Sacubitril and Neprilysin Inhibtion

So let us examine the article just published online that reports a trial of Novartis' new drug.(2)

The new Novartis medication is sacubitril, which inhibits an enzyme called neprilysin, which degrades various active compounds in the body.  Inhibition of the enzyme and the resultant increase in the level of these compounds seems to favorably affect the disadvantageous compensation mechanisms found in CHF.

A previous effort to develop a neprilysin inhibitor found that it produced an unacceptable risk of a serious side-effect, angioedema, when combined with an ACE inhibitor.  So the current study involved another neprilysin inhibitor, sacubitril, combined with a angiotensin receptor blocker, valsartan, sold by Novartis under the trade name Diovan.

The trial had many good features.  It was large, including 8442 patients randomized.  It followed patients for longer than the short-term, a median of 27 months.  Most importantly, it assessed real clinical outcomes that might be important to patients (that is, "patient-centered outcomes,") including death, acute hospitalization, and a measure of health status and physical function, the Kansas City Cardiomyopathy Questionnaire (KCCQ).  

So far, so good.  However, a close read revealed some major and some minor problems.
  
Low Dose of Comparator 

This is a bit complex so bear with me.  

The study assessed a combination of sacubitril and valsartan versus a well-known ACE inhibitor, enalapril.  The target dose of the sacubitril and valsartan, rather confusingly called LCZ696, was 160 mg of valsartan twice daily, for a total of 320 mg/ day of valsartan.  The target dose of enalapril was 10 mg twice daily, for a total of 20 mg.

Note that both ACEIs like enalapril and ARBs like valsartan are considered appropriate first line treatment of CHF with systolic dysfunction.  In the most recent ACCF/ AHA guideline for heart failure, the maximum suggested dose of enalapril is 10-20 mg twice a day, and of valsartan, 160 mg twice a day.  Previous studies have suggested that pushing these doses as high as patients can tolerate improves outcomes.  

So the current study compared a targeted maximum dose of valsartan (plus sacubitril) to a less than maximum dose of enalapril.  The article did not explain why the study did not call for a maximum dose of enalapril, or indeed why valsartan plus sacubitril was not compared to valsartan alone. 

Thus the advantages of valsartan plus sacubitril found in the study could be entirely due to the superiority of maximum doses of valsartan versus moderate doses of enalapril.  I do not believe the study design can allow conclusions to be drawn about the efficacy of sacubitril.

 Note that this problem was noted in an online comment on the article by Dr Martin Nitschke.   

Choosing to compare the new drug to a less than maximally efficacious dose of the comparator medicine could make the new drug appear to be more efficacious than it actually is.  This apparent major design problem has been listed as one of the ways commercially sponsored studies may be manipulated to make the sponsors' products appear better.  The particular tactic of conducting a trial "against a treatment known to be inferior" was listed in a 2005 article on clinical research manipulation by Richard Smith.(3)


Active Run-In Period

Before patients were enrolled in the trial, they went through two "run-in" periods.  In the first, they were switched from their previous doses of ACEIs or ARBs to enalapril, up to 10 mg twice daily.  Patients unable to tolerate this were not randomized.  

Then the patients were switched from enalapril to valsartan 160 mg plus sacubitril up to .  Again, if they failed to tolerate this, they were also not randomized.  

The article noted that substantial patients were disqualified during these active run-in periods.  During the enalapril period, of 10,513 patients, 1102 were dropped from the study, including 591 (5.6%) due to an adverse effect, 66 (0.6%) due to an abnormal test results, and 49 (0.5%) who died.  During the valsartan plus sacubitril period, of 9419 patients, 977 were dropped, including 547 (5.8%) for adverse effects, 58 (0.6%) for abnormal test results, and 47 (0.5%) who died.  

There are major problems with such active run-in periods.  First, by eliminating patients who had adverse effects from the main results, they make the adverse effect rate appear smaller.  

Second, they raise questions about the patient population to whom the study results apply.  The study results only clearly apply to patients who are known to be able to tolerate valsartan and sacubitril.  In practice, should the drug be approved, at that time the only such patients would be those who already participated in trials.  (Of course, the results only apply to patients known to be able to tolerate enalapril.  This drug, however, has been on the market for years, and is widely used for problems, like hypertension, other than CHF.  So there are already quite a few patients known to tolerate it.)

The problems with interpreting studies that included active run-in periods were clearly described in an article by Pablos-Mendez et al in 1998.(4) 

Failure to Consider Adverse Effects Specific to Sacubitril

Valsartan and enalapril are now old drugs.  Their adverse effects are well known.

Sacubitril is a new drug in a new class.  It inhibits an enzyme that in turn affects the metabolism of many substances.  Thus, it is possible it has widespread effects, and may have multiple, and possibly unusual side-effects.

Yet the current study did not apparently include any efforts to anticipate and attempt to assess such side effects.  This problem was pointed out in a comment by Dr Ivan Boyadzhiev.

Failure to consider specific adverse effects may mean these effects are overlooked.  Thus, it is possible that the new drug has adverse effects that go beyond what are addressed in the article. 

Large Numbers of Sites and Quality Control

The study was done in 1043 centers in 47 countries.  The list of investigators took up six pages of the supplementary documentation.  Thus the average number of patients recruited per center was less than nine.

It seems improbable that a study involving so many investigators and centers, most of whom must have devoted little of their time and effort to this particular study, would have adequate quality control.  One indicator that quality control may have been a problem was that although the study inclusion criteria included patients with class II-IV heart failure, about 5% of study patients had class I heart failure.

The article and the supplementary material did not discuss study coordination or quality control.  It is not possible to tell whether any such problems with quality control may have distorted the study's results.

Lack of Generalizability in the Patient Population

The complete list of exclusion criteria, only appearing in the supplementary material, was extensive.  Patients with many common problems were supposed to be excluded, and the definition of the some exclusion criteria were vague and subjective.  These problems included coronary or carotid artery disease "likely to require" surgical or percutaneous intervention within 6 months, "history of severe pulmonary disease," "any surgical or medical condition which might significantly alter the absorption, distribution, metabolism or excretion of study drugs," including inflammatory bowel disease, duodenal or gastric ulcers, evidence of liver disease, and "presence of any other disease with a life expectancy of less than 5  years."

CHF patients are commonly elderly and have other medical problems.  Thus the study's results may not generalize to many patients with CHF in real-life. 

 Summary

It would certainly be nice to have a new medicine to improve the management of chronic CHF.  Sacubitril may have promise to do so.  Unfortunately, the clinical trial that just generated much favorable publicity ahead of regulatory consideration of this drug had major, possibly fatal flaws.  Use of a probably non-comparable and inferior "comparator" medication made it impossible to tell whether sacubitril actually is efficacious.  Use of an active run-in period, and failure to consider whether this new drug may have unexpected side-effects made it likely that the study underestimated its adverse effects.  Study results may not generalize to many real-life patients.  There are reasons to be concerned about whether the quality of study implementation was adequate.

Therefore, all the enthusiasm about this drug may be premature, and does not appear to be evidence-based.  That clinical research sponsored by organizations that sell health care goods and services may be manipulated to make the sponsors' products look better than they really are is now an old story.  We have seen multiple instances in which drugs and devices turned out to be less efficacious and/or more dangerous than originally advertised.  Excess enthusiasm about such new innovations may drive up costs, and worse, hurt patients.  Physicians, other health care professionals, and those concerned about health policy ought to be much more skeptical about every new instance of a purportedly wondrous innovation. 

 Evidence-based medicine rigorously applied suggests that individual health care and health policy decisions should be driven by the best available evidence, mostly from clinical research, about the benefits and harms of tests, treatments, programs, and so on, in the context of what outcomes matter to patients.  The skepticism EBM should engender lead to health care that is more about patients and their outcomes, and less about ideology, hype, and hucksterism.

ADDENDUM (3 September, 2014) - See also post by Dr Vinay Prasad on the CardioExchange site.  He drew similar conclusions about the choice of comparator, and the active run-in period, and added a new concern about the early stopping of the trial.  The comments include a - ahem - vigorous exchange between Dr Prasad and Dr Milton Packer, the Principal Investigator of the trial.  IMHO, Dr Packer did not completely understand or appreciate the points made by Dr Prasad.  Also, see our later blog post on this exchange here.

ADDENDUM (9 September, 2014) - See also a post by Gary Schwitzer on the HealthNewsReview.org blog that summarizes other critical online comments about the PARADIGM - HF study.  In particular, Dr Richard Lehman on his Journal Review blog on the British Medical Journal website wrote this scathing paragraph:

 And now, alas, to the much-vaunted PARADIGM-HF trial. This has been hyped as the biggest breakthrough in heart failure for at least 20 years.  A fixed dose of enalapril was compared with a substance called LCZ696. This turns out to have been a mixture of valsartan and sacubitril, a neutral endopeptidase inhibitor, and most participants ended up receiving a daily dose of 320mg of valsartan, versus 20mg of enalapril. A total of 711 patients (17.0%) receiving LCZ696 and 835 patients (19.8%) receiving enalapril died after a median follow-up of 27 months, at which point the trial was stopped prematurely. So just what are we looking at here? How can we distinguish the effect of the sacubitril from the effect of the high dose of valsartan? Well, we can’t. And this trial is a perfect example of everything that is wrong with heart failure trials. The mean age of the 8442 patients was 63.8, nearly  80% were male, and they were selected by reduced ejection fraction in 1043 centres across 47 countries. A logistic nightmare, but a great way for Novartis to spread influence. And Novartis then collected, managed and analyzed all the data itself. As I have said, a submaximal dose of one drug was compared with a maximal dose of another plus an extra ingredient. There was a run-in period, in which patients who were intolerant to the new treatment (12%) dropped out. Adding bias to bias, the trial was terminated prematurely. One of the primary end-points was hospitalization, which was ably demolished in a JAMA article I pointed out last week. And yes, there was a mortality benefit, but the number-needed-to-treat was about 35 to prevent one death in 2 and half years, in a population far removed from the elderly co-morbid patients we see in real life. As I draw to the end of a clinical career in which I’ve tried to help people with heart failure, I stand bemused. This is just how things have been done for the last 30 years, and it’s not good enough. At the very least, Novartis must make its full data set available for independent analysis. And before sacubitril is licensed, we need a properly designed trial, say between valsartan 160mg b.d. alone and valsartan plus sacubitril, in a typical population with heart failure. It will be very interesting to see what the FDA, the EMA and NICE decide.
 
References
1.  Jessup M. Neprilysin inhibition - a novel therapy for heart failure.  N Engl J Med 2014;  DOI: 10.1056/NEJMe1409898.  Link here.
2.  McMurray JJV, Packer M, Desai AS et al.  Angiotensin - neprilysin inhibition versus enalapril in heart failure.  N Engl J Med 2014; DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1409077  Link here.
3.  Smith R. Medical journals are an extension of them marketing arms of pharmaceutical companies.  PLoS Medicine 2005;  DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020138.  Link here.
4.  Pablos-Mendez A, Barr G, Shea S. Run-in periods in randomized trials: implications for the application of results in clinical practice.  JAMA 1998;  279(3): 222-225. doi:10.1001/jama.279.3.222.  Link here.

Thursday, August 28, 2014

The RUC. "an Independent Group of Physicians?" - But It Includes Executives and Board Members of For-Profit Health Care Corporations and Large Hospital Systems

Introduction

We just discussed how a major story in Politico has once again drawn attention to the opaque RUC (Resource Based Relative Value System Update Committee) and its important role in determining what physicians are paid for different kinds of services, and hence the incentives that have helped make the US health care system so procedurally oriented.  (See the end of our last post for a summary of the complex issues that swirl around the RUC.)

The Politico article covered most of the bases, but notably omitted how the RUC may be tied to various large health care organizations, especially for-profit, and how the incentives it creates may benefit them. When the RUC membership first became public in 2011 due to efforts by Wall Street Journal reporters, I used internet searches to find that nearly half of the RUC members had conflicts of interest (look here).  Most of them were part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.

In preparing my latest post, I found that to its credit, the AMA now makes the RUC membership more accessible (look here, free registration required.)  So I decided to check whether the current RUC roster still seems so conflicted.

As I did in 2011, I ran internet searches on all new RUC members since 2011, and updated searches on the continuing members.  Results are below.  Information new since 2011 is highlighted thus.  Note that I believe all the listed relationships are or were actual, but cannot rule out errors, especially given some RUC members have common names.  Any corrections are welcome.


The RUC Members and Their Financial Relationships

- Barbara S Levy, MD

Chair, RVS Update Committee
Federal Way, WA 2000

Consultant/Advisory Boards: Conceptus; AMS; Covidien; Halt Medical; Gynesonics; Idoman Medical (hysteroscopic surgery and sterilization, endometrial ablation, electrosurgery, vaginal hysterectomy) per UptoDate


-Margie Andreae MD
American Academy of Pediatrics
Ann Arbor, MI

Chief Medical Officer of Integrated Revenue Cycle and Billing Compliance, University of Michigan Health System, per University of Michigan Health System


- Michael D. Bishop, MD
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP)
Bloomington, IN 2003

- James Blankenship, MD
American College of Cardiology (ACC)
Danville, PA 2000

Lecture fees from Sanofi-Aventis per New England Journal of Medicine
Financial relationships with  The Medicines Company, Abbott Vascular, Conor Med Systems, Portola Pharmaceuticals, Schering Plough, AGA Medical, Astra Zeneca, Abiomed, Bristol Myers Squibb, Tryton Medical, Kai Pharmaceutical, Novartis (Grants or Research Support) per Society for Cardiovascular Angiography and Interventions Disclosure Summary


- Robert Dale Blasier, MD
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS)
Little Rock, AK 2008

-Albert Bothe Jr MD
CPT Editorial Board
Danville PA

Executive Vice President and Chief Medical Officer, Geisinger Health Systems, per Geisinger


- Ronald Burd, MD
American Psychiatric Association (APA)
Fargo, ND 2006

-C Scott Collins MD
American Academy of Dermatology
Rochester, MN


- Thomas P Cooper MD
American Urological Association
Everett, WA

General Partner, Aperture Venture Partners LLC, (health care focused venture capital firm) , per Aperture
Member, Board of Directors, Kindred Healthcare, per Kindred
Member, Board of Directors, Hanger Inc (orthotic and prosthetic care), per Hanger
Member, Board of Directors, IPC/ the Hospitalist Company, per IPC



-Anthony Hamm DC
Health Care Professional Advisory Committee
Goldsboro, NC


- David F. Hitzeman, DO
American Osteopathic Association (AOA)
Tulsa, OK 1996


- Charles F. Koopmann, Jr., MD
American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery (AAO-HNS)
Ann Arbor, MI 1996

- Robert Kossmann, MD
Renal Physicians Association (RPA)
Santa Fe, NM 2009

Member of Advanced Renal Technologies Advisory Board, Network 15 Medical Advisory Board, Baxter Home Dialysis Advisory Board, Fresenius Medical Advisory Board per Renal Physicians Association

- Walter Larimore, MD
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)
Colorado Springs, CO 2009

-Alan E Lazaroff MD
American Geriatrics Society
Denver, CO


- J. Leonard Lichtenfeld, MD
American College of Physicians (ACP)
Atlanta, GA 1994

Member, Physician Advisory Board, Aetna per Aetna 
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, American Cancer Society, per ACS

- Scott Manaker, MD, PhD
Practice Expense Subcommittee
Philadelphia, PA 2010

Consultant to Pfizer and Johnson and Johnson. Owns stock in Neose Technologies, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Rohm and Haas per Chest

-William J Mangold Jr MD
American Medical Association
Tuscon, AZ

Vice President, Board Developer Inc (health care management consulting firm), per Board Developer
Senior Advisor, ADVI (health care management consulting firm), per ADVI
Member, Board of Directors, Sante (post-acute health care company), per Sante


-Geraldine B McGinty MD
American College of Radiology,
New York, NY


- Gregory Przybylski, MD
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS)
Edison, NJ 2001

Stock Ownership: United Healthcare (300 shares); Scientific Advisory Board: United Health Group (B, Spine Advisory Board) per NASS meeting

- Marc Raphaelson, MD
American Academy of Neurology (AAN)
Leesburg, VA 2009

personal compensation for activities with Jazz Pharmaceuticals and Medtronics as a speakers bureau member or consultant per AAN

- Sandra Reed, MD
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
Thomasville, GA 2009


GlaxoSmithKline Consulting, $1750 in 2009, $1500 in 2010 per ProPublica Dollars for Docs search through here

David H Regan MD
American Society of Clinical Oncology
Portland, OH

Payment from Cephalon in 2009 for $2200, per ProPublica search 



-Chad A Rubin MD
American College of Surgery
Columbia, SC


-Joseph R Schlecht
Pimrary Care Seat
Jenks, OK 


- Peter Smith, MD
Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS)
Durham, NC 2006

Eli Lilly, Consulting, $1500 in 2009, $1990 in 2010 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Advisor or consultant to Bayer per Medscape

-Samuel D Smith MD
American Pediatric Surgical Association
Little Rock, AK


-Stanley Stead MD
American Society of Anesthesiologist
Encino, CA


J Allan Tucker MD
College of American Pathologists
Mobile, AL


- James Waldorf, MD
American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS)
Jacksonville, FL 2008

- George Williams, MD
American Academy of Ophthalmology (AAO)
Royal Oak, MI 2009

Advisory Team, RetroSense Therapeutics
Shareholder and consultant for ThromboGenics Ltd. and holds intellectual property on the use of plasmin per Review of Opthamology
Alcon Laboratories, consultant, lecturer; Allergan, consultant, lecturer; Macusight, consultant, equity owner; Neurotech, consultant; Nu-Vue Technologies, equity owner, patent/ royalties; OMIC- Ophthalmic Mutual Insurance Company, employee; Optimedica, consultant, equity owner; Thrombogenics, consultant, equity owner per AAO meeting

Pfizer, “Professional Advising,” $5534 in 2009 per Pro Publica Dollars for Docs search through here
Member, Medical and Scientific Committee, Pixium Vision Inc, per Pixium 
Member, Board of Directors, Macusight Inc, per BusinessWeek.  


Summary 

The membership of the RUC continues to have a considerable number of apparent financial conflicts of interest.  By my count, in 2014, nearly half, 15/31 members had such conflicts.

Again, most of the conflicts were financial ties such as part-time paid consulting relationships, paid speaking engagements, and memberships on advisory boards involving drug, device, biotechnology and occasionally health insurance companies, or personal stock holdings in such companies.  A number of members who had such ties known in 2011 have several more such ties in 2014. 

In 2014, new kinds of conflicts of interest that appear even more intense have appeared.  Several members are now known to also be members of the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations, including biotechnology, device, health care provider, and health care management services companies. 

We have been writing about the severe conflicts of interest presented by service on the boards of  health care corporationa.  In 2006 we first discussed a newly discovered species of conflict of interest in health care, in which leaders of medical or health care organizations were simultaneously serving on boards of directors of health care corporations.
 
We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive.  It ostensibly requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]  Of course, after the global financial collapse of 2008 made us sadder and a little wiser, we realized that many board members actually seem to have unyielding loyalty to their cronies among top management.  However, in any case, the stated or actual interests of a member of the board of a health care corporation, like a pharmaceutical company or medical device company, could be very different and at odds with the mission of an academic medical institution or a non-profit ostensibly dedicated to improving health care quality, like in this case, the RUC of the American Medical Association.

Also, one new RUC member is apparently a top executive of a health care management services company, and another new RUC member is apparently a general partner of a health care venture capital firm. Again, such leadership roles create responsibilities that could be very much at odds with a leadership role in a very influential committee run by a physicians' society.

Finally, two new members are top executives of large, although admittedly non-profit hospital systems.  One member is now known to be a full-time executive of a large, non-profit disease specific patient advocacy organization.  While hospital systems' interests may overlap those of physicians, modern  hospital systems are often run by generic managers who put revenues ahead of all else.  Furthermore, in pursuit of revenues, hospital system leaders may be very interested in increasing utilization of the most lucrative, usually high-technology and procedural services, and thus in structuring physicians' incentives accordingly.  While disease-specific patient advocacy goups' interests may also overlap those of doctors, they may tend to be more interested in their diseases than all others.

By the way, note that AMA and RUC leaders often defend the RUC as purely physician run organization, e.g., the testimony of the RUC leader, Dr Barbara Levy, at a Senate hearing, per MedPage Today in 2011, (see this post),

The RUC is an independent group of physicians from many specialties, including primary care, who use their expertise on caring for Medicare patients to provide input to CMS [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services],' RUC chair Barbara Levy, MD, said in a statement. 

But now it is clear that the RUC includes corporate executives and board members, and top hospital system executives.  These people may have MDs, but their loyalties appear divided.

We have questioned the tremendously influential role the RUC plays in setting the incentives that drive the US health care system.  Now it appears that the RUC membership remains conflicted.  Almost half work part-time for drug, device, biotechnology, and health insurance companies.  Several are in the top leadership and/or governance of various health care corporations and large non-profit hospital systems.  Thus it seems that the incentives that drive are health care system are under the influence of people who may put corporate or organizational revenue ahead of patients' and the public's health.

As we wrote before, the prevalence of conflicts of interest among RUC members highlight the need for a more accountable, transparent and honest system to manage how the government pays physicians, and a need for more transparency and accountability in the relationship among the government, health care insurance, and physicians.

As a first step, I submit that all RUC members who are executives or board members of for-profit health care corporations or large hospital systems step down from the RUC, or resign these positions.

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

Now Politico Tries RUC Raking

It has been a year since we wrote about the RUC, the American Medical Association's Relative Value System Update Committee.  There is only one thing new since then.  Politico just made another attempt to shed some light on this obscure committee and its outsize effect on health care. 

To summarize the events so far, all I need to do is cut and paste from our last post on the topic, from July, 2013...

In 2007, readers of the Annals of Internal Medicine could read part of the solution to a great medical mystery.(1)  For years, health care costs in the US had been levitating faster than inflation, without producing any noticeable positive effect on patients.  Many possible reasons were proposed, but as the problem continued to worsen, none were proven.

Prices are High Because They are Fixed That Way

The article in the Annals, however, proposed one conceptually simple answer.

The prices of most physicians' services, at least most of those that involved procedures or operations for Medicare patients, were high because the US government set them that way. Although the notion that prices were high because they were fixed to be so high was simple, how the fixing was done, and how the fixing affected the rest of the health system was complex, mind numbingly complex.

Perhaps because of the complexity of its implementation, the simplicity of the concept has not seemingly reached the consciousness of most American health care professionals or policy makers, despite the publication of several scholarly articles on the subject, efforts by humble bloggers such as yours truly, a major journalistic expose in the Wall Street Journal in 2010,  another major expose in Washington Monthly in 2013, and congressional hearings in 2013.  The lack of much public discussion of this issue despite its importance and the above attempts to start discussion seemed to be a prime example of what we have called the anechoic effect, that important causes of health care dysfunction whose discussion would discomfit those who are currently personally profiting from the current system rarely produce many public echoes.  (For a review of what is known to date about how the offputtingly named Resource Based Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) works, and previous attempts to makes it central role in fixing what US physicians are paid public, see the Appendix.)


Politico's Turn


Now an article by Katie Jennings in Politico brings up some of the issues about the RUC that we have dealt with again and again. These included six of seven major points discussed in the Washington Monthly article, and that have been discussed multiple times on Health Care Renewal.  I will list the seven points, with supporting quotes for the first six from the Politico article.  (Our post in 2013 on the Washington Monthly article had supporting quotes for the last point.) 


The RUC is Well Hidden


 And yet even many doctors are not aware of the hidden hand of the AMA-run committee in perpetuating this costly crisis. The panel, with very little transparency or public discussion, continues....
Also

RUC meetings were closed, invitations had to be approved by the AMA, the charter had not been made public and there were no minutes or public documentation of what was said at the meetings. (Last year, under pressure, the RUC announced it would post meeting minutes on the AMA website.)

The RUC Fixes Prices


a secretive committee run by the American Medical Association (AMA) ..., with the assent of the government, has enormous power to determine Medicare prices by assessing the relative value of the services that physicians perform.

The Government Enables the RUC to Fix Prices

the role of the AMA’s secret committee [dates] back to 1992, when the U.S. government sought to overhaul the entire Medicare fee system and decided it didn’t have the right personnel to conduct extensive surveys of physicians. So the federal agency tasked with overseeing the program, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, enlisted the AMA and the committee it had formed to determine what’s known as the relative value of physician work, meaning the amount of time, effort and skill that goes into performing a procedure. Each procedure had a corresponding code in the AMA’s Current Procedural Terminology coding system, which the government had already adopted nearly a decade before, in 1983, as the standard for physician billing and reimbursement for Medicare.

Also,
Above all, the RUC appeared to be dictating solutions to the government. Since 1992, the RUC has submitted more than 7,000 recommendations to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The agency has accepted 87.4 percent of the recommendations, according to a study published in Health Affairs.


The Government Fixed Prices are Endorsed by the Private Sector

Because Medicare fees are the baseline for the rest of the pricing in the health care system, this has had a broad effect,...

The Price Fixing Drives Up Costs and the Use of Services

For decades the committee has ... [set prices] done so in a way that has skewed Medicare fees in favor of expensive specialists over ordinary general practitioners like Fischer, who are the nation’s first line of defense against serious illness. Because Medicare fees are the baseline for the rest of the pricing in the health care system, this has had a broad effect, contributing to a situation where primary care doctors are in general underpaid, underappreciated — and in critically short supply as medical students flock to where the money and opportunity are.


These Incentives Cripple Primary Care

And because the 31-member committee was – and still is — made up of a majority of specialists who typically sought to maximize their own share of the pie (26 of the 31 are appointed by the major national medical associations), it was no surprise who the losers turned out to be. 'The specialists know what the game is,' said Dr. Robert Berenson of the Urban Institute in DC, who was a member of the RUC in the early 1990s. 'The [RUC’s] basic method of relying on a specialty society to give a non-biased appraisal … is fundamentally a flawed concept.' Dr. Grant Rodkey, the first chair of the committee that came to be known as the RUC, described the scene of the inaugural meeting as 'reminiscent of a group of dogs on leash eyeing a platter with a not-too-generous bone,' in a 1997 interview in the Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons.


These Incentives Benefit Big Corporations, not just Medical Specialists


This was the only issue not directly addressed in the 2014 Politico article.  (But see our 2013 post.)


What to Do and What Will Happen?


The Politico article concluded on an optimistic note, suggesting that increased transparency about what Medicare pays physicians might help.

One key moment came in a court ruling this year: For 35 years until last April, all the Medicare billing practices of physicians had been kept private by a court injunction granted to the AMA. But after an appeals court ruled that such information must be made public, the 2012 billing data was released, showing that the top 1 percent of doctors, mostly specialists, accounted for an outsized portion —14 percent — of Medicare billing.

Or perhaps Congress might ride to the rescue,

Today ironically, the renegade primary care doctors see hope on Capitol Hill—and in the Obamacare law that so many on Capitol Hill have demonized. In April, seeking to avoid impending cuts to physician Medicare reimbursements, Congress passed the “Protecting Access to Medicare Act.” The new law expands on a provision already included in the Affordable Care Act that gives the secretary of Health and Human Services greater authority to identify and correct misvalued Current Procedural Terminology codes. Spurred by Congressman McDermott — who told me in an email that he still wants “major changes that make the RUC’s process more transparent” — Congress also commissioned a report from the Comptroller General to study the process by which the RUC provides recommendations to the government on Medicare fees.


And there is even one - one out of very many - health care insurance companies that might finally deviate from the Medicare fee schedule as influenced by the RUC,

Even some medical insurers, like CareFirst in the Washington, D.C. region, have begun to rebel against the old system and to push the savings that might come from paying primary care physicians more. As long as I can remember, family physicians and general internists have been financially at the low end of the totem pole,' even though they’re the ones who perform the critical if unglamorous work of preventing serious illnesses, former CareFirst Chairman Michael Merson told The Washington Post recently.

But there have been only tiny changes in the RUC since the Washington Monthly article last year, and actually since we first wrote about the RUC in 2007.

The AMA, of course, fails to see anything wrong with the RUC.  On the AMA Wire blog appeared an  anonymous but apparently official post that sought to refute most of the the points made in the Politico article.

Well Hidden

The title of the blog post included the phrase "and it's no secret," but as far as I can tell, the AMA post never directly addressed the secrecy issue, especially involving the secrecy of RUC proceedings, whose location on the AMA website is not obvious to me.  I must admit that the list of members of the RUC is no longer secret, but can be found here (with a log-in, but no subscription required, and minus any biographical information, or conflict of interest disclosures).

Price Fixing

The AMA blog post stated

the RUC does not control the Medicare payment system, nor does it set rates for medical services

That is true as far as it goes, but totally ignores how the RUC's determination of the relative values indirectly sets payment rates.

Government's Uncritical Acceptance of the RUC's Recommendations

The AMA blog post included,

The RUC's recommendations are thoroughly reviewed by government officials who have the final say.

That failed to acknowledge how rarely the government officials have altered the RUC's findings in the past.

Effects on Primary Care

The AMA blog post stated

The RUC values all physicians’ cognitive work and role tackling the growing number of Americans with long-term health problems that need continuous care. The committee’s work reflects the continued importance of services that all doctors—including primary care physicians—perform.

Again, this ignores the small representation of primary care physicians, and of physicians who perform only cognitive, as opposed to procedural services on the RUC, and the data, starting with the Annals of Internal Medicine article from 2007, that suggests the RUC's updates favor procedural services.

Presumably as long as the leadership of the AMA sees no problems with the RUC, not much is likely to change.    

Summary

So since 1992, the RUC has had an outsize role controlling what Medicare pays physicians, and hence physicians' pay in general.  Over this time, the playing field has become increasingly tilted in favor of procedural services and away from cognitive services, especially primary care.  The result is that the US has the most expensive health care system in the world, but hardly the best health care or health care results in the world. 

Economists have beaten us over the head with idea that incentives matter.  The RUC seems to embody a corporatist approach to fixing prices for medical services to create perverse incentives for physicians to do more procedures, and do less conversing with and examining patients, examining the best clinical research evidence about their problems, and rigorously thinking about how best to help them.  More procedures at higher prices helps physicians who do procedures.  It may help even more the corporations that provide the devices and drugs whose use is necessitated by such procedures, and the hospitals who can charge a lot of money as sites for performance of procedures.  It may even help insurance companies by driving ever more money through the health care system, and thus allow rationalization for higher administrative expenses as a function of overall money flow.

Yet incentives favoring procedures over all else may lead to worse outcomes for patients, and more costs to patients and society.  If we do not figure out how to make incentives given to physicians more rational and fair, expect health care costs to continue to rise, while access and quality continue to suffer.

Since we started writing about the RUC in 2007,  there have been some small changes in the RUC.  It has slightly more primary care representation, and its membership is no longer secret.  That is, however, about it.

As I wrote last time, hopefully the Politico article, added to all the other attempts to shine light on the RUC, will succeed in increasing awareness of the RUC and its essential role in making the US health care system increasingly unworkable.  Of course, such awareness may disturb the many people who are making so much money within the current system.  But if we do nothing about the RUC, and about the ever expanding bubble of health care costs, that bubble will surely burst, and the results for patients' and the public's health will be devastating.


ADDENDUM (28 August, 2014) - This post was re-posted on the Naked Capitalism blog, and on the NBCH Newsletter blog

APPENDIX - Background on the RUC

 We have frequently posted, first here in 2007, and more recently here,  here, here, and here, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC.

Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients' values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.

 

As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments.
 

However, the identities of RUC members were opaque for a long time, and the proceedings of the group are secret.  As Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."
 

In fact, the fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (here, here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.
 

That changed in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, here in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and here from the Center for Public Integrity (also reprinted by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.
 

In 2011, after the "Replace the RUC" movement generated some more interest about this secretive group, and its complicated but obscure role in the health care system, the current RUC membership was finally revealed.  It was relatively easy for me to determine that many of the members had conflicts of interest (beyond their specialty or sub-specialty identity and their role in medical societies that might have institutional conflicts of interest, and leaders with conflicts of interest).  
 

Then that year a lawsuit was filed by a number of primary care physicians that contended that the RUC was functioning illegally as a de facto US government advisory panel.  It appeared that things might change.  However, it was not to be.  A judge dismissed the lawsuit in 2012, based on his contention that the law that set up the RBRVS system prevented any challenges through the legal system to the mechanism used to set payment rates.  The ruling did not address the legality of the relationship between the RUC and the federal government.  The eery quiet then resumed, only punctuated briefly in early 2013, when a Senate committee held hearings with no obvious effect.      

References
1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link here.)