Incoming President of IOM Outed as Member of Boards of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Medtronic and Pepsico

We just discussed how the new CEO of the National Quality Forum was revealed to be a member of the board of directors of Premier Inc, and discussed the implications of this apparently intense conflict of interest. 

Now another new leader of an influential non-profit organization dedicated to improving health and health care has also been shown to have major conflicts of interest.

All Hail the New President of the Institute of Medicine

In 2010, we posted about a student protest of the salaries of some top administrators at Duke University, including then Chancellor of Health Affairs Dr Victor Dzau, at a time when the university was undergoing financial difficulties.  We pointed out that Dr Dzau's income was further increased by compensation received as a member of the boards of directors of multiple corporations, and further that serving as a highly paid steward of health care companies like Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Genzyme, and Medtronic appeared to be a major conflict of interest.  .  

Last week Dr Victor Dzau was hailed as the new president of the Institute of Medicine.  The simple version, in Modern Healthcare:

 Duke University Health System President and CEO Dr. Victor Dzau was named president of the Institute of Medicine, succeeding the longtime president, Dr Harvey Fineberg, the National Academy of Sciences announced Wednesday.

Dzau, whose six-year term will begin July 1, has done research in the area of treatment for high blood pressure and congestive heart failure and pioneered the use of gene therapy for vascular disease, the institute said in announcing the selection. Dzau served on the IOM Council from 2008 through 2013, Fineberg said in a statement.

'As a physician-scientist and leader in academic medicine, Victor has consistently demonstrated inspirational leadership, innovative thinking and multifaceted achievement. Now, all of us at the IOM, both members and staff, will benefit more fully from his leadership,' said Fineberg, who has served as president of the institute for 12 years.

Conflicts of Interest Barely Noted

Neither this article, the official Institute of Medicine press release, nor articles in the few media outlets that initially covered this new appointment on 19-20 February, 2014,, including the Boston Globe and the Charlotte News-Observer, noted Dr Dzau's positions on the boards of directors of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, device manufacturer Medtronic, and sugary soft drink maker Pepsico.

However, Forbes blogger Larry Husten, was the first to publicly report these memberships, drawing on our 2010  post  on Dr Dzau's conflicts of interest as Duke Chancellor for Health Affairs.

Then a blog post on Modern Healthcare by Steven Ross Johnson added some more detail,

IOM spokeswoman Jennifer Walsh said in an e-mail that Dzau initiated steps to resign from his corporate board positions before Wednesday's announcement and that he has committed to severing the ties by the time he begins his six-year term in July.

It did not mention why the IOM press release and the initial news stories did not mention Dr Dzau's board memberships nor his intention to resign from them.  The IOM spokeswoman apparently did not discuss why Dr Dzau was going to resign his board memberships now, while he had maintained them as a member of the IOM Council from 2008 to 2013.

Since then, later on 21 February, a single mainstream media article, in Bloomberg, did address Dr Dzau's new job, his corporate board memberships, and his planned resignations, with emphasis on his break from PepsiCo:

The newly appointed president of the Institute of Medicine, which advises government leaders and policymakers on health issues, plans to resign from several corporate boards in advance of taking his new job—including one that might have created a sticky situation.

Among the companies that Victor Dzau will sever ties with is PepsiCo (PEP), according to Jennifer Walsh, a spokeswoman for the IOM. 'Dr. Dzau had already decided to step down from corporate boards before he accepted the position,' she says.

For Dzau, who’s leaving his position as chief executive officer of the Duke University Health System to head up the IOM, the PepsiCo relationship might have been a problem: Several of the company’s products are among those blamed for contributing to the obesity epidemic in the U.S. The Purchase (N.Y.)-based company is best known for its Pepsi soft-drink line and snacks including Fritos and Cheetos.

The IOM, which has identified solving the nation’s weight problem as a top priority, endorsed the idea of a soda tax in a report detailing the 'staggering toll' of obesity. The agency estimates obesity-related illness in the U.S. costs $190 billion a year.

The Bloomberg article mentioned his memberships on the Alnylam and Medtronic boards mainly in passing.

The Rewards of Board Membership


The Modern Healthcare blog post provided a list of recent compensation Dr Dzau received from his board memberships.

According to Pepsico's 2013 proxy statement, Dzau deferred his retainer of $66,667 for the year ending Dec. 29, 2012, in lieu of 944 units of phantom stock, where cash is paid at a future date in an amount equal to the market value of stock shares. Dzau also serves on the boards of Alynylam Pharmaceuticals (he was paid $50,000 and received option awards of $89,000 in 2013) and medical devicemaker Medtronic (PDF) (he was paid $80,000 and received stock awards worth $140,000 in 2013).

It did not mention whether he currently owns any stock, or the equivalent, in any of these companies. 


However, the most recent Alnylam, Medtronic, and PepsiCo proxy statements show Dr Dzau's considerable stock holdings in these companies.

- According to the 2013 Alnylam Pharmaceuticals proxy statement, he currently owns the equivalent of 90,000 shares today worth $8,070,300 at the current price of $89.67.
- According to the 2013 Medtronic proxy statement, he currently owns 9636 stock options and 15,200 deferred stock units for total holdings of 25,156 share equivalents today worth $1,450,495 at a current price of $57.66.
-  According to the 2013 Pepsico proxy statement, Dr Dzau currently owns the equivalent of  36,173 shares of Pepsico stock. today worth $2,830,537 given a current price of $78.25. 

The Bloomberg article provided a somewhat lower estimate of the value his PepsiCo stock holdings based on an otherwise unidentified 2 December, 2013 filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.  It estimated the value of his deferred stock units in Medtronic based on an April, 2013 disclosure, but did not list the stock options which appeared in the July, 2013 proxy statement.  It noted his membership on the Alnylam board but did not mention that he held any shares or the equivalent in Alnylam stock.

I cannot find anything public about what, if anything, Dr Dzau plans to do with these not inconsiderable stock holdings in health care and health related corporations.  

Note that as we posted in 2010, in its last proxy statement before it was acquired by Sanofi, Genzyme declared that Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 75,137shares as of 2009, which in 2010 were worth approximately $5.3 million.  I cannot tell what Dr Dzau did with these stock holdings after the merger.  


Thus while there may be some confusion about this current holdings and their exact value, it seems clear that Dr Dzau has become a multimillionaire by virtue of his holdings of stock or equivalent from the three companies, a drug company, and medical device company, and a company whose products have apparent public health implications, on whose boards he currently sits, and possibly by virtue of his holdings in another drug/ biotechnology company on whose board he previously sat.  .  

The Intensity of the Conflicts

The acuity of the conflicts presented were the President of the IOM to continue sitting on these boards was emphasized by this description of the influence wielded by the IOM written in an article in the Durham (NC) Herald-Sun,

 Under the congressional charter of the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine is recognized as a primary source for independent, scientifically informed analysis and recommendations on health issues.

Even though Dr Dzau will apparently exit his board memberships before he becomes IOM President, the IOM  has been providing such analysis and recommendations under the supervision of a Council member who had fiduciary duties to the stockholders of two pharmaceutical companies a medical device company, and company that makes sugar-laden soft drinks and snack foods.  It will continue to provide such analysis and recommendations under the supervision of a President who became a multimillionaire by virtue of the stock holdings he acquired through his board positions.


In 2006 we first discussed a newly discovered species of conflict of interest in health care, in which leaders of medical or health care organizations were simultaneously serving on boards of directors of health care corporations.  We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive.  It ostensibly requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]  Of course, after the global financial collapse of 2008 made us sadder and a little wiser, we realized that many board members actually seem to have unyielding loyalty to their cronies among top management.  However, in any case, the stated or actual interests of a member of the board of a health care corporation, like a pharmaceutical company or medical device company, could be very different and at odds with the mission of an academic medical institution or a non-profit ostensibly dedicated to improving health care quality.

Also, this case could be aggregated with that of Dr Cassel, the new CEO of the National Quality Forum (and former CEO of the American Board of Internal Medicine) who was found to be a member of the board of directors of Premier Inc, a for-profit hospital group purchasing organization.(see this post).  In my humble opinion, the issue here goes even beyond blatant conflicts of interest.  That top stewards of big for-profit health care corporations could simultaneously be  top leaders of influential non-profit organizations ostensibly dedicated to improving health and health care suggests that increasingly US health care is run by an insular group of insiders whose influence gets ever larger because of their collective power, not necessarily because of their dedication or ability to improvement of health care.  As reported by ProPublica about Dr Cassel's case,

Rosemary Gibson, an author and senior adviser to The Hastings Center, a research group dedicated to bioethics in the public interest, said she wasn’t surprised at Cassel’s outside compensation. So much money permeates decision-making in Washington, she said, that participants have become oblivious.

'The insiders don’t see it,' Gibson said. 'It’s like a fish in water.'

How Would Dr Dzau Respond to Criticisms of the Companies He Directs, and How Would His Responses Reflect on the IOM?

Even if  Dr Dzau were to resign from all three corporate boards, and sells all his stock holdings in the three companies, as previous board member he was responsible for the stewardship of these four companies for years. Therefore it would not be unfair for someone to ask him to address any questionable actions of those companies that affected patients' and the public's health.

For example, as we have discussed here, Medtronic has been involved in a series of recent misadventures, including most recently a settlement between multiple hospitals and the Us Department of Justice of charges that they allowed themselves to be persuaded by executives of Medtronic subsidiary Kyphon to inflate their billings for patients who had a Kyphon device implanted (look here),  and a Senate report that Medtronic manipulated articles in the medical literature to market another of its products (look here).

But the awkward fact is that Dr Dzau, as a board member of Medtronic, can be seen to be a steward of that corporation, and hence responsible for the its overall direction.  Even if he were no longer a board member, he cannot erase his responsibility for Medtronic activities that occurred on his watch.  Thus, Dr Dzau could easily find herself in the uncomfortable situation of having to defend and justify questionable past behavior by Medtronic while simultaneously wearing the hat of President of the IOM.  How that would play out is not obvious.

Summary

To date, the case of Dr Dzau as incoming president of the IOM and current board member of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Medtronic and Pepsico has received little attention, and therefore no ethics expert has gotten a chance to speak up in public about it, as they have about the case of Dr Cassel, the NQF, and Premier Inc.  So I will have to step in.

As I have said before,  Dr Joe Collier said, "people who have conflicts of interest often find giving clear advice (or opinions) particularly difficult."  [Collier J. The price of independence. Br Med J 2006; 332: 1447-9. Link here.]  To reduce further unclear thinking and its consequences, we again urge that academic medical institutions, and non-profit organizations dedicated to improving patient care and public health forthwith begin real reductions of conflicts of interest affecting all those who make clinical or policy decisions.

The IOM ought to consider
-  Immediately disclosing conflicts of interest affecting all its members, staff, and leadership in a very clear and accessible manner
-  Beginning a gradual but complete phase out of such conflicts

Otherwise, we all ought to be concerned that the leadership of medicine and health care is increasingly in the hands of a small group of insiders, interchangeable executives who simultaneously or sequentially lead multiple organizations, and are likely to become more comfortable with the fellow members of this interlocking leadership than with ordinary health care professionals, patients and the public.   

What If the Institute of Medicine Wrote a Report and Nobody Followed it? - the Case of the Standards for Developing Trustworthy Guidelines

For over 20 years, clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) have been touted to improve health care quality and control costs.  Enormous numbers of guidelines have been developed, but with seemingly little impact on health outcomes.  While some of those leading health care organizations have predictably blamed individual practitioners for obstinately ignoring or challenging guidelines, there is increasing evidence that maybe the guidelines themselves are part of the problem.

 An Example of a Guideline that Apparently was Not Trusted

One example Dr Wally Smith and I have taught in our recurring mini-course on why physicians fail to follow guidelines (and otherwise appear not to practice in accord with others' wishes) is that of the guidelines on management of depression in primary care.  Most existing guidelines urge physicians to screen patients for (presumably mild-to-moderate) depression and treat them aggressively, with emphasis on the use of the newer anti-depressants.  These guidelines, in turn, were based on numerous published randomized clinical trials that showed that these drugs were safe and efficacious.  Yet multiple studies showed that physicians failed to follow these guidelines, and various attempts to improve their adherence did little.  So for years the assumption was that physicians at best experienced practical and system barriers to follow these guidelines, and at worst were ill-informed or irrational. 


However, information that came out gradually during the early part of the 21st century suggested that perhaps the problem was within the guidelines, not the health care professionals.  First, documents produced during New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKline about the marketing of one of these drugs (Paxil, paroxetine) suggested that the company had suppressed clinical trial data that reflected poorly on the drug (See Kondro W.  Drug company experts advised staff to withold data about SSRI use in children.  Can Med Assoc J 2004; 170: 783.  Link here.)    These suspicions were later fleshed out  by consideration of documents further disclosed in litigation (e.g., see this post and its links).  Then several studies, most particularly that by Erick Turner and colleagues, showed that numerous trials of new anti-depressants had been suppressed, that is, never published (Turner et al. Selective publication of antidepressant trials and its influence on apparent efficacy. N Engl J Med 2008; 358:252-260.  Link here).  When the results of these trials were added to those that were published, the efficacy of anti-depressants was no longer so clear.  So maybe the guidelines that physicians did not follow were not trustworthy, and should not have been followed in the first place.

Would IOM Standards to Improve Guideline Trustworthiness Help?

So in 2011, the prestigious Institute of Medicine released a report on the development of  better standards to produce more trustworthy guidelines (Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust.  Link here.)  We posted about that report here, but noted that it was receiving little other attention, an example of the anechoic effect. 

A few weeks ago, an article appeared documenting a study meant to assess the the trustworthiness of clinical practice guidelines published soon after the IOM report.  Its title telegraphs the results. ( Kung J, Miller RR, Mackowiak PA. Failure of clinical practice guidelines to meet Institute of Medicine standards: two more decades of little, if any progress.  Arch Intern Med 2012.  Link here.)

Methods and Results

The investigators selected a random sample of 114 individual guidelines available during June, 2011 stratified by 26 clinical topics. The versions of the guidelines used were those archived in the National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC) maintained by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).


The goal of the study was to "examine adherence to the IOM standards" by guidelines published after the standards were published.  Actually, the study only assessed adherence to 18 of the 25 standards espoused by the IOM (because the remaining seven were "too vague and subjective to be analyzed.")

Furthermore, the criteria used to determine if a specific guideline met each of the three items above were rather lax:

In evaluating each guideline summary, care was taken to be as liberal as possible in considering that a standard was met when the individual guideline summary provided any information pertaining to that particular standard.

Nevertheless, using these lax standards to only evaluate adherence to 18/25 guidelines, the authors found that "the overall median number of IOM standards satisfied (out of 18) was 8 (44.4%) ....  Fewer than half of the guidelines surveyed met more than 50% of the IOM standards."

An examination of the details of the study's methods reveals things are even worse than that.

Analyzing the Study's Methods to Find that Things Are Worse Than They Seem

Review of the study's methods show that they provided a very optimistic view of adherence to the IOM standards.  As noted above, the study did not look for adherence to all of the IOM standards.  Moreover, those they did consider were simplified and made less rigorous.  For example, Standard 2 from the IOM on management of conflict of interest (COI) was:

  STANDARD 2
Management of conflict of interest (COI)

2.1
Prior to selection of the Guideline Development Group (GDG), individuals being considered for membership should declare all interests and activities potentially resulting in COI with development group activity, by written disclosure to those convening the GDG.
- Disclosure should reflect all current and planned commercial (including services from which a clinician derives a substantial proportion of income), non-commercial, intellectual, institutional, and patient/public activities pertinent to the potential scope of the CPG.

2.2
Disclosure of COIs within GDG
- All COI of each GDG member should be reported and discussed by the prospective development group prior to the onset of their work.
- Each panel member should explain how their • COI could influence the CPG development process or specific recommendations.

2.3
Divestment
- Members of the GDG should divest themselves of financial investments they or their family members have in, and not participate in marketing activities or advisory boards of, entities whose interests could be affected by CPG recommendations.

2.4
Exclusions
- Whenever possible GDG members should not have COI.
- In some circumstances, a GDG may not be able to perform its work without members who have COIs, such as relevant clinical specialists who receive a substantial portion of their incomes from services pertinent to the CPG.
- Members with COIs should represent not more than a minority of the GDG.
- The chair or co-chairs should not be a person(s) with COI.
- Funders should have no role in CPG development.

However, the study boiled all this down to three items:
-  COIs stated
-  Chair has COI
-  Co-chairperson has COI

Thus the study did not address standards requiring full and complete disclosure (not just some disclosure) of all COIs; consideration of how the COIs might influence the particular guideline; divestment of specific types of conflicts of interest, that is, financial investments, and cessation of participation in marketing activities or advisor boards; minimization of conflicts of all members of the committee; and barring of participation of funders in guideline development.

Even so, the guidelines assessed did a very poor job upholding even these few liberalized standards regarding conflicts of interest.  Of the guidelines assessed, less than half, 46.8% provided ANY disclosure of conflicts of interest.  Those written by sub-specialty societies were particularly opaque in this regard.  Less than one-third, 29.3%, provided any disclosure.  Thus the majority of guidelines assessed were not at all transparent about conflicts of interest affecting the guideline development process.

Furthermore, of the 46.8% of all the guidelines which made any disclosures of conflicts of interest, 71.4% admitted their chair people HAD a conflict of interest.  Thus, only (0.468 * [1 - .714]) = 13.3% provided assurance that they fulfilled the single requirement (from standard 2.4 above) that the chair person did not have a COI.  For the guidelines written by sub-specialty societies, by a similar calculation, only 12.2% provided an assurance that the chair had no COI.  (The proportions providing assurance that the co-chair people had no COI were even lower.)  Thus the vast majority of guidelines did not clearly follow two straight-forward standards for minimizing the effects of conflict of interest, that the guideline committee chair and co-chair should not have any relevant conflicts. 

Given the miserable results concerning even minimal adherence to some of the IOM report's conflict of interest standards, it is likely that almost no published guidelines from 2011 came close to fulfilling the full set of IOM standards.  Despite the best efforts of the IOM, it appears that guideline developers have not progressed at all towards providing trustworthy guidelines. 

Summary

An editorial (Shaneyfelt T. In guidelines we cannot trust.  Arch Intern Med 2012) accompanying the article by Kung and colleagues summarized its results thus:

The same problems that have plagued guideline development continue to plague guideline development; namely, their variable and opaque development methods, their often conflicted and limited panel composition, and their lack of significant external review by stakeholders throughout the development process.   As a result, the trustworthiness of guidelines is limited.

While guidelines may have seemed to be a promising method to improve health care in the early 1990s, they have failed to live up to that promise.  Shaneyfelt was not optimistic they would improve in the future:

I am not optimistic that much will improve.  No one seems interested in curtailing the out-of-control guideline industry.

On the other hand, in my humble opinion, it is not that on one is interested in better guidelines.  It would clearly be in the best interests of patients and the public, and of health care professionals who care about the quality of their practice and the outcomes of their patients to curtail that industry.  The issue is why patients', the public's, and professional's interests were ignored.

Neither Shaneyfelt nor Kung et al discussed why there has been so little attention to patients' and the public's health, and to health care professionalism in all this.  For a quick answer, we do not have to look far on Health Care Renewal. 


In fact, the IOM report on guideline development from 2011 was a serious challenge to the powers that be in health care.  In particular, it challenged the cozy relationships that had grown up among the organizations that undertook guideline development and the health care professionals on guideline panels on one hand and organizations that stand to gain were specific guidelines to favor their products, services, and agendas on the other.  The standards mandated transparency and honesty about conflicts of interest affecting guideline committees and the organizations which assembled them, and if upheld would have greatly reduced these relationships.

Now it turns out that the guideline standards have been honored mainly in the breach.  Of course, these standards, while increasing trustworthiness, would have cost a lot of medical societies considerable commercial funding, and would have cost a lot of health care professionals on guideline panels considerable personal wealth.  These standards would probably also have cost a lot of companies whose products and services were addressed by guidelines to lose revenue.  So it is not surprising that the IOM standards were ignored.  Their implementation would have cost too many people who are financially benefiting from the status quo too much money.  And these people, that is, leaders of professional societies dependent on commercial outside funding, health care professionals and academic used to financial support from commercial interests, and health care corporations are good at making sure their interests are not ignored, even if their interests conflict with those of patients, the public, and well-intentioned health care professionals.  

So, the flouting of the well reasoned IOM guideline standards adds one more reason for patients and the general public to distrust modern health care and all those who "deliver" it, even to distrust well-intentioned health care professionals who have not been able to distinguish themselves from their colleagues who are too happy to help commercial interests while taking commercial money.  If health care professionals want to regain the public's trust, they could do worse than publicly declaring their intention to show that their practice in the future will be guided by trustworthy guidelines based on clinical research evidence and knowledge of biomedical science, drawn up by health care professionals independent of commercial interests.